Bill Totten's Weblog

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

The Threat to the Planet

by Jim Hansen

The New York Review of Books (July 13 2006)


The Weather Makers: How Man Is Changing the Climate and What It Means for Life on Earth
by Tim Flannery (Atlantic Monthly Press, 357 pages, $24.00)

Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change
by Elizabeth Kolbert (Bloomsbury, 210 pages, $22.95)

An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It
by Al Gore (Melcher Media/Rodale, 325 pages, $21.95)

An Inconvenient Truth
a film directed by Davis Guggenheim
_____

Jim Hansen is Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Adjunct Professor of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University's Earth Institute. His opinions are expressed here, he writes, "as personal views under the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution".


1.

Animals are on the run. Plants are migrating too. The Earth's creatures, save for one species, do not have thermostats in their living rooms that they can adjust for an optimum environment. Animals and plants are adapted to specific climate zones, and they can survive only when they are in those zones. Indeed, scientists often define climate zones by the vegetation and animal life that they support. Gardeners and bird watchers are well aware of this, and their handbooks contain maps of the zones in which a tree or flower can survive and the range of each bird species.

Those maps will have to be redrawn. Most people, mainly aware of larger day-to-day fluctuations in the weather, barely notice that climate, the average weather, is changing. In the 1980s I started to use colored dice that I hoped would help people understand global warming at an early stage. Of the six sides of the dice only two sides were red, or hot, representing the probability of having an unusually warm season during the years between 1951 and 1980. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, four sides were red. Just such an increase in the frequency of unusually warm seasons, in fact, has occurred. But most people - who have other things on their minds and can use thermostats - have taken little notice.

Animals have no choice, since their survival is at stake. Recently after appearing on television to discuss climate change, I received an e-mail from a man in northeast Arkansas: "I enjoyed your report on Sixty Minutes and commend your strength. I would like to tell you of an observation I have made. It is the armadillo. I had not seen one of these animals my entire life, until the last ten years. I drive the same forty-mile trip on the same road every day and have slowly watched these critters advance further north every year and they are not stopping. Every year they move several miles."

Armadillos appear to be pretty tough. Their mobility suggests that they have a good chance to keep up with the movement of their climate zone, and to be one of the surviving species. Of course, as they reach the city limits of Saint Louis and Chicago, they may not be welcome. And their ingenuity may be taxed as they seek ways to ford rivers and multiple-lane highways.


Problems are greater for other species, as Tim Flannery, a well-known Australian mammalogist and conservationist, makes clear in The Weather Makers. Ecosystems are based on interdependencies - between, for example, flower and pollinator, hunter and hunted, grazers and plant life - so the less mobile species have an impact on the survival of others. Of course climate fluctuated in the past, yet species adapted and flourished. But now the rate of climate change driven by human activity is reaching a level that dwarfs natural rates of change. And barriers created by human beings, such as urban sprawl and homogeneous agricultural fields, block many migration routes. If climate change is too great, natural barriers, such as coastlines, spell doom for some species.

Studies of more than one thousand species of plants, animals, and insects, including butterfly ranges charted by members of the public, found an average migration rate toward the North and South Poles of about four miles per decade in the second half of the twentieth century. That is not fast enough. During the past thirty years the lines marking the regions in which a given average temperature prevails ("isotherms") have been moving poleward at a rate of about thirty-five miles per decade. That is the size of a county in Iowa. Each decade the range of a given species is moving one row of counties northward.

As long as the total movement of isotherms toward the poles is much smaller than the size of the habitat, or the ranges in which the animals live, the effect on species is limited. But now the movement is inexorably toward the poles and totals more than a hundred miles over the past several decades. If emissions of greenhouse gases continue to increase at the current rate - "business as usual" - then the rate of isotherm movement will double in this century to at least seventy miles per decade. If we continue on this path, a large fraction of the species on Earth, as many as fifty percent or more, may become extinct.

The species most at risk are those in polar climates and the biologically diverse slopes of alpine regions. Polar animals, in effect, will be pushed off the planet. Alpine species will be pushed toward higher altitudes, and toward smaller, rockier areas with thinner air; thus, in effect, they will also be pushed off the planet. A few such species, such as polar bears, no doubt will be "rescued" by human beings, but survival in zoos or managed animal reserves will be small consolation to bears or nature lovers.


In the Earth's history, during periods when average global temperatures increased by as much as ten degrees Fahrenheit, there have been several "mass extinctions", when between fifty and ninety percent of the species on Earth disappeared forever. In each case, life survived and new species developed over hundreds of thousands of years. The most recent of these mass extinctions defines the boundary, 55 million years ago, between the Paleocene and Eocene epochs. The evolutionary turmoil associated with that climate change gave rise to a host of modern mammals, from rodents to primates, which appear in fossil records for the first time in the early Eocene.

If human beings follow a business-as-usual course, continuing to exploit fossil fuel resources without reducing carbon emissions or capturing and sequestering them before they warm the atmosphere, the eventual effects on climate and life may be comparable to those at the time of mass extinctions. Life will survive, but it will do so on a transformed planet. For all foreseeable human generations, it will be a far more desolate world than the one in which civilization developed and flourished during the past several thousand years.


2.

The greatest threat of climate change for human beings, I believe, lies in the potential destabilization of the massive ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica. As with the extinction of species, the disintegration of ice sheets is irreversible for practical purposes. Our children, grandchildren, and many more generations will bear the consequences of choices that we make in the next few years.

The level of the sea throughout the globe is a reflection primarily of changes in the volume of ice sheets and thus of changes of global temperature. When the planet cools, ice sheets grow on continents and the sea level falls. Conversely, when the Earth warms, ice melts and the sea level rises. In Field Notes from a Catastrophe, Elizabeth Kolbert reports on the work of researchers trying to understand the acceleration of melting, and in his new book and film An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore graphically illustrates possible effects of a rising sea level on Florida and other locations.

Ice sheets waxed and waned as the Earth cooled and warmed over the past 500,000 years. During the coldest ice ages, the Earth's average temperature was about ten degrees Fahrenheit colder than today. So much water was locked in the largest ice sheet, more than a mile thick and covering most of Canada and northern parts of the United States, that the sea level was 400 feet lower than today. The warmest interglacial periods were about two degrees Fahrenheit warmer than today and the sea level was as much as sixteen feet higher.

Future rise in the sea level will depend, dramatically, on the increase in greenhouse gases, which will largely determine the amount of global warming. As described in the books under review, sunlight enters the atmosphere and warms the Earth, and then is sent back into space as heat radiation. Greenhouse gases trap this heat in the atmosphere and thereby warm the Earth's surface as we are warmed when blankets are piled on our bed. Carbon dioxide (CO2), produced mainly by burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), is the most important greenhouse gas made by human beings. Methane (CH4), which is "natural gas" that escapes to the atmosphere from coal mines, oil wells, rice paddies, landfills, and animal feedlots, is also an important greenhouse gas. Other significant warming agents are ground-level ozone and black soot, which arise mainly from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels and biofuels.

In order to arrive at an effective policy we can project two different scenarios concerning climate change. In the business-as-usual scenario, annual emissions of carbon dioxide continue to increase at the current rate for at least fifty years, as do other warming agents including methane, ozone, and black soot. In the alternative scenario, carbon dioxide emissions level off this decade, slowly decline for a few decades, and by mid-century decrease rapidly, aided by new technologies.

The business-as-usual scenario yields an increase of about five degrees Fahrenheit of global warming during this century, while the alternative scenario yields an increase of less than two degrees Fahrenheit during the same period. Warming can be predicted accurately based on knowledge of how Earth responded to similar levels of greenhouse gases in the past. (By drilling into glaciers to analyze air bubbles trapped under layers of snow, scientists can measure the levels of each gas in the atmosphere hundreds of thousands of years ago. By comparing the concentrations of different isotopes of oxygen in these air bubbles, they can measure the average temperature of past centuries.) Climate models by themselves yield similar answers. However, the evidence from the Earth's history provides a more precise and sensitive measure, and we know that the real world accurately included the effects of all feedback processes, such as changes of clouds and water vapor, that have an effect on temperature.


How much will sea level rise with five degrees of global warming? Here too, our best information comes from the Earth's history. The last time that the Earth was five degrees warmer was three million years ago, when sea level was about eighty feet higher.

Eighty feet! In that case, the United States would lose most East Coast cities: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Miami; indeed, practically the entire state of Florida would be under water. Fifty million people in the US live below that sea level. Other places would fare worse. China would have 250 million displaced persons. Bangladesh would produce 120 million refugees, practically the entire nation. India would lose the land of 150 million people.

A rise in sea level, necessarily, begins slowly. Massive ice sheets must be softened and weakened before rapid disintegration and melting occurs and the sea level rises. It may require as much as a few centuries to produce most of the long-term response. But the inertia of ice sheets is not our ally against the effects of global warming. The Earth's history reveals cases in which sea level, once ice sheets began to collapse, rose one meter (1.1 yards) every twenty years for centuries. That would be a calamity for hundreds of cities around the world, most of them far larger than New Orleans. Devastation from a rising sea occurs as the result of local storms which can be expected to cause repeated retreats from transitory shorelines and rebuilding away from them.


Satellite images and other data have revealed the initial response of ice sheets to global warming. The area on Greenland in which summer melting of ice took place increased more than fifty percent during the last twenty-five years. Meltwater descends through crevasses to the ice sheet base, where it provides lubrication that increases the movement of the ice sheet and the discharge of giant icebergs into the ocean. The volume of icebergs from Greenland has doubled in the last ten years. Seismic stations reveal a shocking increase in "icequakes" on Greenland, caused by a portion of an ice sheet lurching forward and grinding to a halt. The annual number of these icequakes registering 4.6 or greater on the Richter scale doubled from seven in 1993 to fourteen in the late 1990s; it doubled again by 2005. A satellite that measures minute changes in Earth's gravitational field found the mass of Greenland to have decreased by fifty cubic miles of ice in 2005. West Antarctica's mass decreased by a similar amount.

The effect of this loss of ice on the global sea level is small, so far, but it is accelerating. The likelihood of the sudden collapse of ice sheets increases as global warming continues. For example, wet ice is darker, absorbing more sunlight, which increases the melting rate of the ice. Also, the warming ocean melts the offshore accumulations of ice - "ice shelves" - that form a barrier between the ice sheets and the ocean. As the ice shelves melt, more icebergs are discharged from the ice sheets into the ocean. And as the ice sheet discharges more icebergs into the ocean and loses mass, its surface sinks to a lower level where the temperature is warmer, causing it to melt faster.

The business-as-usual scenario, with five degrees Fahrenheit global warming and ten degrees Fahrenheit at the ice sheets, certainly would cause the disintegration of ice sheets. The only question is when the collapse of these sheets would begin. The business-as-usual scenario, which could lead to an eventual sea level rise of eighty feet, with twenty feet or more per century, could produce global chaos, leaving fewer resources with which to mitigate the change in climate. The alternative scenario, with global warming under two degrees Fahrenheit, still produces a significant rise in the sea level, but its slower rate, probably less than a few feet per century, would allow time to develop strategies that would adapt to, and mitigate, the rise in the sea level.


3.

Both the Department of Energy and some fossil fuel companies insist that continued growth of fossil fuel use and of carbon dioxide emissions are facts that cannot be altered to any great extent. Their prophecies become self-fulfilling, with the help of government subsidies and intensive efforts by special interest groups to prevent the public from becoming well-informed.

In reality, an alternative scenario is possible and makes sense for other reasons, especially in the US, which has become an importer of energy, hemorrhaging wealth to foreign nations in order to pay for it. In response to oil shortages and price rises in the 1970s, the US slowed its growth in energy use mainly by requiring an increase from thirteen to twenty-four miles per gallon in the standard of auto efficiency. Economic growth was decoupled from growth in the use of fossil fuels and the gains in efficiency were felt worldwide. Global growth of carbon dioxide emissions slowed from more than four percent each year to between one and two percent growth each year.

This slower growth rate in fossil fuel use was maintained despite lower energy prices. The US is still only half as efficient in its use of energy as Western Europe, that is, the US emits twice as much carbon dioxide to produce a unit of GNP, partly because Europe encourages efficiency by fossil fuel taxes. China and India, using older technologies, are less energy-efficient than the US and have a higher rate of carbon dioxide emissions.


Available technologies would allow great improvement of energy efficiency, even in Europe. Economists agree that the potential could be achieved most effectively by a tax on carbon emissions, although strong political leadership would be needed to persuasively explain the case for such a tax to the public. The tax could be revenue-neutral, that is, it could also provide for tax credits or tax decreases for the public generally, leaving government revenue unchanged; and it should be introduced gradually. The consumer who makes a special effort to save energy could gain, benefiting from the tax credit or decrease while buying less fuel; the well-to-do consumer who insisted on having three Hummers would pay for his own excesses.

Achieving a decline in carbon dioxide emissions faces two major obstacles: the huge number of vehicles that are inefficient in their use of fuel and the continuing carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. Auto makers oppose efficiency standards and prominently advertise their heaviest and most powerful vehicles, which yield the greatest short-term profits. Coal companies want new coal-fired power plants to be built soon, thus assuring long-term profits.

The California legislature has passed a regulation requiring a thirty percent reduction in automobile greenhouse gas emissions by 2016. If adopted nationwide, this regulation would save more than $150 billion annually in oil imports. In thirty-five years it would save seven times the amount of oil estimated by the US Geological Services to exist in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. By fighting it in court, automakers and the Bush administration have stymied the California law, which many other states stand ready to adopt. Further reductions of emissions would be possible by means of technologies now being developed. For example, new hybrid cars with larger batteries and the ability to plug into wall outlets will soon be available; and cars whose bodies are made of a lightweight carbon composite would get better mileage.

If power plants are to achieve the goals of the alternative scenario, construction of new coal-fired power plants should be delayed until the technology needed to capture and sequester their carbon dioxide emissions is available. In the interim, new electricity requirements should be met by the use of renewable energies such as wind power as well as by nuclear power and other sources that do not produce carbon dioxide. Much could be done to limit emissions by improving the standards of fuel efficiency in buildings, lighting, and appliances. Such improvements are entirely possible, but strong leadership would be required to bring them about. The most effective action, as I have indicated, would be a slowly increasing carbon tax, which could be revenue-neutral or would cover a portion of the costs of mitigating climate change.


The alternative scenario I have been referring to has been designed to be consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, that is, with a world in which emissions from developed countries would decrease slowly early in this century and the developing countries would get help to adopt "clean" energy technologies that would limit the growth of their emissions. Delays in that approach - especially US refusal both to participate in Kyoto and to improve vehicle and power plant efficiencies - and the rapid growth in the use of dirty technologies have resulted in an increase of two percent per year in global carbon dioxide emissions during the past ten years. If such growth continues for another decade, emissions in 2015 will be 35 percent greater than they were in 2000, making it impractical to achieve results close to the alternative scenario.

The situation is critical, because of the clear difference between the two scenarios I have projected. Further global warming can be kept within limits (under two degrees Fahrenheit) only by means of simultaneous slowdown of carbon dioxide emissions and absolute reduction of the principal non-CO2 agents of global warming, particularly emissions of methane gas. Such methane emissions are not only the second-largest human contribution to climate change but also the main cause of an increase in ozone - the third-largest human-produced greenhouse gas - in the troposphere, the lowest part of the Earth's atmosphere. Practical methods can be used to reduce human sources of methane emission, for example, at coal mines, landfills, and waste management facilities. However, the question is whether these reductions will be overwhelmed by the release of frozen methane hydrates - the ice-like crystals in which large deposits of methane are trapped - if permafrost melts.

If both the slowdown in carbon dioxide emissions and reductions in non-CO2 emissions called for by the alternative scenario are achieved, release of "frozen methane" should be moderate, judging from prior interglacial periods that were warmer than today by one or two degrees Fahrenheit. But if carbon dioxide emissions are not limited and further warming reaches three or four degrees Fahrenheit, all bets are off. Indeed, there is evidence that greater warming could release substantial amounts of methane in the Arctic. Much of the ten-degree Fahrenheit global warming that caused mass extinctions, such as the one at the Paleocene-Eocene boundary, appears to have been caused by release of "frozen methane". Those releases of methane may have taken place over centuries or millennia, but release of even a significant fraction of the methane during this century could accelerate global warming, preventing achievement of the alternative scenario and possibly causing ice sheet disintegration and further long-term methane release that are out of our control.

Any responsible assessment of environmental impact must conclude that further global warming exceeding two degrees Fahrenheit will be dangerous. Yet because of the global warming already bound to take place as a result of the continuing long-term effects of greenhouse gases and the energy systems now in use, the two-degree Fahrenheit limit will be exceeded unless a change in direction can begin during the current decade. Unless this fact is widely communicated, and decision-makers are responsive, it will soon be impossible to avoid climate change with far-ranging undesirable consequences. We have reached a critical tipping point.


4.

The public can act as our planet's keeper, as has been shown in the past. The first human-made atmospheric crisis emerged in 1974, when the chemists Sherry Rowland and Mario Molina reported that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) might destroy the stratospheric ozone layer that protects animal and plant life from the sun's harmful ultraviolet rays. How narrowly we escaped disaster was not realized until years later.

CFC appeared to be a marvelous inert chemical, one so useful as an aerosol propellant, fire suppressor, and refrigerant fluid that CFC production increased ten percent per year for decades. If this business-as-usual growth of CFCs had continued just one more decade, the stratospheric ozone layer would have been severely depleted over the entire planet and CFCs themselves would have caused a larger greenhouse effect than carbon dioxide.

Instead, the press and television reported Rowland and Molina's warning widely. The public, responding to the warnings of environmental groups, boycotted frivolous use of CFCs as propellants for hair spray and deodorant, and chose non-CFC products instead. The annual growth of CFC usage plummeted immediately from ten percent to zero. Thus no new facilities to produce CFCs were built. The principal CFC manufacturer, after first questioning the scientific evidence, developed alternative chemicals. When the use of CFCs for refrigeration began to increase and a voluntary phaseout of CFCs for that purpose proved ineffective, the US and European governments took the lead in negotiating the Montreal Protocol to control the production of CFCs. Developing countries were allowed to increase the use of CFCs for a decade and they were given financial assistance to construct alternative chemical plants. The result is that the use of CFCs is now decreasing, the ozone layer was damaged but not destroyed, and it will soon be recovering.


Why are the same scientists and political forces that succeeded in controlling the threat to the ozone layer now failing miserably to deal with the global warming crisis? Though we depend on fossil fuels far more than we ever did on CFCs, there is plenty of blame to go around. Scientists present the facts about climate change clinically, failing to stress that business-as-usual will transform the planet. The press and television, despite an overwhelming scientific consensus concerning global warming, give equal time to fringe "contrarians" supported by the fossil fuel industry. Special interest groups mount effective disinformation campaigns to sow doubt about the reality of global warming. The government appears to be strongly influenced by special interests, or otherwise confused and distracted, and it has failed to provide leadership. The public is understandably confused or uninterested.

I used to spread the blame uniformly until, when I was about to appear on public television, the producer informed me that the program "must" also include a "contrarian" who would take issue with claims of global warming. Presenting such a view, he told me, was a common practice in commercial television as well as radio and newspapers. Supporters of public TV or advertisers, with their own special interests, require "balance" as a price for their continued financial support. Gore's book reveals that while more than half of the recent newspaper articles on climate change have given equal weight to such contrarian views, virtually none of the scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals have questioned the consensus that emissions from human activities cause global warming. As a result, even when the scientific evidence is clear, technical nit-picking by contrarians leaves the public with the false impression that there is still great scientific uncertainty about the reality and causes of climate change.

The executive and legislative branches of the US government seek excuses to justify their inaction. The President, despite conclusive reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National Academy of Sciences, welcomes contrary advice from Michael Crichton, a science fiction writer. Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, describes global warming as "the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people" and has used aggressive tactics, including a lawsuit to suppress a federally funded report on climate change, to threaten and intimidate scientists.

Policies favoring the short-term profits of energy companies and other special interests are cast by many politicians as being in the best economic interests of the country. They take no account of the mounting costs of environmental damage and of the future costs of maintaining the supply of fossil fuels. Leaders with a long-term vision would place greater value on developing more efficient energy technology and sources of clean energy. Rather than subsidizing fossil fuels, the government should provide incentives for fossil-fuel companies to develop other kinds of energy.


Who will pay for the tragic effects of a warming climate? Not the political leaders and business executives I have mentioned. If we pass the crucial point and tragedies caused by climate change begin to unfold, history will judge harshly the scientists, reporters, special interests, and politicians who failed to protect the planet. But our children will pay the consequences.

The US has heavy legal and moral responsibilities for what is now happening. Of all the carbon dioxide emissions produced from fossil fuels so far, we are responsible for almost thirty percent, an amount much larger than that of the next-closest countries, China and Russia, each less than eight percent. Yet our responsibility and liability may run higher than those numbers suggest. The US cannot validly claim to be ignorant of the consequences. When nations must abandon large parts of their land because of rising seas, what will our liability be? And will our children, as adults in the world, carry a burden of guilt, as Germans carried after World War II, however unfair inherited blame may be?

The responsibility of the US goes beyond its disproportionate share of the world's emissions. By refusing to participate in the Kyoto Protocol, we delayed its implementation and weakened its effectiveness, thus undermining the attempt of the international community to slow down the emissions of developed countries in a way consistent with the alternative scenario. If the US had accepted the Kyoto Protocol, it would have been possible to reduce the growing emissions of China and India through the Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, by which the developed countries could offset their own continuing emissions by investing in projects to reduce emissions in the developing countries. This would have eased the way to later full participation by China and India, as occurred with the Montreal Protocol. The US was right to object to quotas in the Kyoto Protocol that were unfair to the US; but an appropriate response would have been to negotiate revised quotas, since US political and technology leadership are essential for dealing with climate change.

It is not too late. The US hesitated to enter other conflicts in which the future was at stake. But enter we did, earning gratitude in the end, not condemnation. Such an outcome is still feasible in the case of global warming, but just barely.

As explained above, we have at most ten years - not ten years to decide upon action, but ten years to alter fundamentally the trajectory of global greenhouse emissions. Our previous decade of inaction has made the task more difficult, since emissions in the developing world are accelerating. To achieve the alternative scenario will require prompt gains in energy efficiencies so that the supply of conventional fossil fuels can be sustained until advanced technologies can be developed. If instead we follow an energy-intensive path of squeezing liquid fuels from tar sands, shale oil, and heavy oil, and do so without capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide emissions, climate disasters will become unavoidable.


5.

When I recently met Larry King, he said, "Nobody cares about fifty years from now". Maybe so. But climate change is already evident. And if we stay on the business-as-usual course, disastrous effects are no further from us than we are from the Elvis era. Is it possible for a single book on global warming to convince the public, as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, 1962), did for the dangers of DDT? Bill McKibben's excellent book The End of Nature (Anchor Books, 1997) is usually acknowledged as having been the most effective so far, but perhaps what is needed is a range of books dealing with different aspects of the global warming story.

Elizabeth Kolbert's Field Notes, based on a series of articles she wrote for The New Yorker, is illuminating and sobering, a good book to start with. The reader is introduced to some of the world's leading climate researchers who explain the dangers in reasonably nontechnical language but without sacrificing scientific accuracy. The book includes fascinating accounts of how climate changes affected the planet in the past, and how such changes are occurring in different parts of the world right now. If Field Notes leaves the reader yearning for more experience in the field, I suggest Thin Ice by Mark Bowen, which captures the heroic work of Lonnie Thompson in extracting unique information on climate change from some of the most forbidding and spectacular places on the planet. {1}

Tim Flannery's The Weather Makers puts needed emphasis on the effects of human-made climate change on other life on the planet. Flannery is a remarkable scientist, having discovered and described dozens of mammals in New Guinea, yet he writes for a general audience with passion and clarity. He considers changes in climate that correspond to what I have defined as the business-as-usual and alternative scenarios. Flannery estimates that when we take account of other stresses on species imposed by human beings, the alternative scenario will lead to the eventual extinction of twenty percent of today's species, while continuing with business-as-usual will cause sixty percent to become extinct. Some colleagues will object that he extrapolates from meager data, but estimates are needed and Flannery is as qualified as anyone to make them. Fossil records of mass extinctions support Flannery's shocking estimate of the potential for climate change to extinguish life.

Flannery concludes, as I have, that we have only a short time to address global warming before it runs out of control. However, his call for people to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, while appropriate, oversimplifies and diverts attention from the essential requirement: government leadership. Without such leadership and comprehensive economic policies, conservation of energy by individuals merely reduces demands for fuel, thus lowering prices and ultimately promoting the wasteful use of energy. I was glad to see that in a recent article in these pages, he wrote that an effective fossil energy policy should include a tax on carbon emissions. {2}

A good energy policy, economists agree, is not difficult to define. Fuel taxes should encourage conservation, but with rebates to taxpayers so that the government revenue from the tax does not increase. The taxpayer can use his rebate to fill his gas-guzzler if he likes, but most people will eventually reduce their use of fuel in order to save money, and will spend the rebate on something else. With slow and continual increases of fuel cost, energy consumption will decline. The economy will not be harmed. Indeed, it will be improved since the trade deficit will be reduced; so will the need to protect US access to energy abroad by means of diplomatic and military action. US manufacturers would be forced to emphasize energy efficiency in order to make their products competitive internationally. Our automakers need not go bankrupt.

Would this approach result in fewer ultraheavy SUVs on the road? Probably. Would it slow the trend toward bigger houses with higher ceilings? Possibly. But experts say that because technology has sufficient potential to become more efficient, our quality of life need not decline. In order for this to happen, the price of energy should reflect its true cost to society.


Do we have politicians with the courage to explain to the public what is needed? Or may it be that such people are not electable, in view of the obstacles presented by television, campaign financing, and the opposition of energy companies and other special interests? That brings me to Al Gore's book and movie of the same name: An Inconvenient Truth. Both are unconventional, based on a "slide show" that Gore has given more than one thousand times. They are filled with pictures - stunning illustrations, maps, graphs, brief explanations, and stories about people who have important parts in the global warming story or in Al Gore's life. The movie seems to me powerful and the book complements it, adding useful explanations. It is hard to predict how this unusual presentation will be received by the public; but Gore has put together a coherent account of a complex topic that Americans desperately need to understand. The story is scientifically accurate and yet should be understandable to the public, a public that is less and less drawn to science.

The reader might assume that I have long been close to Gore, since I testified before his Senate committee in 1989 and participated in scientific "roundtable" discussions in his Senate office. In fact, Gore was displeased when I declined to provide him with images of increasing drought generated by a computer model of climate change. (I didn't trust the model's estimates of precipitation.) After Clinton and Gore were elected, I declined a suggestion from the White House to write a rebuttal to a New York Times Op-Ed article that played down global warming and criticized the Vice President. I did not hear from Gore for more than a decade, until January of this year, when he asked me to critically assess his slide show. When we met, he said that he "wanted to apologize", but, without letting him explain what he was apologizing for, I said, "Your insight was better than mine".

Indeed, Gore was prescient. For decades he has maintained that the Earth was teetering in the balance, even when doing so subjected him to ridicule from other politicians and cost him votes. By telling the story of climate change with striking clarity in both his book and movie, Al Gore may have done for global warming what Silent Spring did for pesticides. He will be attacked, but the public will have the information needed to distinguish our long-term well-being from short-term special interests.

An Inconvenient Truth is about Gore himself as well as global warming. It shows the man that I met in the 1980s at scientific roundtable discussions, passionate and knowledgeable, true to the message he has delivered for years. It makes one wonder whether the American public has not been deceived by the distorted images of him that have been presented by the press and television. Perhaps the country came close to having the leadership it needed to deal with a grave threat to the planet, but did not realize it.


Notes

{1} Henry Holt, 2005. See the review by Bill McKibben, "The Coming Meltdown", The New York Review (January 12 2006).

{2} See "The Ominous New Pact", The New York Review (February 23 2006).


Copyright (c) 1963-2007 NYREV, Inc. All rights reserved.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19131


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

The US psychological torture system is finally on trial

America has deliberately driven hundreds, perhaps thousands, of prisoners insane. Now it is being held to account in a Miami court

by Naomi Klein

Guardian (February 23 2007)


Something remarkable is going on in a Miami courtroom. The cruel methods US interrogators have used since September 11 to "break" prisoners are finally being put on trial. This was not supposed to happen. The Bush administration's plan was to put Jose' Padilla on trial for allegedly being part of a network linked to international terrorists. But Padilla's lawyers are arguing that he is not fit to stand trial because he has been driven insane by the government.

Arrested in May 2002 at Chicago's O'Hare airport, Padilla, a Brooklyn-born former gang member, was classified as an "enemy combatant" and taken to a navy prison in Charleston, South Carolina. He was kept in a cell 9 feet by 7 feet, with no natural light, no clock and no calendar. Whenever Padilla left the cell, he was shackled and suited in heavy goggles and headphones. Padilla was kept under these conditions for 1,307 days. He was forbidden contact with anyone but his interrogators, who punctured the extreme sensory deprivation with sensory overload, blasting him with harsh lights and pounding sounds. Padilla also says he was injected with a "truth serum", a substance his lawyers believe was LSD or PCP.

According to his lawyers and two mental health specialists who examined him, Padilla has been so shattered that he lacks the ability to assist in his own defence. He is convinced that his lawyers are "part of a continuing interrogation program" and sees his captors as protectors. In order to prove that "the extended torture visited upon Mr Padilla has left him damaged", his lawyers want to tell the court what happened during those years in the navy brig. The prosecution strenuously objects, maintaining that "Padilla is competent" and that his treatment is irrelevant.

The US district judge Marcia Cooke disagrees. "It's not like Mr Padilla was living in a box. He was at a place. Things happened to him at that place." The judge has ordered several prison employees to testify on Padilla's mental state at the hearings, which began yesterday. They will be asked how a man who is alleged to have engaged in elaborate anti-government plots now acts, in the words of brig staff, "like a piece of furniture".

It's difficult to overstate the significance of these hearings. The techniques used to break Padilla have been standard operating procedure at Guanta'namo Bay since the first prisoners arrived five years ago. They wore blackout goggles and sound-blocking headphones and were placed in extended isolation, interrupted by strobe lights and heavy metal music. These same practices have been documented in dozens of cases of "extraordinary rendition" carried out by the CIA, as well as in prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many have suffered the same symptoms as Padilla. According to James Yee, a former army Muslim chaplain at Guanta'namo, there is an entire section of the prison called Delta Block for detainees who have been reduced to a delusional state. "They would respond to me in a childlike voice, talking complete nonsense. Many of them would loudly sing childish songs, repeating the song over and over." All the inmates of Delta Block were on 24-hour suicide watch.

Human Rights Watch has exposed a US-run detention facility near Kabul known as the "prison of darkness" - tiny pitch-black cells, strange blaring sounds. "Plenty lost their minds," one former inmate recalled. "I could hear people knocking their heads against the walls and the doors."

These standard mind-breaking techniques have never faced scrutiny in an American court because the prisoners in the jails are foreigners and have been stripped of the right of habeas corpus - a denial that, scandalously, was just upheld by a federal appeals court in Washington DC. There is only one reason Padilla's case is different - he is a US citizen. The administration did not originally intend to bring Padilla to trial, but when his status as an enemy combatant faced a supreme court challenge, the administration abruptly changed course, charging Padilla and transferring him to civilian custody. That makes Padilla's case unique - he is the only victim of the post-9/11 legal netherworld to face an ordinary US trial.

Now that Padilla's mental state is the central issue in the case, the government prosecutors are presented with a problem. The CIA and the military have known since the early 1960s that extreme sensory deprivation and sensory overload cause personality disintegration - that's the whole point. "The deprivation of stimuli induces regression by depriving the subject's mind of contact with an outer world and thus forcing it in upon itself. At the same time, the calculated provision of stimuli during interrogation tends to make the regressed subject view the interrogator as a father-figure." That comes from Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation, a declassified 1963 CIA manual for interrogating "resistant sources".

The manual was based on the findings of the agency's notorious MK-ULTRA programme, which in the 1950s funnelled about $25 million to scientists to carry out research into "unusual techniques of interrogation". One of the psychiatrists who received CIA funding was the infamous Ewen Cameron, of Montreal's McGill University. Cameron subjected hundreds of psychiatric patients to large doses of electroshock and total sensory isolation, and drugged them with LSD and PCP. In 1960 Cameron gave a lecture at the Brooks air force base in Texas, in which he stated that sensory deprivation "produces the primary symptoms of schizophrenia".

There is no need to go so far back to prove that the US military knew full well that it was driving Padilla mad. The army's field manual, reissued just last year, states: "Sensory deprivation may result in extreme anxiety, hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and antisocial behaviour" - as well as "significant psychological distress".

If these techniques drove Padilla insane, that means the US government has been deliberately driving hundreds, possibly thousands, of prisoners insane around the world. What is on trial in Florida is not one man's mental state. It is the whole system of US psychological torture.
_____

Naomi Klein's book on disaster capitalism will be published this spring; a version of this article appears in the Nation www.nologo.org

Guardian Unlimited (c) Guardian News and Media Limited 2007


http://politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/comment/0,,2019630,00.html


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Monday, February 26, 2007

Army Acts to Curb Abuses of Injured Recruits

by Ralph Blumenthal

The New York Times (May 12 2006)


The Army has shaken up a program to heal recruits injured in basic training after soldiers and their parents said troops hurt at Fort Sill were punished with physical abuse and medical neglect.

The program, which treated more than 1,100 injured soldiers last year at five posts, normally returns three-fourths of its patients to active duty, according to Army statistics. But at Fort Sill, recruits said, injuries were often subject to derision, ignored or improperly treated.

Two soldiers in the program have died since 2004, one or possibly both of accidental overdoses of prescription drugs. The latest death, in March, remains under investigation, the Army said.

"I am an inmate", one soldier, Private First Class Mathew Scarano of Eureka, California, wrote in a letter home in January two months before he died. "I sometimes ask those friends of mine with jailhouse tattoos if they'd rather be back in jail, or here. So far, they are unanimous - jail."

Commanders acknowledge problems with the Physical Training and Rehabilitation Program, and they have ordered changes here at the Field Artillery Center and at the other training centers. For the first time, as a result of the Fort Sill problems, a medical professional is to head each program.

A civilian spokesman at the fort, Jon Long, said an investigation had substantiated "misbehavior" by a drill sergeant who, soldiers say, kicked a trainee with stitches in his knee. Mr Long said the sergeant had been suspended and reassigned, along with another drill sergeant who, soldiers complained, had repeatedly awakened injured trainees throughout the night for uniform changes and formations.

The events, after a drill sergeant's bribery scandal last year and a drug sting that ensnared twelve soldiers, have thrown a cloud over Fort Sill, one of the centers for nine weeks of basic training where volunteers first report on the way to Iraq or elsewhere. GIs who fall prey to sprains and fractures and cannot complete the often grueling passage to "warrior" are sent to the Physical Training and Rehabilitation Program, where a motto reads "Heal and Ship".

Soldiers' blogs reflect dissatisfaction at some of the other programs, too, but Lieutenant Colonel Michael Russell, command psychologist at the Training and Doctrine Command in Fort Missourinroe, Virginia, who was involved in the new therapy, said just Fort Sill had had a fatality or major complaints. The other sites are Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

"Of course, we take anything like that very seriously", Colonel Russell said. "We're going to put medical people in charge". At Fort Sill, an artillery captain has been in charge.

The Army now limits treatments to six months, with evaluations after three months and then monthly.

In interviews, soldiers and parents said injured troops regularly suffered punitive treatment as malingerers, although many had joined specifically to serve in Iraq.

A trainee with a broken finger who was described by fellow soldiers as frustrated by indifferent treatment, slashed himself with a razor, smeared himself with feces and walked around naked, the Army confirmed. Regarded as faking illness, he was returned to his unit to finish training.

Soldiers in the forty-member unit said their injuries often went unattended in stays that exceeded six months and worsened while they waited to see specialists in short supply because of medical needs in Iraq.

"I don't want to say cruel and unusual punishment, but that's what it was", said Tom Nugent of Candor, New York., near Ithaca. His son Private Justin Nugent has had two operations since a shoulder "popped out" after push-ups in July.

Another parent, Steven Howell, an aide to Representative Mark Souder, Republican of Indiana, said he and his wife had complained about the treatment of their son Clayton, who has spent a year in the "limbo" of the program after a gallbladder attack. "My main concern as a parent is that medical issues are not being addressed properly", Mr Howell said.

One mother critical of the war who had an injured son in the unit and another son serving in Iraq, appealed to Amnesty International and members of Congress for help. The mother, Patricia deVarennes, from outside Sarasota, Florida, brought to light the complaints about her son Private First Class Richard Thurman by posting them on her blog, along with Private Scarano's final e-mail messages.

They were then reported in a March issue of a biweekly left-wing newsletter, CounterPunch.

"The supreme irony", said Ms deVarennes, a writer and computer specialist, "is that I was more worried about my son at Fort Sill than the one in Iraq".

Colonel Russell credited Ms deVarennes with bringing the problems to his attention.

In e-mail responses to questions, Mr Long, the Fort Sill spokesman, confirmed that an investigation focused on accusations of physical and verbal abuse. He declined to discuss details because no one had been charged with a crime. But Mr Long said the initial findings did substantiate the reports of misbehavior by the drill sergeant, who was said to have kicked the soldier and who along with another drill sergeant received "administrative disciplinary action".

The findings, Mr Long said, also pointed to "command climate issues" that allowed cursing at injured soldiers. He said none of the physical or verbal abuse had been directed at Private Scarano or was involved with his death. Mr Long said it might be weeks before a toxicology report provided an official cause of death.

He said that in July 2004 a private in the program was found to have died from "acute methadone intoxication" after an accidental overdose.

Fort Sill, where up to 15,000 troops a year are trained and sent to active duty, had already been brushed by problems. In January 2005, a longtime drill sergeant was convicted of taking bribes to guarantee that recruits would pass basic training.

In October, the first of twelve present and former soldiers at the post were caught in an FBI sting and charged with conspiring to guard cocaine shipments while in uniform.

The fort commander, Major General David C Ralston, said he was confident that the leadership of the healing program took the correct actions after a thorough investigation. General Ralston said he was pleased with the improvements at Fort Sill, where the success rate was 75 percent, one of the highest for the training centers.

"Although this is a very good track record", the general added, "there will always be challenges to taking so many young adults and giving them the rigorous training they need to serve successfully in our nation's Army and to win on the battlefield".

In letters home, Private Scarano, who severely injured his shoulder in a fall in training, said he was wearing a patch with the painkiller fentanyl, which he called "eighty times stronger than heroin", and also wrote: "The Army has me on Ambien, seroquel, tylox and oxycontins. I also get trazadone to take the edge off".

At that time, Mr Long said, soldiers were not monitored while taking medication. Now, they are closely supervised. In another change, he said, a patient advocate has been assigned to monitor lengths of stay.

Interviewed on visiting weekend in April, Private Thurman, Ms deVarennes's son, said he had passed an alternative physical fitness test that replaced running with walking. But after graduating basic training in November with his family at the ceremony, he said, he and two other soldiers were "ungraduated" and put into the Physical Training and Rehabilitation Program. He was belatedly found to have suffered stress fractures in his feet.

Mr Long confirmed the confusion over the acceptability of the alternative test.

Private Thurman, who has completed more than four months in the program and has been sent to his first duty station as a computer artilleryman, and other soldiers said morale plummeted around mid-January with the arrival of a new drill sergeant, Robert Langford.

On the Martin Luther King's Birthday holiday weekend, with the rest of the post off duty, Sergeant Langford ordered the therapy unit to move out the bunk beds and lockers and hand scrape the wax off the floor tiles. When the results were not to his liking, the soldiers said, the sergeant had them redo it. While scraping, Private Scarano cracked his injured shoulder, he wrote home.

The kicking episode occurred about that time, soldiers said, when Sergeant Langford ordered an injured private, Damien McMahon, 21, of Emporia, Kansas, "to take a knee", or bow, after losing his temper in a formation. Private McMahon, who had had knee surgery for a staph infection and was also in disciplinary trouble for sneaking to the PX on a tobacco run, said the investigators had asked him not to discuss the case. But he confirmed accounts by fellow soldiers that he had protested that kneeling was painful and that the sergeant had kicked him in his bad knee, loosening one of nine stitches.

Sergeant Langford, reached by telephone at home at Fort Sill, refused to discuss the accusations and denied that he had been suspended before hanging up.

Also around January, soldiers said, another drill sergeant, Troy Bullock, suspected that a soldier in the unit had sneaked a cigarette and ordered the entire injury unit woken up every hour from ten pm to two am for uniform changes and formations, even though some patients were on heavy sleep medications, the soldiers said. Mr Long said he could not comment, and no telephone listing for Sergeant Bullock could be found.

On March 7, in an e-mail note to Ms deVarennes later put on her blog, Private Scarano said, "I am a casualty of a broken system; I fell through the cracks of the bureaucracy".

If he could get out at least temporarily, Private Scarano said, he wanted to explore a more promising civilian procedure to repair his shoulder "instead of being a guinea pig to a medical system I have no faith in, whatever".

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12training.html?ei=5070&en=71e4af1b1f22c3fa&ex=1169614800&pagewanted=print


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Sunday, February 25, 2007

The Anti-Empire Report

Some things you need to know before the world ends

by William Blum

www.killinghope.org (January 12 2007)


Johnny got his gun


In the past year Iran has issued several warnings to the United States about the consequences of an American or Israeli attack. One statement, issued in November by a high Iranian military official, declared: "If America attacks Iran, its 200,000 troops and 33 bases in the region will be extremely vulnerable, and both American politicians and military commanders are aware of it". {1} Iran apparently believes that American leaders would be so deeply distressed by the prospect of their young men and women being endangered and possibly killed that they would forswear any reckless attacks on Iran. As if American leaders have been deeply stabbed by pain about throwing youthful American bodies into the bottomless snakepit called Iraq, or were restrained by fear of retaliation or by moral qualms while feeding 58,000 young lives to the Vietnam beast. As if American leaders, like all world leaders, have ever had such concerns.

Let's have a short look at some modern American history, which may be instructive in this regard. A report of the US Congress in 1994 informed us that:

Approximately 60,000 military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940s to test two chemical agents, mustard gas and lewisite [blister gas]. Most of these subjects were not informed of the nature of the experiments and never received medical followup after their participation in the research. Additionally, some of these human subjects were threatened with imprisonment at Fort Leavenworth if they discussed these experiments with anyone, including their wives, parents, and family doctors. For decades, the Pentagon denied that the research had taken place, resulting in decades of suffering for many veterans who became ill after the secret testing. {2}

In the decades between the 1940s and 1990s, we find a remarkable variety of government programs, either formally, or in effect, using soldiers as guinea pigs - marched to nuclear explosion sites, with pilots sent through the mushroom clouds; subjected to chemical and biological weapons experiments; radiation experiments; behavior modification experiments that washed their brains with LSD; widespread exposure to the highly toxic dioxin of Agent Orange in Korea and Vietnam ... the list goes on ... literally millions of experimental subjects, seldom given a choice or adequate information, often with disastrous effects to their physical and/or mental health, rarely with proper medical care or even monitoring. {3}

In the 1990s, many thousands of American soldiers came home from the Gulf War with unusual, debilitating ailments. Exposure to harmful chemical or biological agents was suspected, but the Pentagon denied that this had occurred. Years went by while the veterans suffered terribly: neurological problems, chronic fatigue, skin problems, scarred lungs, memory loss, muscle and joint pain, severe headaches, personality changes, passing out, and much more. Eventually, the Pentagon, inch by inch, was forced to move away from its denials and admit that, yes, chemical weapon depots had been bombed; then, yes, there probably were releases of deadly poisons; then, yes, American soldiers were indeed in the vicinity of these poisonous releases, 400 soldiers; then, it might have been 5,000; then, "a very large number", probably more than 15,000; then, finally, a precise number - 20,867; then, "The Pentagon announced that a long-awaited computer model estimates that nearly 100,000 US soldiers could have been exposed to trace amounts of sarin gas". {4}

If the Pentagon had been much more forthcoming from the outset about what it knew all along about these various substances and weapons, the soldiers might have had a proper diagnosis early on and received appropriate care sooner. The cost in terms of human suffering has been incalculable.

Soldiers have also been forced to take vaccines against anthrax and nerve gas not approved by the FDA as safe and effective; and punished, sometimes treated like criminals, if they refused. (During World War II, soldiers were forced to take a yellow fever vaccine, with the result that some 330,000 of them were infected with the hepatitis B virus. {5})

And through all the recent wars, countless American soldiers have been put in close proximity to the radioactive dust of exploded depleted uranium-tipped shells and missiles on the battlefield; depleted uranium has been associated with a long list of rare and terrible illnesses and birth defects. It poisons the air, the soil, the water, the lungs, the blood, and the genes. (The widespread dissemination of depleted uranium by American warfare - from Serbia to Afghanistan to Iraq - should be an international scandal and crisis, like AIDS, and would be in a world not so intimidated by the United States.)

The catalogue of Pentagon abuses of American soldiers goes on ... Troops serving in Iraq or their families have reported purchasing with their own funds bullet-proof vests, better armor for their vehicles, medical supplies, and global positioning devices, all for their own safety, which were not provided to them by the army ... Continuous complaints by servicewomen of sexual assault and rape at the hands of their male counterparts are routinely played down or ignored by the military brass ... Numerous injured and disabled vets from all wars have to engage in an ongoing struggle to get the medical care they were promised ... One should read "Army Acts to Curb Abuses of Injured Recruits" (New York Times, May 12 2006) for accounts of the callous, bordering on sadistic, treatment of soldiers in bases in the United States ... Repeated tours of duty, which fracture family life and increase the chance not only of death or injury but of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). {6}

National Public Radio's All Things Considered, on December 4 and other days, ran a series on Army mistreatment of soldiers home from Iraq and suffering serious PTSD. At Colorado's Fort Carson these afflicted soldiers are receiving a variety of abuse and punishment much more than the help they need, as officers harass and punish them for being emotionally "weak".

Keep the above in mind the next time you hear a president or a general speaking on Memorial Day about "honor" and "duty" and about how much we "owe to the brave young men and women who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of freedom and democracy".

And read Johnny Got His Gun by Dalton Trumbo (1939; Bantam Reissue edition, 1984) for the ultimate abuse of soldiers by leaders of nations.


The conscience of our leaders

After he ordered the bombing of Panama in December 1989, which killed anywhere from 500 to a few thousand totally innocent people, guilty of no harm to any American, the first President George Bush declared that his "heart goes out to the families of those who have died in Panama". {7}

When asked by a reporter: "Was it really worth it to send people to their death for this? To get Noriega?", Bush replied: "Every human life is precious, and yet I have to answer, yes, it has been worth it". {8}

Speaking in November 1990 of his imminent invasion of Iraq, Bush Senior said: "People say to me: 'How many lives? How many lives can you expend?' Each one is precious". {9}

While his killing of thousands of Iraqis was proceeding merrily along in 2003, the second President George Bush was moved to say: "We believe in the value and dignity of every human life". {10}

In December 2006, the White House spokesman for Bush Junior, commenting about American deaths reaching 3,000 in Iraq, said President Bush "believes that every life is precious and grieves for each one that is lost". {11}

Both father and son are on record expressing their deep concern for God and prayer both before and during their mass slaughters. "I trust God speaks through me", said Bush the younger in 2004. "Without that, I couldn't do my job". {12}

After his devastation of Iraq and its people, Bush the elder said: "I think that, like a lot of others who had positions of responsibility in sending someone else's kids to war, we realize that in prayer what mattered is how it might have seemed to God". {13}

God, one surmises, might have asked George Bush, father and son, about the kids of Iraq. And the adults. And, in a testy, rather ungodlike manner, might have snapped: "So stop wasting all the precious lives already!"

In the now-famous exchange on TV in 1996 between Madeleine Albright and reporter Lesley Stahl, the latter was speaking of US sanctions against Iraq, and asked the then-US ambassador to the UN, and Secretary of State-to-be: "We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And - and you know, is the price worth it?" Replied Albright: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it". {14}

Ten years later, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, continuing the fine tradition of female Secretaries of State and the equally noble heritage of the Bush family, declared that the current horror in Iraq is "worth the investment" in American lives and dollars. {15}

And don't forget that we can't pull out of Iraq now because it would dishonor the troops who haven't died yet.


The American media as the Berlin Wall

In December 1975, while East Timor, which lies at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago, was undergoing a process of decolonization from Portugal, a struggle for power took place. A movement of the left, Fretilin, prevailed and then declared East Timor's independence from Portugal. Nine days later, Indonesia invaded East Timor. The invasion was launched the day after US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had left Indonesia after giving President Suharto permission to use American arms, which, under US law, could not be used for aggression. But Indonesia was Washington's most valuable ally in Southeast Asia and, in any event, the United States was not inclined to look kindly on any government of the left.

Indonesia soon achieved complete control over East Timor, with the help of the American arms and other military aid, as well as diplomatic support at the UN. Amnesty International estimated that by 1989, Indonesian troops had killed 200,000 people out of a population of between 600,000 and 700,000, a death rate which is probably one of the highest in the entire history of wars. {16}

Is it not remarkable that in the numerous articles in the American daily press following President Ford's death last month, there was not a single mention of his role in the East Timor massacre? A search of the extensive Lexis-Nexis and other media databases finds mention of this only in a few letters to the editor from readers; not a word even in the reports of any of the news agencies, like the Associated Press, which generally shy away from controversy less than the newspapers they serve; nor a single mention in the mainstream broadcast news programs.

Imagine if following the recent death of Augusto Pinochet the media made no mention of his overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, or the mass murder and torture which followed. Ironically, the recent articles about Ford also failed to mention his remark a year after Pinochet's coup. President Ford declared that what the United States had done in Chile was "in the best interest of the people in Chile and certainly in our own best interest". {17}

During the Cold War, the American government and media never missed an opportunity to point out the news events embarrassing to the Soviet Union which became non-events in the communist media.


Man shall never fly

The Cold War is still with us. Because the ideological conflict that was the basis for it has not gone away. Because it can't go away. As long as capitalism exists, as long as it puts profit before people, as it must, as long as it puts profit before the environment, as it must, those on the receiving end of its sharp pointed stick must look for a better way.

Thus it is that when Venezuelan President Hugo Cha'vez announced a few days ago that he plans to nationalize telephone and electric utility companies to accelerate his "socialist revolution", the spokesperson for Capitalism Central, White House press secretary Tony Snow, was quick to the attack: "Nationalization has a long and inglorious history of failure around the world", Snow declared. "We support the Venezuelan people and think this is an unhappy day for them". {18}

Snow presumably buys into the belief that capitalism defeated socialism in the Cold War. A victory for a superior idea. The boys of Capital chortle in their martinis about the death of socialism. The word has been banned from polite conversation. And they hope that no one will notice that every socialist experiment of any significance in the past century has either been corrupted, subverted, perverted, or destabilized ... or crushed, overthrown, bombed, or invaded ... or otherwise had life made impossible for it, by the United States. Not one socialist government or movement - from the Russian Revolution to Cuba, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in Salvador, from Communist China to Grenada, Chile and Vietnam - not one was permitted to rise or fall solely on its own merits; not one was left secure enough to drop its guard against the all-powerful enemy abroad and freely and fully relax control at home. Even many plain old social democracies - such as in Guatemala, Iran, British Guiana, Serbia and Haiti, which were not in love with capitalism and were looking for another path - even these too were made to bite the dust by Uncle Sam.

It's as if the Wright brothers' first experiments with flying machines all failed because the automobile interests sabotaged each test flight. And then the good and god-fearing folk of America looked upon this, took notice of the consequences, nodded their collective heads wisely, and intoned solemnly: Man shall never fly.

Tony Snow would have us believe that the government is no match for the private sector in efficiently getting large and important things done. But is that really true? Let's clear our minds for a moment, push our upbringing to one side, and remember that the American government has landed men on the moon, created great dams, marvelous national parks, an interstate highway system, the peace corps, built up an incredible military machine (ignoring for the moment what it's used for), student loans, social security, Medicare, insurance for bank deposits, protection of pension funds against corporate misuse, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the Smithsonian, the GI Bill, and much, much more. In short, the government has been quite good at doing what it wanted to do, or what labor and other movements have made it do, like establishing worker health and safety standards and requiring food manufacturers to list detailed information about ingredients.

When George W took office one of his chief goals was to examine whether jobs done by federal employees could be performed more efficiently by private contractors. Bush called it his top management priority. By the end of 2005, 50,000 government jobs had been studied. And federal workers had won the job competitions more than eighty percent of the time. {19}

We have to remind the American people of what they've instinctively learned but tend to forget when faced with statements like that of Tony Snow - that they don't want more government, or less government; they don't want big government, or small government; they want government on their side.

And by the way, Tony, the great majority of the population in the last years of the Soviet Union had a much better quality of life, including a longer life, under their "failed nationalized" economy, than they have had under unbridled capitalism.

None of the above, of course, will deter The World's Only Superpower from continuing its jihad to impose capitalist fundamentalism upon the world.


Unwelcome guests at the table of the respectable folk

Senator Joseph Biden, Democrat from Delaware, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has announced four weeks of hearings focused on every aspect of US policy in Iraq. He really wants to get to the bottom of things, find out how and why things went so wrong, who are the ones responsible, hold them accountable, and what can be done now. The committee will hear the testimony of top political, economic and intelligence experts, foreign diplomats, and former and current senior US officials, like Condoleezza Rice, Brent Scowcroft, Samuel Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright and George Shultz. {20} All the usual suspects.

But why not call upon some unusual suspects? Why do congressional committees and committees appointed by the White House typically not call experts who dissent from the official explanations? Why not hear from people who had the wisdom to protest the invasion of Iraq and condemn it in writing before it even began? People who called the war illegal and immoral, said we should never start it, and predicted much of the horrible outcome. Surely they may have some insights and analyses that will not be heard from the mouths of the usual suspects.

Likewise, why didn't the September 11 Committee, or any of the congressional committees dealing with the terrorist attack, call upon any of the numerous 9-11 experts who have done extensive research and who question various aspects of the official story?

Traditionally, of course, such committees have been formed to put a damper on dissident questioning of official stories, to ridicule them as "conspiracy theorists", not to give the dissidents a larger audience.


NOTES

{1} Fars News Agency (November 21 2006)

{2} Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans' Health? Lessons Spanning Half a Century" (December 08 1994), page 5

{3} Ibid, passim

{4} Washington Post (October 2 and 23 1996) and (July 31 1997) for the estimated numbers of affected soldiers.

{5} Journal of the American Medical Association (September 01 1999), page 822

{6} Washington Post (December 20 2006), page 19

{7} New York Times (December 22 1989), page 17

{8} New York Times (December 22 1989), page 16

{9} Los Angeles Times (December 01 1990), page 1

{10} Washington Post (May 28 2003)

{11} Washington Post (January 01 2007), page 1

{12} Washington Post (July 20 2004), page 15, statement attributed to President Bush in the Lancaster (Pennsylvania) New Era newspaper from a private meeting with Amish families on July 9. The White House later said Bush said no such thing. Yes, we know how the Amish lie.

{13} Los Angeles Times (June 07 1991), page 1

{14} CBS 60 Minutes (May 12 1996)

{15} Associated Press (December 22 2006)

{16} Search National Security Archive - www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ - for "Ford" and "Timor"; see also William Blum, Rogue State, pages 188-9

{17} New York Times, September 17, 1974, page 22

{18} Washington Post (January 10 2007), page 7

{19} Washington Post (March 23 2006), page 21

{20} Washington Post (January 05 2007)


William Blum's speaking engagements

January 25 - Flagstaff, Arizona
March 9 - Venice, California
March 10 - Irvine, California
March 17 or 18 - Columbus, Ohio

See www.killinghope.org for the details

To make a financial donation to support the work of the Anti-Empire Report
you can use the following address. But if you are not in pretty good shape
financially, please do not donate. Thanks.

William Blum
5100 Connecticut Avenue, NorthWest #707
Washington, DC 20008-2064


William Blum is the author of:-

Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War 2
(Common Courage Press, 1995)

Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower (Zed Books, 2002)

West-Bloc Dissident: A Cold War Memoir (Soft Skull Press, 2002)

Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire
(Common Courage Press, 2004)


Portions of the books can be read, and copies purchased, at www.killinghope.org and previous Anti-Empire Reports can be read at this website.

To add yourself to this mailing list simply send an email to bblum6@aol.com with "add" in the subject line. I'd like your name and city in the message, but that's optional. I ask for your city only in case I'll be speaking in your area.

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Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Saturday, February 24, 2007

Army of Altruists

On the alienated right to do good

by David Graeber

Harper's Magazine (January 2007)


You know, education, if you make the most of it, you study hard, you do your homework and you make an effort to be smart, you can do well. If you don't, you get stuck in Iraq. -- Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts)

Kerry owes an apology to the many thousands of Americans serving in Iraq, who answered their country's call because they are patriots and not because of any deficiencies in their education. -- Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona)


In the lead-up to the midterm elections, the Republicans' single fleeting ray of hope was a botched joke by Senator John Kerry. The joke was obviously aimed at George W Bush, but they took it to suggest that Kerry thought only those who flunked out of school end up in the military. It was all very disingenuous. Most knew perfectly well that Kerry's real point was to suggest that the president wasn't very bright. But the right smelled blood. The problem with "aristoslackers" like Kerry, wrote one blogger on the website of National Review, is that they assume "the troops are in Iraq not because they are deeply committed to the mission (they need to deny that) but rather because of a system that takes advantage of their lack of social and economic opportunities ... We should clobber them with that ruthlessly until the day of the election - just like we did in 2004 - because it is the most basic reason they deserve to lose".

In the end, it didn't make a lot of difference, because most Americans decided they were not deeply committed to the mission either - insofar as they were even sure what the mission was. But it seems to me the question we should really be asking is: why did it take a military catastrophe (not to mention a strategy of trying to avoid any association with the sort of northeastern elites Kerry typifies for so many Americans) to allow the Democrats to finally emerge from the political wilderness? Or, in other words: why has this Republican line proved so effective?

It strikes me that to get at the answer, one has to probe far more deeply into the nature of American society than most commentators are willing to go. We're used to reducing all such issues to an either/or: patriotism versus opportunity, "values" versus bread-and-butter issues like jobs and education. But I would argue that to frame things this way plays into the hands of the right.
Certainly, many people do join the army because they are deprived of opportunities. But the real question to be asking is: opportunities to do what?

Let me offer an anthropological perspective on the question. It first came home to me a year or two ago when I was attending a lecture by Catherine Lutz, a fellow anthropologist from Brown University who has been studying US military bases overseas. Many of these bases organize outreach programs, in which soldiers venture out to repair schoolrooms or to perform free dental checkups for the locals. These programs were created to improve local relations, but they were apparently at least as effective in their psychological impact on the soldiers, many of whom would wax euphoric when describing them: for example, "This is why I joined the army", "This is what military service is really all about - not just defending your country, but helping people". The military's own statistics point in the same direction: although the surveys do not list "helping people" among the motives far enlistment, the most high-minded option available - "to do something to be proud of" - is the favorite.


Is it possible that America is actually a nation of frustrated altruists? Certainly this is not the way that we normally think about ourselves. Our normal habits of thought, actually, tend toward a rough and ready cynicism. The world is a giant marketplace; everyone is in it for a buck; if you want to understand why something happened, first ask who stands to gain by it. The same attitudes expressed in the back rooms of bars are echoed in the highest reaches of social science. America's great contribution to the world in the latter respect has been the development of "rational choice" theories, which proceed from the assumption that all human behavior can be understood as a matter of economic calculation, of rational actors trying to get as much as possible out of any given situation with the least cost to themselves. As a result, in most fields, the very existence of altruistic behavior is considered a kind of puzzle, and everyone from economists to evolutionary biologists has become famous through attempts to "solve" it - that is, to explain the mystery of why bees sacrifice themselves for hives or human beings hold open doors and give correct street directions to total strangers. At the same time, the case of the military bases suggests the possibility that in fact Americans, particularly the less affluent ones, are haunted by frustrated desires to do good in the world.

It would not be difficult to assemble evidence that this is the case. Studies of charitable giving, for example, have shown the poor to be the most generous: the lower one's income, the higher the proportion of it that one is likely to give away to strangers. The same pattern holds true, incidentally, when comparing the middle classes and the rich: one study of tax returns in 2003 concluded that if the most affluent families had given away as much of their assets as even the average middle-class family, overall charitable donations that year would have increased by $25 billion. (All this despite the fact that the wealthy have far more time and opportunity.) Moreover, charity represents only a tiny part of the picture. lf one were to break down what typical American wage earners do with their disposable income, one would find that they give much of it away, either through spending in one way or another on their children or through sharing with others: presents, trips, parties, the six-pack of beer for the local softball game. One might object that such sharing is more a reflection of the real nature of pleasure than anything else (who would want to eat a delicious meal at an expensive restaurant all by himself?), but this is actually half the point. Even our self-indulgences tend to be dominated by the logic of the gift. Similarly, some might object that shelling out a small fortune to send one's children to an exclusive kindergarten is more about status than altruism. Perhaps: but if you look at what happens over the course of people's actual lives, it soon becomes apparent that this kind of behavior fulfills an identical psychological need. How many youthful idealists throughout history have managed to finally come to terms with a world based on selfishness and greed the moment they start a family? If one were to assume altruism were the primary human motivation, this would make perfect sense: The only way they can convince themselves to abandon their desire to do right by the world as a whole is to substitute an even more powerful desire to do right by their children.

What all this suggests to me is that American society might well work completely differently than we tend to assume. Imagine, for a moment, that the United States as it exists today were the creation of some ingenious social engineer. What assumptions about human nature could we say this engineer must have been working with? Certainly nothing like rational choice theory. For clearly our social engineer understands that the only way to convince human beings to enter into the world of work and the marketplace (that is, of mind-numbing labor and cutthroat competition) is to dangle the prospect of thereby being able to lavish money on one's children, buy drinks for one's friends, and, if one hits the jackpot, spend the rest of one's life endowing museums and providing AIDS medications to impoverished countries in Africa. Our theorists are constantly trying to strip away the veil of appearances and show how all such apparently selfless gestures really mask some kind of self-interested strategy, but in reality American society is better conceived as a battle over access to the right to behave altruistically. Selflessness - or, at least, the right to engage in high-minded activity - is not the strategy. It is the prize.

If nothing else, I think this helps us understand why the right has been so much better, in recent years, at playing to populist sentiments than the left. Essentially, they do it by accusing liberals of cutting ordinary Americans off from the right to do good in the world. Let me explain what I mean here by throwing out a series of propositions.


Proposition 1: Neither egoism nor altruism is a natural urge; they in fact arise in relation to each other and neither would be conceivable without the market.

First of all, I should make clear that I do not believe that either egoism or altruism is somehow inherent in human nature. Human motives are rarely that simple. Rather, egoism and altruism are ideas we have about human nature.

Historically, one has tended to arise in response to the other. In the ancient world, for example, it is generally in the times and places that one sees the emergence of money and markets that one also sees the rise of world religions - Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. If one sets aside a space and says, "Here you shall think only about acquiring material things hr yourself", then it is hardly surprising that before long someone else will set aside a countervailing space and declare, in effect: "Yes, but here we must contemplate the fact that the self, and material things, are ultimately unimportant". It was these latter institutions, of course, that first developed our modem notions of charity.

Even today, when we operate outside the domain of the market or of religion, very few of our actions could be said to be motivated by anything so simple as untrammeled greed or utterly selfless generosity. When we are dealing not with strangers but with friends, relatives, or enemies, a much more complicated set of motivations will generally come into play: envy, solidarity, pride, self-destructive grief, loyalty, romantic obsession, resentment, spite, shame, conviviality, the anticipation of shared enjoyment, the desire to show up a rival, and so on. These are the motivations impelling the major dramas of our lives that great novelists like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky immortalize but that social theorists, for some reason, tend to ignore. If one travels to parts of the world where money and markets do not exist - say, to certain parts of New Guinea or Amazonia - such complicated webs of motivation are precisely what one still finds. In societies based around small communities, where almost everyone is either a friend, a relative, or an enemy of everyone else, the languages spoken tend even to lack words that correspond to "self-interest" or "altruism" but include very subtle vocabularies for describing envy, solidarity, pride, and the like. Their economic dealings with one another likewise tend to be based on much more subtle principles. Anthropologists have created a vast literature to try to fathom the dynamics of these apparently exotic "gift economies", but if it seems odd to us to see, for instance, important men conniving with their cousins to finagle vast wealth, which they then present as gifts to bitter enemies in order to publicly humiliate them, it is because we are so used to operating inside impersonal markets that it never occurs to us to think how we would act if we had an economic system in which we treated people based on how we actually felt about them.

Nowadays, the work of destroying such ways of life is still often done by missionaries - representatives of those very world religions that originally sprang up in reaction to the market long ago. Missionaries, of course, are out to save souls; but they rarely interpret this to mean their role is simply to teach people to accept God and be more altruistic. Almost invariably, they end up trying to convince people to be more selfish and more altruistic at the same time. On the one hand, they set out to teach the "natives" proper work discipline, and try to get them involved with buying and selling products on the market, so as to better their material lot. At the same time, they explain to them that ultimately, material things are unimportant, and lecture on the value of the higher things, such as selfless devotion to others.


Proposition 2: The political right has always tried to enhance this division and thus claims to be the champion of both egoism and altruism simultaneously. The left has tried to efface it.

Might this not help to explain why the United States, the most market driven, industrialized society on earth, is also among the most religious? Or, even more strikingly, why the country that produced Tolstoy and Dostoevsky spent much of the twentieth century trying to eradicate both the market and religion entirely?

Whereas the political left has always tried to efface this distinction - whether by trying to create economic systems that are not driven by the profit motive or by replacing private charity with one or another form of community support - the political right has always thrived on it. In the United States, for example, the Republican Party is dominated by two ideological wings: the libertarians and the "Christian right". At one extreme, Republicans are free-market fundamentalists and advocates of individual liberties (even if they see those liberties largely as a matter of consumer choice); on the other, they are fundamentalists of a more literal variety, suspicious of most individual liberties but enthusiastic about biblical injunctions, "family values", and charitable good works. At first glance it might seem remarkable that such an alliance manages to hold together at all (and certainly they have ongoing tensions, most famously over abortion). But, in fact, right-wing coalitions almost always take some variation of this form. One might say that the right's approach is to release the dogs of the market, throwing all traditional verities into disarray; and then, in this tumult of insecurity, offer themselves up as the last bastion of order and hierarchy, the stalwart defenders of the authority of churches and fathers against the barbarians they have themselves unleashed. A scam it may be, but it is a remarkably effective one; and one result is that the right ends up seeming to have a monopoly on value. It manages, we might say, to occupy both positions, on either side of the divide: extreme egoism and extreme altruism.

Consider, for a moment, the word "value". When economists talk about value they are really talking about money - or, more precisely, about whatever it is that money is measuring; also, whatever it is that economic actors are assumed to be pursuing. When we are working for a living, or buying and selling things, we are rewarded with money. But whenever we are not working or buying or selling, when we are motivated by pretty much anything other than the desire to get money, we suddenly find ourselves in the domain of "values". The most commonly invoked of these are, of course, "family values" (which is unsurprising, since by far the most common form of unpaid labor in most industrial societies is child-rearing and housework), but we also talk about religious values, political values, the values that attach themselves to art or patriotism - one could even, perhaps, count loyalty to one's favorite basketball team. All are seen as commitments that are, or ought to be, uncorrupted by the market. At the same time, they are also seen as utterly unique; whereas money makes all things comparable, "values" such as beauty, devotion, or integrity cannot, by definition, be compared. There is no mathematical formula that could possibly allow one to calculate just how much personal integrity it is right to sacrifice in the pursuit of art or how to balance responsibilities to your family with responsibilities to your God. (Obviously, people do make these kinds of compromises all the time. But they cannot be calculated.) One might put it this way: if value is simply what one considers important, then money allows importance to take a liquid form, by enabling us to compare precise quantities of importance and trade one off for the other. If someone does accumulate a very large amount of money, the first thing he or she is likely to do is to try to convert it into something unique, whether it be Monet's water lilies, a prize-winning racehorse, or an endowed chair at a university.

What is really at stake here in any market economy is precisely the ability to make these trades, to convert "value" into "values". All of us are striving to put ourselves in a position in which we can dedicate ourselves to something larger than ourselves. When liberals do well in America, it's because they can embody that possibility: the Kennedys, for example, are the ultimate Democratic icons not just because they started as poor Irish immigrants who made enormous amounts of money but because they are seen as having managed, ultimately, to turn all that money into nobility.


Proposition 3: The real problem of the American left is that although it does try in certain ways to efface the division between egoism and altruism, value and values, it largely does so for its own children. This has allowed the right, paradoxically, to represent itself as the champion of the working class.

This proposition might help explain why the left in America is in such a mess. Far from promoting new visions of effacing the difference between egoism and altruism, value and values, or providing a model for passing from one to the other, progressives cannot even seem to understand the problem. After the last presidential election, the big debate in progressive circles was the relative importance of economic issues versus what was called "the culture wars". Did the Democrats lose because they were not able to spell out any plausible economic alternatives, or did the Republicans win because they successfully mobilized evangelical Christians around the issue of gay marriage? The very fact that progressives frame the question this way not only shows they are trapped in the right's terms of analysis; it demonstrates that they do not understand how America really works.

Let me illustrate what I mean by considering the strange popular appeal, at least until recently, of George W Bush. In 2004 most of the American liberal intelligentsia did not seem to be able to get their minds around it. After the election, what left so many of them reeling was their suspicion that the things they most hated about Bush were exactly what so many Bush voters liked about him. Consider the debates, for example. If statistics are to be believed, millions of Americans watched George Bush and John Kerry lock horns, concluded that Kerry won, and then went off and voted for Bush anyway. It was hard to escape the suspicion that, in the end, Kerry's articulate presentation, his skill with words and arguments, had actually counted against him.

This sent liberals into spirals of despair. They could not understand why decisive leadership was equated with acting like an idiot. Neither could they understand how a man who comes from one of the most elite families in the country, who attended Andover, Yale, and Harvard, and whose signature facial expression is a self-satisfied smirk, ever convinced anyone he was a "man of the people". I must admit I have struggled with this as well. As a child of working-class parents who won a scholarship to Andover in the 1970s and, eventually, a job at Yale, I have spent much of my life in the presence of men like Bush, every inch of them oozing self-satisfied privilege. But, in fact, stories like mine - stories of dramatic class mobility through academic accomplishment - are increasingly unusual in America.

America, of course, continues to see itself as a land of opportunity, and certainly from the perspective of an immigrant from Haiti or Bangladesh it is. But America has always been a country built on the promise of unlimited upward mobility. The working-class condition has been traditionally seen as a way station, as something one's family passes through on the road to something else. Abraham Lincoln used to stress that what made American democracy possible was the absence of a class of permanent wage laborers. In Lincoln's day, the ideal was that wage laborers would eventually save up enough money to build a better life: if nothing else, to buy some land and become a homesteader on the frontier.

The point is not how accurate this ideal was; the point is that most Americans have found the image plausible. Every time the road is perceived to be clogged, profound unrest ensues. The closing of the frontier led to bitter labor struggles, and over the course of the twentieth century, the steady and rapid expansion of the American university system could be seen as a kind of substitute. Particularly after World War II, huge resources were poured into expanding the higher education system, which grew extremely rapidly, and all this growth was promoted quite explicitly as a means of social mobility. This served during the Cold War as almost an implied social contract, not just offering a comfortable life to the working classes but holding out the chance that their children would not be working class themselves. The problem, of course, is that a higher education system cannot be expanded forever. At a certain point one ends up with a significant portion of the population unable to find work even remotely in line with their qualifications, who have every reason to be angry about their situation, and who also have access to the entire history of radical thought. By the late Sixties and early Seventies, the very point when the expansion of the university system hit a dead end, campuses were, predictably, exploding.

What followed could be seen as a kind of settlement. Campus radicals were reabsorbed into the university but set to work largely at training children of the elite. As the cost of education has skyrocketed, financial aid has been cut back, and the prospect of social mobility through education - above all liberal arts education - has been rapidly diminished. The number of working-class students in major universities, which steadily grew until the Seventies, has now been declining for decades. The matter was further complicated by the fact that this overall decline of accessibility happened at almost exactly the same time that many who had previously been excluded (the GI Bill of Rights, after all, had applied basically to white males) were finally being welcomed. These were the identities celebrated in the campus "identity politics" of the Eighties and Nineties - an inclusiveness that notably did not extend to, say, Baptists or "rednecks". Unsurprisingly, many focused their rage not on government or on university administrations but on minorities, queers, and feminists.


Why do working-class Bush voters tend to resent intellectuals more than they do the rich? It seems to me that the answer is simple. They can imagine a scenario in which they might become rich but cannot possibly imagine one in which they, or any of their children, would become members of the intelligentsia. If you think about it, this is not an unreasonable assessment. A mechanic from Nebraska knows it is highly unlikely that his son or daughter will ever become an Enron executive. But it is possible. There is virtually no chance, however, that his child, no matter how talented, will ever become an international human-rights lawyer or a drama critic for the New York Times. Here we need to remember not just the changes in higher education but also the role of unpaid, or effectively unpaid, internships. It has become a fact of life in the United States that if one chooses a career for any reason other than the salary, for the first year or two one will not be paid. This is certainly true if one wishes to be involved in altruistic pursuits: say, to join the world of charities, or NGOs, or to become a political activist. But it is equally true if one wants to pursue values like Beauty or Truth: to become part of the world of books, or the art world, or an investigative reporter. The custom effectively seals off such a career for any poor student who actually does attain a liberal arts education. Such structures of exclusion had always existed, of course, especially at the top, but in recent decades fences have become fortresses.

If that mechanic's daughter wishes to pursue something higher, more noble, for a career, what options does she really have? Likely just two: She can seek employment at her local church, which is hard to get. Or she can join the army.

This is, of course, the secret of nobility. To be noble is to be generous, high-minded, altruistic, to pursue higher forms of value. But it is also to be able to do so because one does not really have to think too much about money. This is precisely what our soldiers are doing when they give free dental examinations to villagers: they are being paid (modestly, but adequately) to do good in the world. Seen in this light, it is also easier to see what really happened at universities in the wake of the 1960s - the "settlement" I mentioned above. Campus radicals set out to create a new society that destroyed the distinction between egoism and altruism, value and values. It did not work out, but they were, effectively, offered a kind of compensation: the privilege to use the university system to create lives that did so, in their own little way, to be supported in one's material needs while pursuing virtue, truth, and beauty, and, above all, to pass that privilege on to their own children. One cannot blame them for accepting the offer. But neither can one blame the rest of the country for hating them for it. Not because they reject the project: as I say, this is what America is all about. As I always tell activists engaged in the peace movement and counter recruitment campaigns: why do working-class kids join the army anyway? Because, like any teenager, they want to escape the world of tedious work and meaningless consumerism, to live a life of adventure and camaraderie in which they believe they are doing something genuinely noble. They join the army because they want to be like you.

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David Graeber is an anthropologist and activist currently living in New York City. An associate professor at Yale he is the author of Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) and Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004)


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Friday, February 23, 2007

The Changing Climate on Climate Change

by Joseph E Stiglitz

The Chosun Ilbo (February 21 2007)


The message, it seems, has finally gotten through: global warming represents a serious threat to our planet. At the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, world leaders saw climate change, for the first time, topping the list of global concerns.

Europe and Japan have shown their commitment to reduce global warming by imposing costs on themselves and their producers, even if it places them at a competitive disadvantage. The biggest obstacle until now has been the United States. The Clinton administration had called for bold action as far back as 1993, proposing what was in effect a tax on carbon emissions; but an alliance of polluters, led by the coal, oil, and auto industries beat back this initiative.

To the scientific community, the evidence on climate change has, of course, been overwhelming for more than a decade and a half. I participated in the second assessment of the scientific evidence conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which perhaps made one critical mistake: it underestimated the pace at which global warming was occurring. The Fourth Assessment, which was just issued, confirms the mounting evidence and the increasing conviction that global warming is the result of the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The increased pace of warming reflects the impact of complex non-linear factors and a variety of "tipping points" that can result in acceleration of the process. For instance, as the Arctic ice cap melts, less sunlight is reflected. Seemingly dramatic changes in weather patterns - including the melting of glaciers in Greenland and the thawing of the Siberian permafrost - have at last convinced most business leaders that the time for action is now.

Recently, even President Bush seems to have woken up. But a closer look at what he is doing, and not doing, shows clearly that he has mostly heard the call of his campaign contributors from the oil and coal industries, and that he has once again put their interests over the global interest in reducing emissions. If he were truly concerned about global warming, how could he have endorsed the construction of coal-fired electricity plants, even if those plants use more efficient technologies than have been employed in the past?

What is required, first and foremost, are market-based incentives to induce Americans to use less energy and to produce more energy in ways that emit less carbon. But Bush has neither eliminated massive subsidies to the oil industry (though, fortunately, the Democratic Congress may take action) nor provided adequate incentives for conservation. Even his call for energy independence should be seen for what it is - a new rationale for old corporate subsidies.

A policy that entails draining America's limited oil supplies - I call it "drain America first" - will leave the US even more dependent on foreign oil. The US imposes a tariff of more than fifty cents per gallon on sugar-based ethanol from Brazil, but subsidizes inefficient corn-based American ethanol heavily - indeed , it requires more than a gallon of gasoline to fertilize, harvest, transport, process, and distill corn to yield one gallon of ethanol.

As the world's largest polluter, accounting for roughly a quarter of global carbon emissions, America's reluctance to do more is perhaps understandable, if not forgivable. But claims by Bush that America cannot afford to do anything about global warming ring hollow: other advanced industrial countries with comparable standards of living emit only a fraction of what the US emits per dollar of GDP.

As a result, American firms with access to cheap energy are given a big competitive advantage over firms in Europe and elsewhere. Some in Europe worry that stringent action on global warming may be counterproductive: energy-intensive industries may simply move to the US or other countries that pay little attention to emissions. And there is more than a grain of truth to these concerns.

A striking fact about climate change is that there is little overlap between the countries that are most vulnerable to its effects - mainly poor countries in the South that can ill afford to deal with the consequences - and the countries, like the US, that are the largest polluters. What is at stake is in part a moral issue, a matter of global social justice.

The Kyoto Protocol represented the international community's attempt to begin to deal with global warming in a fair and efficient way. But it left out a majority of the sources of emissions, and unless something is done to include the US and the developing countries in a meaningful way, it will be little more than a symbolic gesture. There needs to be a new "coalition of the willing," this time perhaps led by Europe and this time directed at a real danger.

This "coalition of the willing" could agree to certain basic standards: to forego building coal-fired plants, increase automobiles' fuel efficiency, and provide targeted assistance to developing countries to enhance their energy efficiency and reduce emissions. Coalition members could also agree to provide stronger incentives to their own producers, through either more stringent caps on emissions or higher taxes on pollution. They could then agree to impose taxes on products from other countries - including the US - that are produced in ways that unnecessarily add substantially to global warming. What is at stake is not protecting domestic producers, but protecting our planet.

The changing climate on climate change provides political leaders in Europe and other potential members of this "coalition of the willing" an unprecedented opportunity to move beyond mere rhetoric. The time to act is now.
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Joseph E Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at Columbia University and was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President Clinton and Chief Economist and Senior Vice President at the World Bank. His latest book is Making Globalization Work (W W Norton, 1996).


Copyright (c) 2003 Digital Chosun. All rights reserved.

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200702/200702210006.html


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

The Real News about Global Warming

www.TomDispatch.com (February 19 2007)


The world is, it seems, melting like an ice cream cone in the sun. {1} Let me leave it at that.

As all Tomdispatch readers know, I write the introductions to posts at this site. This post is undoubtedly the exception that proves the rule. The editors of The New York Review of Books {2} have been kind enough to let me put out Bill McKibben's striking essay on the real news lurking in the latest major report on global warming. (His piece appears in the March 15 issue of the magazine, now on the newsstands.) McKibben whose new book, Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future {3}, is about to be published (and eagerly awaited by me), has been involved in important recent organizing efforts regarding climate change. So I decided to give him the first - and last - word today. -- Tom Engelhardt

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This piece is an account of a scientific triumph - the ongoing effort to understand and warn about climate change in a timely fashion - and also, of course, of a political debacle - the complete failure of our government over two decades to address the problem in any fashion whatsoever. But it ends with a paragraph about an effort now five weeks old and, so far, entirely confined to the Web. When we launched www.stepitup07.org in mid-January, we hoped we might be able to find a couple of hundred groups and individuals around the country who would agree to hold rallies on April 14.

That would have represented by far the largest demonstration against global warming in US history. By this point, our wildest imaginings have been long since surpassed - we're nearing 700 actions scheduled for April 14, and the sheer genius people have brought to designing some of them boggles the mind. There will be underwater demonstrations, rallies on top of mountains, and on and on. All of it makes me think of the example and the words of Rebecca Solnit {4} on www.tomdispatch.com in recent years: As far as I can tell, she's absolutely right in her confidence that people around the country and around the world can, joyfully and powerfully, rise to the challenges in front of us. People power is a lovely thing to behold!
-- Bill McKibben

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Warning on Warming

by Bill McKibben

This piece, which appears in the March 15 2007 issue of The New York Review of Books is posted here with the kind permission of the editors of that magazine.
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When the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its latest report in early February, it was greeted with shock: "World Wakes to Climate Catastrophe", reported an Australian paper. But global warming is by now a scientific field with a fairly extensive history, and that history helps set the new findings in context - a context that makes the new report no less terrifying but much more telling for its unstated political implications.

Although atmospheric scientists had studied the problem for decades, global warming first emerged as a public issue in 1988 when James Hansen, a NASA scientist, told Congress that his research, and the work of a handful of other scientists, indicated that human beings were dangerously heating the planet, particularly through the use of fossil fuels. This bold announcement set off a scientific and political furor: many physicists and chemists played down the possibility of serious harm, and many governments, though feeling pressure to react, did little to restrain the use of fossil fuel. "More research" was the mantra everyone adopted, and funding for it flowed freely from governments and foundations. Under the auspices of the United Nations, scientists and governments set up a curious hybrid, the IPCC, to track and report on the progress of that research.

From roughly 1988 to 1995, the hypothesis that burning coal and gas and oil in large quantities was releasing carbon dioxide and other gases that would trap the sun's radiation on Earth and disastrously heat the planet remained just that: a hypothesis. Scientists used every means at their disposal to reconstruct the history of the earth's climate and to track current changes. For example, they studied the concentration of greenhouse gases in ancient air trapped in glacial cores, sampled the atmosphere with weather balloons, examined the relative thickness of tree rings, and observed the frequency of volcanic eruptions. Most of all, they refined the supercomputer models of the earth's atmosphere in an effort to predict the future of the world's weather.

By 1995, the central Herculean tasks of both research and synthesis were largely complete. The report the IPCC issued that year was able to assert that "the balance of evidence suggests" that human activity was increasing the planet's temperature and that it would be a serious problem. This was perhaps the most significant warning our species, as a whole, has yet been given. The report declared (in the pinched language of international science) that humans had grown so large in numbers and especially in appetite for energy that they were now damaging the most basic of the earth's systems - the balance between incoming and outgoing solar energy. Although huge amounts of impressive scientific research have continued over the twelve years since then, their findings have essentially been complementary to the 1995 report - a constant strengthening of the simple basic truth that humans were burning too much fossil fuel.

The 1995 consensus was convincing enough for Europe and Japan: the report's scientific findings were the basis for the Kyoto negotiations and the treaty they produced; those same findings also led most of the developed world to produce ambitious plans for reductions in carbon emissions. But the consensus didn't extend to Washington, and hence everyone else's efforts were deeply compromised by the American unwillingness to increase the price of energy. Our emissions continued to soar, and the plans of many of the Kyoto countries in Western Europe to reduce emissions sputtered. (At the same time, most tragically of all, China and India had just begun their rapid industrial takeoffs using precisely the technologies we then knew were wreaking havoc; they did not seek or find much aid from the Western countries that could have encouraged them to take a more benign path.) In 2001, the IPCC issued its Third Assessment Report (TAR), but it coincided with the start of the Bush administration, which refused even to consider a serious policy for climate. The IPCC's new Fourth Assessment of this February (known as AR4) arrives at a more congenial moment, as the new Democratic Congress takes up a wide variety of legislation designed, finally, to curb emissions.

The finding of the new report that attracted the most attention in the press was that scientists were now more confident than ever that the warming we've seen so far (about one degree Fahrenheit in the average global temperature) was caused by human beings. Instead of being merely "likely", the conclusion was now "very likely", which in the IPCC's lexicon means better than a ninety percent chance. But it's been years since any reputable scientist specializing in climate research doubted that conclusion. More important findings were ignored in accounts of the report and in some cases were obscured by the document's very poor prose, which is much more opaque than its predecessors. Those findings include:

* The amount of carbon in the atmosphere is now increasing at a faster rate even than before.

* Temperature increases would be considerably higher than they have been so far were it not for the blanket of soot and other pollution that is temporarily helping to cool the planet.

* Alternative explanations for some of the warming (for example, sunspot activity and the "urban heat island effect", the raising of temperatures in cities caused by high building densities and the use of heat-retaining materials such as concrete and asphalt) are now known to be relatively negligible.

* Almost everything frozen on earth is melting. Heavy rainfalls are becoming more common since the air is warmer and therefore holds more water than cold air, and "cold days, cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have become more frequent".


These facts serve as the prelude to the most important part of the new document, its predictions for what is to come. Here, too, the news essentially confirms the previous report, and indeed most of the predictions about climate change dating back to the start of research: if we don't take the most aggressive possible measures to curb fossil fuel emissions immediately, then we will see temperature increases of - at the best estimate - roughly five degrees Fahrenheit during this century. Technically speaking, that's enormous, enough to produce what James Hansen has called a "totally different planet", one much warmer than that known by any of our human ancestors.

The process by which the IPCC conducts its deliberations - scientists and national government representatives quibbling at enormous length over wording and interpretation - is Byzantine at best, and makes the group's achievements all the more impressive. But it sacrifices up-to-the-minute assessment of data in favor of lowest-common-denominator conclusions that are essentially beyond argument. That's a reasonable method, but one result is that the "shocking" conclusions of the new report in fact lag behind the most recent findings of climate science by several years.

That's most obvious here in the discussion of the rise in sea level. Researchers know that sea levels will rise fairly quickly this century, in part because of the melting of mountain glaciers and in part because warm water takes up more space than cold. The new assessment refines the calculations of the rise in sea level and puts the best estimate at a foot or two, which is actually slightly less than the last assessment in 2001. Though it doesn't sound like much, a couple of feet is actually a large amount - enough to inundate many low-lying areas and drown much of the Earth's coastal marshes and wetlands. Still, it might be more or less manageable.

During the last eighteen months, however, new research has indicated that a far more rapid rise in sea level may be possible, because the great ice sheets of Greenland and the Antarctic appear to have begun moving more quickly toward the sea. Some of this research appeared in Al Gore's movie An Inconvenient Truth, and James Hansen has written in The New York Review {5} about this new information; it is responsible for much of the recent increase in the level of alarm. But it is not included in the IPCC report, except as a caveat: "larger values cannot be excluded, but understanding of these effects is too limited to assess their likelihood or provide a best estimate or an upper bound for sea level rise".

In short, the new report is a remarkably conservative document. That it is still frightening in its predictions simply indicates the huge magnitude of the changes we're now causing, changes far larger than most people fully understand. Even using its conservative projections, the panel states unequivocally that typhoons and hurricanes will likely become more intense; that sea ice will shrink and perhaps disappear in the summertime Arctic; that snow cover will contract. Later this year, a second working group will outline the effects of these changes on humans, translating inches of sea-level rise into numbers of refugees, showing the effects of increases in temperature and humidity on malaria-carrying mosquitoes as well as the impact of heat waves on crop losses. The language will still be bloodless, but the findings obviously won't.

The IPCC has always avoided taking political positions - it doesn't recommend specific policies - and it continues this tradition with its new report. In its discussions of the momentum of climate change, however, it does introduce one particularly disturbing statistic. Because of the time lag between carbon emissions and their effect on air temperature, even if we halted the increase in coal, oil, and gas burning right now, temperatures would continue to rise about two tenths of a degree Celsius per decade. But, the report writes, "if all radiative forcing agents [that is, greenhouse gases] are held constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming trend would occur in the next two decades at a rate of about 0.1 degree Celsius per decade".

Translated into English, this means, to put it simply, that if world leaders had heeded the early warnings of the first IPCC report, and by 2000 had done the very hard work to keep greenhouse gas emissions from growing any higher, the expected temperature increase would be half as much as is expected now. In the words of the experts at www.realclimate.org, where the most useful analyses of the new assessment can be found, climate change is a problem with a very high "procrastination penalty": a penalty that just grows and grows with each passing year of inaction.

This is why the most important news about climate at the moment may come not from the IPCC but from Washington. After twenty years of inactivity - a remarkably successful bipartisan effort to accomplish nothing - the first few weeks of the new Congress have witnessed a flurry of activity. A series of bills have been introduced by people ranging from California Representative Henry Waxman and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders to Arizona's John McCain that would call for more or less aggressive carbon reduction targets. Some of the bills would set in place a "cap-and-trade" system that would set overall limits on emissions of carbon dioxide but would allow companies to freely buy and sell credits permitting them to emit certain amounts of it; this would produce a market for carbon-cutting measures.

The IPCC report doesn't call for particular reduction figures. It does, however, make clear that reduction in emissions must be quick and deep. There is no more optimistic alternative. Even if we do everything right, we're still going to see serious increases in temperature, and all of the physical changes (to one extent or another) predicted in the report. However, there's reason to hope that if the US acts extremely aggressively and quickly we might be able to avoid an increase of two degrees Celsius, the rough threshold at which runaway polar melting might be stopped. This means that any useful legislation will have to feature both a very rapid start to reductions and a long and uncompromising mandate to continue them. Sanders's bill, also endorsed by California's Barbara Boxer, who heads the relevant committee, comes closest to that standard. It calls for an eventual eighty percent cut in emissions by 2050. McCain's bill, cosponsored by one of his challengers for the presidency, Barack Obama, is somewhat weaker in its eventual targets. But the bargaining has barely begun, and in any event quick initial implementation of any cuts will be almost as important as the final numbers.

No one expects President Bush to sign such a bill. In fact, it was widely considered a minor miracle that he uttered the words "climate change" in this year's State of the Union address. (His limp proposal, centering on alternative fuels for some vehicles, was equally widely considered a dud.) What's happening now has much to do with positioning for the next presidential election, and the legislation that will eventually be passed and signed in 2009. What the IPCC report makes clear by implication is that that legislation will be our last meaningful chance: anything less than an all-out assault on carbon in our economy will be rendered meaningless by the increasing momentum of global warming. And of course by now our economy is only part of the problem. Though we use more energy per capita than any other country, the Chinese may pass us in total carbon emissions by decade's end. Even if we start to get our own house in order, we'll need to figure out how, with desperate speed, to lead an equally sweeping international response.

The only really encouraging development is the groundswell of public concern that has built over the last year, beginning with the reaction to Hurricane Katrina and Al Gore's movie. In January, a few of us launched an initiative called stepitup07.org. It calls for Americans to organize rallies in their own communities on April 14 asking for congressional action. In the first few weeks the website was open, more than six hundred groups in forty-six states registered to hold demonstrations - this will clearly be the largest organized response to global warming yet in this country. The groups range from environmental outfits to evangelical churches to college sororities, united only by the visceral sense (fueled in part by this winter's bizarre weather) that the planet has been knocked out of whack. The IPCC assessment offers a modest account of just how far out of whack it is - and just how hard we're going to have to work to have even a chance at limiting the damage.

_____

Note: This piece reviews Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, 18 pages It can be found at {}.


Bill McKibben is a frequent contributor to The New York Review and is scholar in residence at Middlebury College and the author of The End of Nature (Anchor, 1990) and Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future {3}.

This article appears in the March 15 2007 issue of The New York Review of Books

Copyright 2007 Bill McKibben

Notes

{1} http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=167460

{2} http://www.nybooks.com/

{3} http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0805076263/nationbooks08

{4} http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=83153

{5} http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19131



http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=167460


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Global Warming: It's All About Energy

by Michael T Klare

Foreign Policy In Focus (February 15 2007)

www.fpif.org


Finally, after years of effort by dedicated scientists and activists like Al Gore, the issue of global warming has begun to receive the international attention it desperately needs. The publication on February 2 of the most recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), providing the most persuasive evidence to date of human responsibility for rising world temperatures, generated banner headlines around the world. But while there is a growing consensus on humanity's responsibility for global warming, policymakers have yet to come to terms with its principal cause: our unrelenting consumption of fossil fuels.

When talk of global warming is introduced into the public discourse, as in Gore's "An Inconvenient Truth", it is generally characterized as an environmental problem, akin to water pollution, air pollution, pesticide abuse, and so on. This implies that it can be addressed - like those other problems - through a concerted effort to "clean up" our resource-utilization behavior, by substituting "green" products for ordinary ones, by restricting the release of toxic substances, and so on.

But global warming is not an "environmental" problem in the same sense as these others - it is an energy problem, first and foremost. Almost ninety percent of the world's energy is supplied through the combustion of fossil fuels, and every time we burn these fuels to make energy we release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere; carbon dioxide, in turn, is the principal component of the "greenhouse gases" (greenhouse gases) that are responsible for warming the planet. Energy use and climate change are two sides of the same coin.


Fossil Fuel Dependency

Consider the situation in the United States. According to the Department of Energy (DoE), carbon dioxide emissions constitute 84% of this nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Of all US carbon dioxide emissions, most - 98% - are emitted as a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, which currently provide approximately 86% of America's total energy supply. This means that energy use and carbon dioxide emissions are highly correlated: the more energy we consume, the more carbon dioxide we release into the atmosphere, and the more we contribute to the buildup of greenhouse gases.

Because Americans show no inclination to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels - but rather are using more and more of them all the time - one can foresee no future reduction in US emissions of greenhouse gases. According to the DoE, the United States is projected to consume 35% more oil, coal, and gas combined in 2030 than in 2004; not surprisingly, the nation's emissions of carbon dioxide are expected to rise by approximately the same percentage over this period. If these projections prove accurate, total US carbon dioxide emissions in 2030 will reach a staggering 8.1 billion metric tons, of which 42% will be generated through the consumption of oil (most of it in automobiles, vans, trucks, and buses), forty percent by the burning of coal (principally to produce electricity), and the remainder by the combustion of natural gas (mainly for home heating and electricity generation). No other activity in the United States will come even close in terms of generating greenhouse gas emissions.

What is true of the United States is also true of other industrialized and industrializing nations, including China and India. Although a few may rely on nuclear power or energy renewables to a greater extent than the United States, all continue to consume fossil fuels and to emit large quantities of carbon dioxide, and so all are contributing to the acceleration of global climate change. According to the DoE, global emissions of carbon dioxide are projected to increase by a frightening 75% between 2003 and 2030, from 25.0 to 43.7 billion metric tons. People may talk about slowing the rate of climate change, but if these figures prove accurate, the climate will be much hotter in coming decades and this will produce the most damaging effects predicted by the IPCC.

What this tells us is that the global warming problem cannot be separated from the energy problem. If the human community continues to consume more fossil fuels to generate more energy, it inevitably will increase the emission of carbon dioxide and so hasten the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus causing irreversible climate change. Whatever we do on the margins to ameliorate this process - such as planting trees to absorb some of the carbon emissions or slowing the rate of deforestation - will have only negligible effect so long as the central problem of fossil-fuel consumption is left unchecked.


State of Denial

Many political and business leaders wish to deny this fundamental reality. They may claim to accept the conclusions of the IPCC report. They will admit that vigorous action is needed to stem the buildup of greenhouse gases. But they will nevertheless seek to shield energy policy from fundamental change.

Typical of this approach is a talk given by Rex W Tillerson, the CEO of Exxon Mobil, at a conference organized by Cambridge Energy Research Associates on February 13. As head of the world's largest publicly traded energy firm, Tillerson receives special attention when he talks. That his predecessor Lee Raymond often disparaged the science of global warming lent his comments particular significance. Yes, Tillerson admitted, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were increasing, and this contributed to the planet's gradual warming. But then, in language characteristic of the industry, he added, "The scale advantages of oil and natural gas across a broad array applications provide economic value unmatched by any alternative". It would therefore be a terrible mistake, he added, to rush into the development of energy alternatives when the consequences of global warming are still not fully understood.

The logic of this mode of thinking is inescapable. The continued production of fossil fuels to sustain our existing economic system is too important to allow the health of the planet to stand in its way. Buy into this mode of thought, and you can say goodbye to any hope of slowing - let alone reversing - the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.


What to Do

If, however, we seek to protect the climate while there is still time to do so, we must embrace a fundamental transformation in our energy behavior: nothing else will make a significant difference. In practice, this devolves into two fundamental postulates. We must substantially reduce our consumption of fossil fuels, and we must find ways to capture and bury the carbon by-products of the fossil fuels we do consume.

Various strategies have been proposed to achieve these objectives. Those that offer significant promise should be utilized to the maximum extent possible. This is not the place to evaluate these strategies in detail, except to make a few broad comments.

First, as noted, since 42% of American carbon dioxide emissions (the largest share) are produced through the combustion of petroleum, anything that reduces oil consumption - higher fuel-efficiency standards for motor vehicles, bigger incentives for hybrids, greater use of ethanol, improved public transportation, car-pooling, and so - should be made a major priority.

Second, because the combustion of coal in electrical power plants is our next biggest source of carbon dioxide, improving the efficiency of these plants and filtering out the harmful emissions has to be another top priority.

Finally, we should accelerate research into promising new techniques for the capture and "sequestration" of carbon during the combustion of fossil fuels in electricity generation. Some of these plans call for burying excess carbon in hollowed-out coalmines and oil wells - a very practical use for these abandoned relics, but only if it can be demonstrated that none of the carbon will leak back into the atmosphere, adding to the buildup of greenhouse gases.

Global warming is an energy problem, and we cannot have both an increase in conventional fossil fuel use and a habitable planet. It's one or the other. We must devise a future energy path that will meet our basic (not profligate) energy needs and also rescue the climate while there's still time. The technology to do so is potentially available to us, but only if we make the decision to develop it swiftly and on a very large scale.
_____

Michael T Klare is a professor of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College, a Foreign Policy In Focus columnist, and the author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependence on Imported Petroleum (Metropolitan Books, 2004).

_____

Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the International Relations Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org).

Copyright (c) Creative Commons - some rights reserved.

Recommended citation: Michael T Klare, "Global Warming: It's All About Energy" (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, February 15 2007).


http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3998


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Bayoneting a Scarecrow

The 9/11 conspiracy theories are a coward's cult

by George Monbiot

Published in the Guardian (February 20 2007)

www.monbiot.com (February 20 2007)


"You did this hit piece because your corporate masters instructed you to. You are a controlled asset of the New World Order ... bought and paid for." {1} "Everyone has some skeleton in the cupboard. How else would MI5 and the Special Branch recruit agents?" {2} "Shill, traitor, sleeper", "leftwing gatekeeper", "accessory after the fact", "political whore of the biggest conspiracy of them all".

These are a few of the measured responses to my article, a fortnight ago, about the film Loose Change, which maintains that the US government destroyed the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Having spent years building up my left-wing credibility on behalf of my paymasters in MI5, I've blown it. I overplayed my hand, and have been exposed, like Bush and Cheney, by a bunch of kids with laptops. My handlers are furious.

I believe that George Bush is surrounded by some of the most scheming, devious, ruthless men to have found their way into government since the days of the Borgias. I believe that they were criminally negligent in failing to respond to intelligence about a potential attack by Al Qaeda, and that they have sought to disguise their incompetence by classifying crucial documents. I believe, too, that the Bush government seized the opportunity provided by the attacks to pursue a long-standing plan to invade Iraq and reshape the Middle East, knowing full well that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11. Bush deliberately misled the American people about the links between 9/11 and Iraq and about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. He is responsible for the murder of many tens of thousands of Iraqis.

But none of this is sufficient. To qualify as a true opponent of the Bush regime, you must also now believe that it is capable of magic. It could blast the Pentagon with a cruise missile, while persuading hundreds of onlookers that they saw a plane. It could wire every floor of the Twin Towers with explosives without attracting attention, and prime the charges (though planes had ploughed through the middle of the sequence) to drop each tower in a perfectly-timed collapse. It could make Flight 93 disappear into thin air, and somehow ensure that the relatives of the passengers collaborated with the deception. It could recruit tens of thousands of conspirators to participate in these great crimes, and induce them all to kept their mouths shut, for ever.

In other words, you must believe that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and their pals are all-knowing, all-seeing and all-powerful, despite the fact that they were incapable of faking either weapons of mass destruction or any evidence at Ground Zero that Saddam Hussein was responsible. You must believe that the impression of cackhandedness and incompetence they have managed to project since taking office is a front. Otherwise you are a traitor and a spy.

Why do I bother with these morons? Because they are destroying the movements which some of us have spent a long time trying to build. Those of us who believe that the crucial global issues - climate change, the Iraq war, nuclear proliferation, inequality - are insufficiently debated in parliament or congress; that corporate power stands too heavily on democracy; that war criminals, cheats and liars are not being held to account, have invested our efforts in movements outside the mainstream political process. These, we are now discovering, are peculiarly susceptible to this epidemic of gibberish.

The obvious corollorary to the belief that the Bush administration is all-powerful is that the rest of us are completely powerless. In fact it seems to me that the purpose of the "9/11 truth movement" is to be powerless. The omnipotence of the Bush regime is the coward's fantasy, an excuse for inaction used by those who don't have the stomach to engage in real political fights.

Let me give you an example. The column I wrote about Loose Change two weeks ago generated 777 posts on Comment is Free, which is almost a record. Most of them were furious. The response from a producer of the film, published last week, attracted 467 {2}. On the same day I published an article about a genuine, demonstrable conspiracy: a spy network feeding confidential information from an arms control campaign to Britain's biggest weapons manufacturer, BAE. It drew sixty responses {3}. The members of the 9/11 cult weren't interested. If they were, they might have had to do something. The great virtue of a fake conspiracy is that it calls on you to do nothing.

The 9/11 conspiracy theories are a displacement activity. A displacement activity is something you do because you feel incapable of doing what you ought to do. A squirrel sees a larger squirrel stealing its hoard of nuts. Instead of attacking its rival, it sinks its teeth into a tree and starts ripping it to pieces. Faced with the mountainous challenge of the real issues we must confront, the chickens in the "truth" movement focus instead on a fairytale, knowing that nothing they do or say will count, knowing that because the perpetrators don't exist, they can't fight back. They demonstrate their courage by repeatedly bayoneting a scarecrow.

Many of those who posted responses on Comment is Free contend that Loose Change (which was neatly demolished in the BBC's film The Conspiracy Files on Sunday night) is a poor representation of the conspiracists' case. They urge us instead to visit websites like 911truth.org, physics911.net and 911scholars.org, and to read articles by the theology professor David Ray Griffin and the physicist Steven E Jones. Concerned that I might have missed something, I have now done all those things, and have come across exactly the same concatenation of ill-attested nonsense as I saw in Loose Change. In all these cases you will find wild supposition raised to the status of incontrovertible fact; rumour and confusion transformed into evidence; selective editing; the citation of fake experts; the dismissal of real ones. Doubtless I will now be told that these are not the true believers: I will need to dive into another vat of tripe to get to the heart of the conspiracy.

The 9/11 truthers remind me of nothing so much as the climate-change deniers, cherry-picking their evidence, seizing any excuse for ignoring the arguments of their opponents. Witness the respondents to my Loose Change column who maintain that the magazine Popular Mechanics, which has ripped the demolition theories apart, is a government front. They know this because one of its editors, Benjamin Chertoff, is the brother / nephew / first cousin of the US Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. (They are, as far as Benjamin can discover, unrelated, but what does he know?) {4}.

Like the millenarian fantasies which helped to destroy the Levellers as a political force in the mid-17th century, this crazy distraction presents a mortal danger to popular oppositional movements. If I were Bush or Blair, nothing would please me more than to see my opponents making idiots of themselves, while devoting their lives to chasing a phantom. But as a controlled asset of the New World Order, I would say that, wouldn't I? It's all part of the plot.

www.monbiot.com


References:

1. Gary Allen, 911truthnc.org, 6th February 2007. Email.

2. "sirarthurchichester", 8th February 2007. On Comment is Free.

3. George Monbiot, 13th February 2007. The parallel universe of BAE: covert, dangerous and beyond the rule of law. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2011751,00.html

4. Quoted by Will Sullivan, 3rd September 2006. Viewing 9/11 From a Grassy Knoll, US News and World Report. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060903/11conspiracy.htm


Copyright (c) 2006 Monbiot.com


http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/02/20/bayoneting-a-scarecrow/


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Creating Real Prosperity

Critics of "go local" movements warn that buying local deprives people in the Global South of jobs that could lift them out of poverty. But are multinationals really helping?

by Frances Moore Lappe


YES! Magazine (Winter 2007 Issue) Go Local!


There's only one thing worse for the poor in the Global South, we're told, than a job in a sweatshop: It's the alternative - no job. That's basically what New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof argued recently. If true, then "buy local" campaigns in the North that cut imports could harm the planet's poorest people.

But before accepting this heart-rending story, let's ground ourselves in the real global economy.

Shedding corporate-media filters, we see that the poor are not languishing in their sad villages and grimy shantytowns just waiting to be saved by corporate giants from abroad. Many poor people are themselves creating the real job growth in much of the Global South. They are the small shopkeepers, street vendors, and home-based workers whose jobs make up what's called the "informal economy" not counted by authorities.

In Latin America, 85 percent of new jobs created during the 1990s were in this sector, not the corporate one. Informal jobs account for more than half of all jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean, and as much as eighty percent in parts of Asia and in Africa. {1}

"The informal economy is anything corporations can't make money on", social entrepreneur Josh Mailman quipped to me recently. "That's why it's invisible".

Many of the jobs the poor are creating are not what the wealthy minority abroad might imagine - one of individuals scrambling, say, to power a pedicab in Dhaka or sell fruit on streets of Caracas.

Millions are working together, through microcredit institutions and people's movements, to further both economic and social goals. Among the biggest are Bangladesh's largely self-financing Grameen Bank, BRAC (formerly the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), and the Association for Social Advancement, whose combined microloans have gone to roughly sixteen million poor people, mostly women, enabling many to create their own village-level enterprises. {2}

Grameen - mostly owned by its borrowers - reports that more than half the families of its borrowers have "crossed the poverty line". Assuming Bangladesh's other two large micro-credit efforts come close to this success rate, rural Bangladeshis' self-directed initiatives have freed more than four times as many from poverty as the number employed in export garment factories, where insecure jobs offer eight to eighteen cents an hour.

Overall, the number of microcredit users worldwide - many of whom are creating their own work - is roughly four times the 23-million people directly employed by all multinational corporations.

BRAC alone employs almost 100,000 people, not in order to return a profit to an investor but, as BRAC says, "with the twin objectives of poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor". With its members' groups now in more than 140,000 Bangladeshi village organizations, BRAC is creating not only health services and schooling but its own small enterprises, to - from fisheries to printing to a tissue-culture lab to an iodized salt plant. They operate mostly for local consumption and are controlled by BRAC itself.

We citizens of the North think of global capital as the only jobs-generator. But more people in the world are members of cooperatives - around 800 million - than own shares in publicly traded companies. {3} Many are helping build locally controlled economies. Over the last three decades, women in India have, for example, built a network of cooperative dairies raising the incomes of more than eleven million households. {4} Compare that to the one to two million jobs created by the high-tech corporate sector in India. {5}

Worldwide, co-op membership doubled in the last thirty years, according to the Geneva-based International Co-operative Alliance. In Colombia, the Saludcoop health care cooperative is the nation's second largest employer, providing services to a quarter of the population. {6}

And to those who still see global capital as the poor's savior, I am tempted to respond, "Let's get real!" Even if it were a path to real advancement, US direct investment in the poorest continent, Africa, is close to zilch anyway - representing about one percent of all US direct investments abroad. {7}


Benefits for North and South

Relocalizing economies in the North isn't an all-or-nothing proposition. Importing tropical products like coffee and bananas from the Global South makes sense, as does importing artisanal goods, linking cultures by spreading beauty and appreciation of difference. The real challenge is ensuring that exports don't undermine basic food security and that producers for export get a fair return.

That means, in part, expanding the fair trade movement, which is already making a huge difference in the lives of over one million farmers and farm workers. It also means challenging monopoly power among food processors as well as encouraging more local processing so that a bigger share of the end-value stays in producer communities. {8} (Today, just a tenth of the value of coffee stays in coffee-producing countries, down from almost a third of the value just ten years ago {9}.)

Getting serious about ending poverty in the Global South does not mean abetting the reach of global corporations. Instead, we can work to remove the barriers US corporate-driven policies place in the way of thriving local economies abroad - policies like NAFTA and US farm subsidies that have drowned Mexican corn farmers in a flood of subsidized US corn.

In building local, living economies here, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the citizens of the Global South.
_____

Frances Moore Lappe is a YES! contributing editor. She is the author of Democracy's Edge: Choosing to Save Our Country by Bringing Democracy to Life (Jossey-Bass, 2005).


Footnotes

(Some of the figures given in this article have been updated from the print version)

1 Gustavo Capdevila, Dim Outlook Despite Economic Growth, Says ILO, IPS, 23 August 1999, Geneva.

"The incomes of the informal sector, crucial to the region's economy, also fell an average of one percent from 1990 to 1998 - a trend that has major repercussions, the report stressed, as a full 85 percent of new jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean were created in the informal sector. Indeed, the creation of new jobs remained stagnant last year in the formal economy, while the informal sector grew 4.5 percent, mainly due to the dynamic performance of micro-enterprises. The informal economy presently provides 58.7 percent of jobs outside of the agricultural sector, formal employment in large private sector firms 28.4 percent, and the public sector 12.9 percent.

See Also: Martha Alter Chen, Women and Informality: A Global Picture, the Global Movement, SAIS Review, Vol 21, #1, Winter-Spring 2001, pages 71-82, Johns Hopkins University Press

"Even before the crisis, official statistics indicated that the informal sector accounted for nearly half of total non-agricultural employment in East Asia, over half in Latin America and the Caribbean, and as much as eighty percent in other parts of Asia and in Africa. {1} In terms of urban employment, the informal sector accounted for well over half in Africa and Asia and a quarter in Latin America and the Caribbean.

[Table 1] Not only its size but the contribution of the informal sector in income terms is significant in many regions. For example, in several African countries, it accounts for nearly thirty percent of total income and over forty percent of total urban income. The contribution of the informal sector to gross domestic product is probably also sizable. For those countries where estimates exist, the share of the informal sector in non-agricultural GDP is between 45 and 60 percent.

2 Sixteen million estimate made up of the following: the website of Grameen Bank indicates that it has 6.67 million borrowers, 97 percent of whom are women. The number of borrowers from the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) is estimated at 4.6 million (see page 5 of ASA annual report, June 2006). BRAC borrowers were estimated at four million in a statement by Bangladesh UN Representative H E Dr Iftekhar Admed Chowdhury, to NGO briefing on 'Microfinance and poverty reduction' in New York, October 13 2005, and are listed at five million in a BRAC press release July 2006.

3 Estimate from International Co-operative Alliance and David Thompson, long time analyst and author about the global cooperative movement.

4 'State of Food Insecurity in the World 2004, Food and Agriculture Organization, UN, 26.

5 A conservative extrapolation from a statistic given by Vijay Joshi in "The Myth of India's Outsourcing Boom", published simultaneously in India Daily and The Financial Times (November 16 2004): "IT-related output is currently less than one per cent of GDP. More significantly the sector employs less than one million people."

6 Oscar Arias Si"?1/2nchez, The Cooperative Revolution, Ode, Issue 31.

7 S Bowles, R Edwards, F Roosevelt, Understanding Global Capitalism, 3rd Edition (Oxford University Press, 2005), 400.

8 For more information about on the impact of Fair Trade choices see www.transfair.org.

9 Bill Vorley, Food Inc: Corporate Concentration from Farm to Consumer, UK Food Group, 2003, 24.

http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=1548


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Monday, February 19, 2007

Jeff Vail's "A Theory of Power"

by Dave Pollard

How to Save the World (December 05 2006)


Jeff Vail's short, free online book A Theory of Power {1} begins with a series of provocative theses:

* The best representation of our world, of what 'is', is not matter, but the connections between matter.

* These connections define 'power-relationships' - the ability of one entity to influence the action of another.

* The 'law' of evolution can therefore be restated as: if new patterns of forces can survive their impacts with one another, if they tend to hold together rather than tear apart, they then represent a stable collection of power-relationships which survive, self-replicate, and mutate into further new patterns which are in turn subject to the same law.

* This law applies to physical (matter), biological (gene) and cultural (meme) patterns; all matter and life and consciousness, and their evolution, are 'creatures' of their/our material, genetic and cultural constituents, created for the perpetuation of these patterns and sustained through their stable power-relationships.

* Because of the evolutionary success of memes (due to their ability to adapt and change much more quickly and successfully than genes), culture has come to play an increasingly dominant role in our planet's power-relationships.

* Most significantly, the advent of agriculture, which was provoked by climate change (the ice ages) brought about a necessary power shift from the individual to the group in the interest of memes' survival, to the point the individual became largely enslaved to the culture, and the survival of the civilization culture now outweighs in importance the survival of any of its members or communities.

* A consequence of that has been the advent of the codependent cultural constructs of market and state, and, as agriculture has enabled exponential growth in population and created new scarcities, egalitarian societies of abundance have given way to hierarchical societies of managed scarcity.

* This hierarchy has been further entrenched with the cultural evolution of technologies that enable even greater self-perpetuation of the memes that gave rise to it, and have led to the 'efficient' subjugation of the human individual to technology - that's the power-relationship that most supports the survival and stasis of the culture, and under it even those at the top of the hierarchy become slave-hosts to the memes and culture.

* These memes and culture can now self-perpetuate and thrive more effectively with technology and the artificial constructs of market and globalizations than they could with inefficient and unreliable human hosts, so technology growth is now even outstripping human growth, to the point that humans are becoming commodities and could even become redundant.

* So: if we are now becoming slaves to the machine-powered perpetuation of memes that are outgrowing their need for us (to the point that although catastrophic global warming and human extinction now seem inevitable, this is not something our meme-culture 'cares' about) can we, the human slaves, thanks to the genetic and memetic evolution of self-awareness, 'liberate' ourselves and defeat the meme-culture before it destroys us? In other words, can we consciously, collectively take control for the first time over power-relationships, and establish new power-relationships that put the genetic survival of the human race (and, hopefully, the survival of all other life on Earth on which that genetic survival depends) ahead of the reckless survival of the Frankenstein 'civilization' culture we have created?

Vail's answer to this final question is a qualified 'yes'. He argues that the way to establish power-relationships that put our genes' interest ahead of memes' is to "confront hierarchy with its opposite - rhizome - a web-like structure of connected but independent nodes", borrowing from successful models in nature of such structures. The working units (nodes) of this 'revolutionary' structure are self-sufficient, egalitarian communities, and the concept of 'ownership' in such communities is eliminated to prevent the reemergence of hierarchy.

Rhizome-based structures need to be developed and then institutionalized from the bottom up to replace hierarchical ones, Vail argues, in all areas of our society - social, political, economic, educational et cetera to entrench the power and sustainability of self-sufficient communities and render them invulnerable to re-expropriation of that power by hierarchies. In practical terms, he says:

"Power remains distributed to the level of the individual rhizome node through local, functional self-sufficiency - a modern equivalent to the Domestic Mode of Production. In other words, functional self-sufficiency means the ability to produce at the household level at least the minimum necessities for day-to-day existence without relying on outside agents or resources. Self-sufficiency removes the individual rhizome node from dependence on the standard set of outside suppliers. It does not eliminate exchange, but creates a situation where any exchange exists as a voluntary activity. The commodities that each node must provide for itself include staple foodstuffs, energy for heating, basic habitat and small group interaction."


Self-sufficient energy coops, and local permaculture-based food movements are examples of rhizome structures. Such networks are also the most effective means for the dissemination of information on how to make rhizome activities even more effective - they have much less signal loss than hierarchical methods that require information to flow up and then down controlled and constricted paths. Rhizomes are also, while less 'efficient', more effective and more resilient than hierarchies.

Next, Vail argues that, once established, to defend against attacks from vestiges of hierarchical systems, rhizome networks need to adopt asymmetrical methods - by reducing the desire of hierarchy to re-achieve power (for example, by making it difficult or unrewarding to do so on its own terms) and by becoming 'invisible' to the hierarchy (for example, dropping out quietly and not taking part in the hierarchy's social, political and economic activities). Vail concludes:

"A new vision, with individual freedom to pursue arts and spirituality, above the pettiness of bickering for power, may prove possible if we learn to control the powers that have dominated us throughout history. In the spirit of this vision, the message will ultimately fail if forced upon others. Only through personal example, by showing that a realistic and preferable alternative exists, will these concepts succeed on a large scale. We will act as pioneers, who will begin to create diverse rhizome nodes, each one representing an individual's struggle to solve the problems of hierarchy and human ontogeny. The more we learn and break free from the control of genes and memes, the more success these pioneers will have. Effective tools and practices will spread, and the rhizome network will grow and strengthen. As this network evolves, it will provide a realistic, implementable alternative to hierarchy - an alternative that fulfills our genetic ontogeny and empowers us as individuals. Nature has shown us that the structure of the rhizome can compete with hierarchy and stratification. When combined with an understanding of reality and humanity that makes us our own masters, we may finally learn from the events of the past ... and gain control of our future."


Natural Community

This is entirely consistent with the approach I have been arguing for - the bottom-up creation of a combination of working models of (a) self-sufficient, sustainable (probably polyamory) egalitarian intentional communities {2} operating under Gift Economy principles, (b) natural enterprises {3} and (c) peer-to-peer information and organization networks {4}.

The concern many have expressed about models like Vail's and mine is how to scale them up - how to get them to the 'tipping point' at which, like viruses, they start spreading quickly and supplant the old hierarchical ones. One approach Vail mentions is Hakim Bey's Temporary Autonomous Zones {5} (TAZs, or 'pirate utopias'). Bey's zones are based on the principles of (a) thirty to fifty person 'bands' replacing families (Bey quotes Gide: "Families, how I hate them! The misers of love!"), (b) a continuous 'festival' culture of conviviality, abundance, sharing, celebration, and joy and (c) no private ownership.

I really like the idea of a festival culture. Bey sees the zones as temporary (nomadic, to prevent their being attacked by the prevailing hierarchical culture). Vail says they will only be needed "until the size of the rhizome network provides enough power" to sustain them.

But that's not how viral models work in nature. They get a foothold and then replicate. Assuming we can create some successful working models without having them destroyed by fearful or envious corporatists (and though I'm perhaps naive, I don't think the establishment would be bothered to try to destroy them when they're below the radar screen, and after that it's too late), how might they replicate virally?

Suppose we were to invite people to just begin. We could use Open Space invitations to find the people who are ready to create some working models of TAZs. We could facilitate Open Space sessions to let invitees form TAZ 'tribes', each tribe consisting of about fifteen contiguous intentional community 'clans' of about 100 people, with each clan having two or three natural enterprise 'bands' operating within them. Then, any clan that was so popular that it attracted new members to grow beyond the magic number of 150 people would 'split' into two new intentional communities (members would self-select which of the two clans to belong to), and any tribe that exceeded about 2000 people would 'split' into two new tribes the same way. This is the way viruses replicate, and the way that some groups of animals instinctively hive off when their membership exceeds a certain threshold. As our rhizome-culture working models became more and more popular, and the hierarchical civilization culture collapses, we would simply and organically take over. Bottom-up, a model that has evolved to work replacing one that has ceased to function. That's life.

These sustainable, natural bands, clans and tribes would support each other through network connections, physical and technological. Each would be autonomous and self-sufficient, and evolve in its own self-determined, wonderfully diverse way.

The great challenge, of course, is finding arable land that can sustain these extraordinary experiments. One solution would be simply to wait until climate change, pandemic, economic collapse or other disasters depopulate an area to the point its land becomes free or nearly so. Another approach I've mentioned before is to find philanthropists willing to donate the land on a successful-efforts basis. Or, we they could start in Russia and other countries where serious depopulation has already begun.

Are you ready for this? Is the world?

_____

Endnotes

{1} http://www.jeffvail.net/atheoryofpower.pdf

{2} http://blogs.salon.com/0002007/2006/05/30.html#a1542

{3} http://blogs.salon.com/0002007/2006/07/03.html#a1577

{4} http://blogs.salon.com/0002007/2006/03/12.html#a1463

{5} http://hermetic.com/bey/taz3.html

{6} http://energybulletin.net/news.php?keywords=&author=vail&order=date&cat=0&startdate%5BF%5D=&startdate%5Bd%5D=&startdate%5BY%5D=&enddate%5BF%5D=&enddate%5Bd%5D=&enddate%5BY%5D=&action=search


Editorial Notes

Thanks to Dave Pollard for an excellent summary, as well as his thoughts on the book. We've run several of Jeff Vail's articles {6} and are interested in his theories. Although they are abstract and not easy to digest, the theories make explicit ideas that seem to be on the minds of many people.

Vail's theory about "rhizome" structures has a lot of applications today: the permaculture movement, guerrilla warfare, the Web, the peak oil blogosphere ...

The idea of rhizome social structures as an alternative to hierarchy has historical roots:

* Communitarian anarchism, as in the works of Peter Kropotkin

* Utopian socialism

* A strain within libertarianism, voiced by Karl Hess.

* Jeffersonian democracy and agrarianism (as in the works of Wendell Berry).

* The self-sufficiency and commune movements of 1960s and 1970s, as well as the back-to-the-land movements of the 1930s and 1940s, and communal movements in the 19th century (for example, Shakers).

* Many traditional and peasant cultures have similar elements.


Jeff Vail's blog is A Theory of Power, www.jeffvail.net


http://www.energybulletin.net/newswire.php?id=23319

http://blogs.salon.com/0002007/2006/12/04.html#a1716


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Sunday, February 18, 2007

How to be good

by Ziauddin Sardar

New Statesman (January 22 2007)

Worldchanging: a user's guide for the 21st century
Edited by Alex Steffen Abrams, 596 pages, GBP 24.95
ISBN 0810930951

Let's face it, the world is in a total mess. Global warming is irrevocably changing our atmosphere. We drive petrol-guzzling cars, heat our homes with inefficient gas and gorge ourselves on food that has clocked up thousands of air miles. At the same time, a billion people are trapped in abject poverty and millions of children die daily because of malnutrition or preventable diseases. Wars, violence and strife have engulfed the globe like uncontrolled forest fires. So what are you going to do about it?

You can, of course, decide to do nothing. You can take comfort in the fact that the world has existed for aeons and will surely continue to do so. You can put your faith in technology and hope that it will solve all those problems that seem so intractable at present - just as it has done in the past. You can wallow in countless predictions of a glorious future just over the horizon, issued with banal regularity by people whose job it is to paint the future in high-definition technicolour, and retire to the sofa in front of Celebrity Big Brother. But reality has a nasty habit of biting back. You will end up drowned in your own waste, poisoned by genetically modified food and infected by some frightening new disease such as bird flu. Forget that crucial Big Brother vote. You will be lucky to have a roof over your head, let alone a new HD television.

If I were you, I would go out this very moment and get a copy of Worldchanging. The introduction explains that, within the next five years, two billion extra people will join the global dinner table. The world's natural resources are disappearing at alarming rates, and our ability to burn oil, brew pesticides and manufacture dangerous plastics is out of all proportion to the renewable resources at our disposal. The planet is being consumed at an unprecedented rate: one person, one day, one decision at a time.

The divide between rich and poor, between nations and within nations, cannot be sustained any longer. It won't be long before shanty-town poor start kidnapping Goldman Sachs employees. Soon you will, like me, be nodding in agreement with Al Gore's observation, in the foreword, that human civilisation has reached a turning point.

So complacency is not an option. The future is imminent. And it will not come - as the science fiction writer Bruce Sterling, who knows about these things, says in the introduction to this massive volume - flying in from outer space, perfect, ready-made and chrome-plated. It will contain unimaginable horrors. We have only 25 years to avert this nightmare, and only one shot to get things right.

And it all depends on you. You are not a totally hopeless, powerless and useless person. You can be a hero if only you understand that the future is not a priori given; it can be shaped by your actions, decisions and commitment. You can usher a sustainable future simply by switching off the television, cutting down on the stuff that surrounds and flows through your daily life, and reducing your carbon footprint. You can empower yourself by cultural jamming (subverting corporate advertising), organising yourself around film and theatre, and even start a non-violent revolution. You can make yourself useful by becoming a citizen scientist, by documenting corporate misbehaviour or human-rights violations, and by connecting with millions of other global citizens who want to change the future.

Your heroic journey to become an environmentally conscious, socially responsible, ecologically successful, personally fulfilled, holistically healthy, non-additive organic consumer begins in the mind. Think about everything you do. And Worldchanging, which began life as an online compendium, is designed to help you think through every aspect of your life from the most minute to the earth-shattering. It's a book of ideas. It doesn't contain a list of dos or don'ts or tell you what to buy or where to shop. Instead, you learn how to buy better clothes, create a healthy home, preserve biodiversity and design a sustainable world. It provides keen planetary insight without the corporate overheads.

Indeed, it is a gold mine of sound, sustainable, green advice. Everything from housing to business practice, communities to cities and politics to direct action is covered. Everything is geared towards pragmatic and practical steps that you, as an individual, can take. And everything is examined with a keen critical sense. You say choice is good for you? Not so fast. Worldchanging says that our consumer culture is relentless: the more choice we have, the more effort we need to evaluate our options, the more tired we get and the more likely we are to be dissatisfied with the outcome. You want to help refugees and disaster victims? Worldchanging provides you with an easy-to-follow guide to lifesaving, blueprints for a refugee camp, suggestions for getting hold of a mobile hospital, even instructions to make a solar power station that can provide much-needed energy in areas with damaged infrastructure. Upset about city bonuses? Worldchanging shows you how to generate your own community capital.

So you have absolutely no excuses. Worldchanging wakes you from reality-TV-induced slumber, takes you by the hand and walks you step by step towards a sane and sustainable 21st century. You learn how to live a stress-free, gender-neutral, uncomplicated life. You acquire essential skills to appreciate and enjoy other traditions, religious or secular or those that choose to practise neither, to help the poor and the needy of the world, and to save the planet. It may not be as lavishly illustrated as that other celebrated do-it-yourself manual, The Joy of Sex, but it's a damn sight more useful. If your kids and grandkids have nothing to eat, drink or breathe, it will be your own fault.

http://www.newstatesman.com/200701220053


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Saturday, February 17, 2007

An Inconvenient Truth

Al Gore delivers the troubling information on global warming and its possible consquences in the documentary An Inconvenient Truth.

by Roger Ebert

RogerEbert.Com (June 02 2006)

Cast & Credits: Paramount Classics presents a documentary featuring Al Gore. Directed by Davis Guggenheim. Running time: 100 minutes. Rated PG (for mild thematic elements).


I want to write this review so every reader will begin it and finish it. I am a liberal, but I do not intend this as a review reflecting any kind of politics. It reflects the truth as I understand it, and it represents, I believe, agreement among the world's experts.

Global warming is real.

It is caused by human activity.

Mankind and its governments must begin immediate action to halt and reverse it.

If we do nothing, in about ten years the planet may reach a "tipping point" and begin a slide toward destruction of our civilization and most of the other species on this planet.

After that point is reached, it would be too late for any action.

These facts are stated by Al Gore in the documentary An Inconvenient Truth. Forget he ever ran for office. Consider him a concerned man speaking out on the approaching crisis. "There is no controversy about these facts", he says in the film. "Out of 925 recent articles in peer-review scientific journals about global warming, there was no disagreement. Zero."

He stands on a stage before a vast screen, in front of an audience. The documentary is based on a speech he has been developing for six years, and is supported by dramatic visuals. He shows the famous photograph "Earthrise", taken from space by the first American astronauts. Then he shows a series of later space photographs, clearly indicating that glaciers and lakes are shrinking, snows are melting, shorelines are retreating.

He provides statistics: The ten warmest years in history were in the last fourteen years. Last year South America experienced its first hurricane. Japan and the Pacific are setting records for typhoons. Hurricane Katrina passed over Florida, doubled back over the Gulf, picked up strength from unusually warm Gulf waters, and went from Category Three to Category Five. There are changes in the Gulf Stream and the jet stream. Cores of polar ice show that carbon dioxide is much, much higher than ever before in a quarter of a million years. It was once thought that such things went in cycles. Gore stands in front of a graph showing the ups and downs of carbon dioxide over the centuries. Yes, there is a cyclical pattern. Then, in recent years, the graph turns up and keeps going up, higher and higher, off the chart.

The primary man-made cause of global warming is the burning of fossil fuels. We are taking energy stored over hundreds of millions of years in the form of coal, gas and oil, and releasing it suddenly. This causes global warming, and there is a pass-along effect. Since glaciers and snow reflect sunlight but sea water absorbs it, the more the ice melts, the more of the sun's energy is retained by the sea.

Gore says that although there is "100 percent agreement" among scientists, a database search of newspaper and magazine articles shows that 57 percent question the fact of global warming, while 43 percent support it. These figures are the result, he says, of a disinformation campaign started in the 1990s by the energy industries to "reposition global warming as a debate". It is the same strategy used for years by the defenders of tobacco. My father was a Luckys smoker who died of lung cancer in 1960, and twenty years later it was still "debatable" that there was a link between smoking and lung cancer. Now we are talking about the death of the future, starting in the lives of those now living.

"The world won't 'end' overnight in ten years", Gore says. "But a point will have been passed, and there will be an irreversible slide into destruction".

In England, Sir James Lovelock, the scientist who proposed the Gaia hypothesis (that the planet functions like a living organism), has published a new book saying that in 100 years mankind will be reduced to "a few breeding couples at the Poles". Gore thinks "that's too pessimistic. We can turn this around just as we reversed the hole in the ozone layer. But it takes action right now, and politicians in every nation must have the courage to do what is necessary. It is not a political issue. It is a moral issue."

When I said I was going to a press screening of "An Inconvenient Truth", a friend said, "Al Gore talking about the environment! Bor...ing!" This is not a boring film. The director, Davis Guggenheim, uses words, images and Gore's concise litany of facts to build a film that is fascinating and relentless. In 39 years, I have never written these words in a movie review, but here they are: You owe it to yourself to see this film. If you do not, and you have grandchildren, you should explain to them why you decided not to.

Am I acting as an advocate in this review? Yes, I am. I believe that to be "impartial" and "balanced" on global warming means one must take a position like Gore's. There is no other view that can be defended. Senator James Inhofe (Republican, Oklahoma), chairman of the Senate Environment Committee, has said, "Global warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people". I hope he takes his job seriously enough to see this film. I think he has a responsibility to do that.

What can we do? Switch to and encourage the development of alternative energy sources: Solar, wind, tidal, and, yes, nuclear. Move quickly toward hybrid and electric cars. Pour money into public transit, and subsidize the fares. Save energy in our houses. I did a funny thing when I came home after seeing "An Inconvenient Truth". I went around the house turning off the lights.


http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060601/REVIEWS/60517002


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Friday, February 16, 2007

Dead End

Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice

by Edward N Luttwak

Harper's Magazine (February 2007)


__________

Note from Bill Totten: I am posting this because it ostensibly points out practical, tactical reasons why the United States cannot win wars against so-called "counterinsurgents" without flouting the very values it professes to hold dear (and holds other nations to), without becoming as evil as the evils it professes to wage war against. (Although, if it had not appeared in Harper's, I might have suspected it to be a trial balloon for abandoning those values.)

Unfortunately Luttwak displays the "national conceit" that William Pfaff discussed in "Manifest Destiny" (posted here on February 2nd): "It is something like a national heresy to suggest that the United States does not have a unique moral status and role to play in the history of nations, and therefore in the affairs of the contemporary world", "the old idea of an anointed nation doing God's work in the world", "A claim to preeminent political virtue ... a demand that other countries yield to what Washington asserts as universal interests" ... "a benevolent (or even inevitable) American world hegemony or empire ... universally assumed, in one or another form, in [US] policy and political circles".

Or, using Noam Chomsky's words, Luttwak adheres to "... the fundamental doctrine that [US] state power has noble objectives, and while it may make terrible blunders, it can have no crass motives and is not influenced by domestic concentrations of private power. Any questioning of these Higher Truths is either ignored or bitterly denounced, also for good reasons: allowing them to be discussed could undermine power and privilege." {"The US says it is fighting for democracy", posted here on February 13th}

The most obvious bias is Luttwak's use of the word "insurgent", which my dictionary defines as "a person who revolts against civil authority or an established government". Why not call them "freedom fighters"?

I inserted other comments at the places marked {==>} below. Bill Totten
__________


Prologue

Modern armed forces continue to be structured for large-scale war, but advanced societies whose small families lack expendable children have a very low tolerance for casualties. Even supposedly warlike Americans gravely count casualties in Iraq that in three years have yet to reach 3,000-fewer than were lost in many a single day of battle in past wars. Fortunately, this refusal to spill the blood needed to fuel battles diminishes the likelihood that advanced societies will deliberately set out to fight one another (pas des enfants, pas des Suisses, pas de guerre) unless they are somehow able to convince themselves that a war could be entirely or very largely aerial and naval.

Such wars, however, are difficult to imagine, except when islands are involved, as in a China-Taiwan war, which is very improbable for its own reasons. Air and naval forces can certainly be employed advantageously against any less advanced enemy incautious enough to rely on a conventional defense, conducted by regular forces, but in that context as well there must be severe doubts about the continued usefulness of the ground forces of advanced countries that are intolerant of casualties. It is easy enough to blockade the enemy, to successfully bomb all the right nodal points and shut down electrical, transportation, and communications networks. Air strikes can disable runways and destroy both sheltered and unsheltered aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear installations. Air power can also sink warships, or rout any mechanized forces deployed in the open, as the United States did with Iraq in 1991 and partly in 2003, and as it could do with Iran. No real role would remain for ground forces except to dislodge the enemy from any territory he had occupied, or to occupy his own territory. That, however, is bound to cost casualties that might not be tolerated; it is also bound to provoke an insurgency.

In that event, naval forces cannot do much, because insurgencies rarely have an important maritime dimension (the Sri Lanka case is an exception) and riverine operations are usually minor. Air forces can have surveillance and transport roles, but insurgents rarely present targets of sufficient stability and sufficient contrast to be identified, designated, and effectively attacked from the air. That leaves almost everything to the ground forces, and when the advanced attack the less advanced, the more advanced forces will have large advantages in firepower, mobility, and operational coherence. But they will also have no visible enemy to fight, so that the normal operational methods and tactics of conventional warfare cannot be applied. True, there are the alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare, but do they actually work? Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see.


The Theory of Counterinsurgency Warfare

Two distinguished American generals of exceptional intelligence, James N Mattis of the Marine Corps and David H Petraeus of the Army, each now responsible for the training and doctrine policy of his own service, have recently circulated the text of a new "counterinsurgency" field manual, FM 324 DRAFT, which they propose for official use. Its doctrines emerge from the chapter titles. After a first chapter of definitions (which any military manual must have, because the battlefield is no place for semantic debate) we come to the first substantive chapter, "Unity of Effort: Integrating Civil and Military Activities", in which the authors duly recognize and strongly emphasize the essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents. That is hardly an original discovery, as the two generals and their staffs would be the first to recognize, yet it is still necessary to affirm what should be obvious, because amid the frustrations of fighting a mostly invisible enemy, it is hard to resist the tempting delusion that some clever new tactics, or even some clever new technology, can defeat the insurgents.

Much more questionable is the proposition that follows, which is presented as self-evident, that a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support can be won by providing better government. Yet the extraordinary persistence of dictatorships as diverse in style as the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Syria shows that in fact government needs no popular support as long as it can secure obedience. As for better government, that is certainly wanted in France, Norway, or the United States, but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders.

{==>} Note the presumption here that our form of government is better than others.

The very word "guerrilla", which now refers only to a tactic, was first used to describe the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators, under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6 1808, King Joseph of Spain presented a draft constitution that for the first time in Spain's history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and of the Church. At that time, abbeys, monasteries, and bishops still owned every building and every piece of land in 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe's most wretched tenants. Despite the fact that the new constitution would have liberated them and let them keep their harvests for themselves, the Spanish peasantry failed to rise up in its support. Instead, they obeyed the priests, who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. For Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that mattered to most Spaniards - not what was proposed but by whom it was proposed.

{==>} Note the tone in preceding and following paragraphs that the illiterate Spanish peasantry "failed" to support the foreign invader. Were Napoleon and the French altruists merely out to aid the poor peasants of Sapin and Naples?

By then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were slaughtered by the very peasants and plebeians they wished to emancipate. They were mustered into a militia of the "Holy Faith" by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally a member of Calabria's largest land-owning family, who led his men forward on horseback. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all promises of material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan. Spain's clergy did the same, and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first clause of Joseph's draft constitution had not only recognized the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church but stated that it was the only one allowed in Spain.


The same kind of politics are now in evidence in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the new Iraqi constitution, and the emergence of clerical warlords who are as ready to use violence as Cardinal Ruffo was. Since the 2003 invasion, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their, "Christian" allies have come to Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland and to steal the country's oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy - with the exception of women's rights, which the clerics say are only propagandized to persuade Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families by imitating the shameless nakedness and impertinence of Western women.

{==>} Here Luttwak insinuates that the Americans and their allies have NOT come to Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland and to steal the country's oil and that all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders is NOT mere hypocrisy.


The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help them. They themselves would never invade a foreign country except to plunder it, the way Iraq invaded Kuwait, thus having made Saddam Hussein genuinely popular for a time when troops brought back their loot. As many opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, the Americans and their allies are widely considered to be the worst of invaders, who came to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil but also of their religion and even their family honor. Many Muslims around the world believe as much, even in Turkey, whose most successful recent film depicted an American Jewish military doctor who was operating on Iraqis not to save their lives but to remove their kidneys, which of course he was sending back to the US for transplantation and his personal profit (he was Jewish after all ). It is the same in Afghanistan, where the American-imposed quota of women parliamentarians has caused widespread resentment, not least because most Afghans are scandalized by the spectacle of a woman contradicting a man in public - as in, for example, televised parliamentary debates.

{==>} Here he insinutates the Americans and their allies ARE unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help the Afghans and Iraqis, and that the Americans and their allies would never invade a foreign country to plunder it. By the way, what moral authority did the Americans have to impose a qouta of women parliamentarians in Afghanistan? Do they have such a quota in their own country?


In other words, "Integrating Civil and Military Activities" to improve local conditions need not gain public support. And even if it did, it does not automatically follow that such support would be decisive, or even important.


Next comes a very long section on "Intelligence in Counterinsurgency", which reflects the crucial predicament of counterinsurgency warfare: the unseen enemy, who can choose when to emerge from civilian cover to launch his attacks, and increasingly can attack by remote control, reducing his exposure or avoiding exposure altogether. Everywhere outgunned, and in Iraq if not Afghanistan outnumbered as well, the insurgents would be easily defeated if their invisibility could be stripped away. That much is obvious. But the authors then automatically assume that it is simply an intelligence problem to identify the insurgents among the population. This is another very questionable proposition, as we shall see, because in fact it is a political problem, which always has a political solution, however unpalatable that may be.

In any case, proceeding on their general premise, the detailed headings that follow point to different ways of overcoming the invisibility of insurgents by using all possible intelligence sources, methods, and assets. The chapter entitled "Intelligence Characteristics in Counterinsurgency" points to the need to have rather different skills and talents when the targets are extremely "low-contrast" insurgents, as opposed to high-contrast targets such as airfields or warships. Next comes "Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield", a section that emphasizes the specificity of counterinsurgency as to time, place, population, culture, and more, as opposed to the general-purpose intelligence preparations for regular war. For example, it is useful to have trained Arabic-speaking interrogators if one plans to invade an Arab-speaking country, and, at a less elementary level, it is useful to have some cultural instruction before trying to analyze the behavior of the locals.

After that comes "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations", discussing, among other things, the different ways of using regular forces, with their regular platforms and sensors, to find the elusive insurgents. These methods may or may not work but certainly entail the use of ultra sophisticated and very expensive F-15s and F-18s, with the most advanced sensors to detect and track the man, the boy, and the donkey who may or may not be transporting an "improvised explosive device" to its intended emplacement. Then comes the delicate subject of "Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance". The second of these is straightforward enough: before attacking a target, it is usually essential for insurgents to observe it in order to plan the action, and with a bit of luck such observers can be spotted by alert defenders. Often the best way of protecting potential targets is to anticipate attacks against them by countersurveillance (or "counterreconnaissance"), then to pre-empt or ambush the attackers. What is delicate is the "Counterintelligence" part, which points to the likelihood of insurgent penetrations of the local forces that are supposedly fighting the insurgency - the friends and allies in need that are being provided with training, weapons, and money. Penetrations always occur, even in the best of military forces and intelligence services, but there is a difference in scale between the consequences of a traitor or two and wholesale enlistments to serve the enemy cause (or the inadvertent recruitment of enemies into the ranks). For example, it must be universally recognized by now that in Iraq many if not most of the Shiites in the army and police force are actually under the orders of one or another of the Shiite militias, including the "Mahdi army", that occasionally launch surprise attacks on American or British forces. Equally, many of the Kurds who are paid by the government: or by the Americans directly are in the service of either Massoud Barazani or Jalal Talebani, the two chieftains who trade under the labels of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (Talebani, moreover, is now Iraq's president. ) Far more dangerously, the Sunnis in the army and police force who have been recruited, trained, equipped, and salaried to fight the Sunni insurgents are just as likely to help the insurgency, or even to be insurgents themselves, on temporary detachment to the government forces, so to speak. That is the only way that Sunnis, whose families live among the Sunni population, can both receive a salary and also keep their families alive. But again, this is really a political problem, which has an unpalatable solution that is certainly more reliable than "Counterintelligence" could ever be.

Later comes "Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion", which refers to the sharing and integration of intelligence coming in separate channels from different services, branches, and individual sources. Such cooperation is characteristic of regular war operations as well, but it is more critical when the targets are almost always unstable, elusive, and low-contrast - if even identifiable at all, as they rarely are. What follows are more predictable chapters on "Designing Counterintelligence Operations" and executing them, and developing "Host Nation" security forces, the relative brevity of these chapters underlining the emphasis the authors place on intelligence operations. Recent scandals readily explain the need for an entire chapter on "Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency", and the chapter on "Building and Sustaining Capability and Capacity", with a subsection on counterinsurgency logistics, also reflects the unhappy experience of Iraq.

Ammunition supply - along with fuel, usually the biggest item in regular operations budgets - is relatively unimportant, since very little ammunition is expended fighting an insurgency, yet logistics still present difficulties in Iraq because supplies cannot simply be trucked from A to B without a high risk of destructive attacks by insurgents, hijacking by militias in need of supplies, simple highway robbery, or opportunistic looting by ordinary civilians. (There are many natural predators in the Iraqi population, probably because of the high proportion of ex-nomads and their direct descendants, for whom the razzia is still an honorable and manly tradition.) Truck convoys can be more secure if rather less efficient, but their safety depends on the quality of their escorts, which are necessarily very scarce and expensive if they are US troops (the British, near the seaport, as is their wont, are more easily supplied), less scarce but even more expensive if they are security contractors, and very cheap but extremely unreliable if they are Iraqi soldiers or police. The end result is that hyper-expensive helicopter hours are very often used to carry even low-value, non-urgent supplies, which is one reason why the occupation costs so much even though very little ordnance is being expended.

__________

Note: Incidentally, in spite of all the advances in "jointness", when the US Air Force tried to help out the Army (and dissuade it from acquiring its own intra-theater fixed-Wing aircraft) by providing a regular shuttle service of C-130 turboprop transports between Kuwait and different bases in Iraq, the aircraft ended up carrying mostly "sailboat fuel" - that is, they flew empty because it was easier for Army formations to use their own helicopters and smaller fixed-wing aircraft than to "interface" with the Air Force.
__________


Two more things can be noted about the new field manual before turning to the peculiar politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There is an Appendix to the chapter on "Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" that further emphasizes the subject's importance and includes a section on "Linguistic Support". It is a sad story indeed when the astonishing linguistic incapacity of US military forces and intelligence organizations is contrasted with the abundance of American civilians who speak all known foreign languages, and the brilliant record of foreign-language education in the US Army and Navy, which used to produce as many good Chinese and Japanese speakers as they wanted by selecting for natural aptitude in the recruit pool, giving them a year of intensive courses (eight hours a day, six days a week), and quickly sending away those who failed to keep up with their classes. Nothing prevents the military from doing the same for Arabic, Persian and, say, Azeri now, except for an unwillingness to invest in the future, and probably a lack of disciplined volunteers willing to learn a language eight hours a day, six days a week, for a whole year or more.

FM 3-24 DRAFT ends with a list of suggested readings, and one of the first books on the list is Small Wars: A Tactical Handbook for Imperial Soldiers (1890), by Charles E Calwell. The previous counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-07.22, also had such a list, and its first suggested reading was The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria, 1955-57, by Paul Aussaresses. Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means.


Counterinsurgency in Practice: Iraq

We begin with some elementary observations. The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years, even as the occasional North Vietnamese regular unit that ventured to fight conventionally was efficiently destroyed. The same two-part proposition is unnecessarily being proven all over again in Iraq, damaging the reputation of the United States for wisdom and strength, misusing fine soldiers, wasting vast amounts of money on skillful but ineffectual air and ground operations, inflicting added suffering on Iraqis at large, and taking the lives of young Americans whose sacrifice, one fears, will be deemed futile.

There is no mystery about the first part of the proposition. Because of their abundant resources and all-round competence, morale, discipline, and skills, the armed forces of the United States on the largest scale, and of other advanced countries on their scale, can usually generate much more firepower than their antagonists. These days, moreover, they can do so with routine precision because of sensors that reveal targets even in poor visibility; platforms and weapons that can reach targets at any planetary range; accurate guidance and homing devices; and command and communication networks that combine all those abilities. Up to a point, the second part of the proposition is merely the logical consequence of the first: faced with especially superior firepower, insurgents strive to be especially elusive - more so than if they were facing less formidable regular forces - and as targets diminish, so does the value of firepower.

But there is much more to it than that. Specifically, there is the matter of politics, on both sides. Unless insurgents confine their operations to thoroughly deserted areas where there is no one to observe them, they must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. Whether they fail to report the insurgents to the authorities out of sympathy for their cause or in terror of their vengeance is entirely irrelevant. In either case, the insurgents are in control of the population around them, and not the authorities. That essentially political advantage is enough to allow motivated insurgents to overcome all manner of tactical weaknesses in combat skills and weapons.

As in so many previous cases, in a manner abundantly familiar from previous insurgencies, that political situation is now playing out in Iraq, where insurgents live very safely in Sunni neighborhoods, towns, and villages, emerging to place bombs or launch attacks when and where it suits them before resuming innocuous civilian identities once again. Local insurgents may indeed pass unobserved by their neighbors when inactive, but not when they take up weapons and gather for operations, while the foreign volunteers among them necessarily attract attention even when they carry no weapons because of their distinct speech and manner. Many of the local inhabitants certainly know who the insurgents are and where they keep their stores of explosives and weapons, but they are not telling. That is why US Army and Marine patrols cannot find insurgents unless they choose to reveal themselves by engaging in direct combat, which of course they rarely do, and only when they think that they have a great advantage. The mostly futile American patrols therefore expose soldiers to the mines, remote-controlled explosives, snipers, and mortar bombs that inflict daily casualties.

Naturally, every form of technical intelligence and every possible sensor is being employed to supplant the lack of very elementary but indispensable human intelligence, including synthetic-aperture radars aboard big four engine aircraft and the infrared and video sensors of the latest targeting pods on two-seat heavyweight jet fighters. The expense of these flights alone is huge, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars a month, but the results are very meager. The aim, of course, is to gather immediately actionable imagery, especially at night, showing such things as insurgents placing side bombs alongside US patrol routes or approaching oil pipelines bearing explosives. Failing that, it is at least hoped that possible insurgent activities could be detected for further investigation; for example, people furtively bringing things to isolated buildings at night. But in practice, unless insurgents carry recognizable weapons, it is simply impossible to differentiate between them and innocent people going about their peaceful business. In the meantime, very elaborate equipment that is very costly to operate, and very effective in identifying armored vehicles, bunkers, missile launchers, and any other readily recognizable target of classic form, is still being employed every day in futile attempts to detect deliveries of a few dollars of food, or the emplacement of readily improvised explosive devices. This too is an aspect of the structural unsuitability of modern armed forces to fight elusive enemies that present no stable targets.

The essentially political advantage of the insurgents in. commanding at least the silence of the local population cannot be overcome by technical means no matter how advanced. Nor can the better operational methods and tactics advocated in FM 3-24 DRAFT be of much help. So few of the insurgents ever engage in direct combat, so much of the insurgency takes covert forms, ranging from the infiltration of the government to bombings, sabotage, and assassinations, that the tactical defeats inflicted on the insurgents - including the killing of their top leaders and heroes - have no perceptible impact on the volume of the violence, and of its political consequences.


In Iraq, as noted, there is supposed to be a far better way of finding insurgents than patrols driving about or sensors, howsoever sophisticated: the Iraqi police and army. Their recruitment, training, equipment, and upkeep, a very costly enterprise in both money and blood, has also yielded meager results because the politics of the situation are again central, and again unfavorable. It is easy to recruit local auxiliaries in any poor country, and any number of Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs can readily be recruited - in recent decades that is how many of them made a living, by exploiting their privileged access as Sunnis and Arabs to prized military and police salaries. Other jobs were much less desirable, because they required work, and now, in any case, they are very scarce. But while they are willing to wear the uniforms and accept training up to a point, Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni Arab ascendancy over Iraq. Besides, their families would be in deadly peril if they were suspected of loyalty to their government, and by extension to the Americans. Some of those policemen and soldiers know much about the insurgents and where exactly they might be found, but are still of no help in finding them, precisely because they are insurgents themselves. Even if specifically ordered into action on those rare occasions in which there is overt combat, most Sunni Arab policemen and soldiers will not fight the insurgents; if they cannot simply stand back quietly, they are apt to desert, usually with their weapons. As for army and police units manned mostly by Shiite Arabs or Kurds, they are not actively disloyal, but they cannot gather information on the insurgents either. Sunni Arab civilians will not confide in them any more than in Americans, and perhaps less, because sooner or later the Americans will leave Iraq, but the Kurds and Shiites will not, and they are therefore the greater enemy.

The adverse political terrain of counterinsurgency is simply a given in Iraq, as it is everywhere else, for if insurgents do not receive, or cannot forcibly exact, at least the passive collaboration of the population at large, they normally cannot survive at all.


The Easy and Reliable Way of Defeating All Insurgencies Everywhere

Perfectly ordinary regular armed forces, with no counterinsurgency doctrine or training whatever, have in the past regularly defeated insurgents, by using a number of well-proven methods. It is enough to consider these methods to see why the armed forces of the United States or of any other democratic country cannot possibly use them.

The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians. For instance, whenever insurgents are believed to be present in a village, small town, or distinct city district - a very common occurrence in Iraq at present, as in other insurgency situations - the local notables can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to mass executions. That is how the Ottoman Empire could control entire provinces with a few feared janissaries and a squadron or two of cavalry. The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender, or else. A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades. So it was mostly by social pressure rather than brute force that the Ottomans preserved their rule: it was the leaders of each ethnic or religious group inclined to rebellion that did their best to keep things quiet, and if they failed, they were quite likely to tell the Turks where to find the rebels before more harm was done.

Long before the Ottoman Empire, the Romans knew how to combine sticks and carrots to obtain obedience and suppress insurgencies. Conquered peoples too proud to accept the benefits of their rule, from public baths and free circus shows to reliable law courts, were "de-bellicized" (a very Roman idea). It was done by killing all who dared to resist in arms - it made good combat practice for the legions - by selling into slavery any who were captured in battle, by leveling towns that held out under siege instead of promptly surrendering, and by readily accepting as peaceful subjects and future citizens all who submitted to Roman rule. In the first two and most successful centuries of imperial Rome, some 300,000 soldiers in all, only half of them highly trained legionary troops, were enough to secure a vast empire that stretched well beyond the Mediterranean basin that formed its core, today the territory of some thirty European, Middle Eastern, and North African states. The Romans could not disperse their soldiers in hundreds of cities, thousands of towns, and countless hamlets to repress riot or rebellion; the troops were needed to guard the frontiers. Instead, they relied on deterrence, which was periodically reinforced by exemplary punishments. Most inhabitants of the empire never rebelled after their initial conquest. A few tribes and nations had to be reconquered after trying and failing to overthrow Roman rule. A few simply refused to become obedient, and so they were killed off: "They make a wasteland and call it peace" was the bitter complaint of a Scottish chieftain (as reported by Tacitus).

Terrible reprisals to deter any form of resistance were standard operating procedure for the German armed forces in the Second World War, and very effective they were in containing resistance with very few troops. As against all the dramatic films and books that describe the heroic achievements of the resistance all over occupied Europe, military historians have documented the tranquility that the German occupiers mostly enjoyed, and the normality of collaboration, not merely by notorious traitors such as the incautious French poet or the failed Norwegian politician but by vast numbers of ordinary people. Polish railwaymen, for example, secured the entire sustenance of the German eastern front. As for the daring resistance attacks that feature in films, they did happen occasionally, but not often, and not because of any lack of bravery in fighting the routinely formidable Germans but because of the terrible punishments they inflicted on the population.

Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their threats. The Germans also established secure and economical forms of occupation by exploiting isolated resistance attacks to achieve much broader demonstration effects. Lone German dispatch riders were easily toppled by tensed wires or otherwise intercepted and killed, but then troops would arrive on the scene to burn or demolish the surrounding buildings or farms or the nearest village, seizing and killing anyone who aroused suspicion or just happened to be there. After word of the terrible deeds spread and was duly exaggerated, German dispatch riders could safely continue on their way, until reaching some other uninstructed part of the world, where the sequence would have to be repeated.

Likewise in the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were skilled in using terror to secure their pervasive territorial control and very ready to use any amount of violence against civilians, from countless individual assassinations to mass executions, as in Hue in 1968. The Communist cause had its enthusiasts, "fellow travelers", and opportunistic followers, but Vietnamese who were none of the above, and not outright enemies, were compelled to collaborate actively or passively by the threat of the violence so liberally used. That is exactly what the insurgents in Iraq are now doing, and this is no coincidence. All insurgencies follow the same pattern. Locals who are not sympathetic to begin with, who cannot be recruited to the cause, are compelled to collaborate by the fear of violence, readily reinforced by the demonstrative killing of those who insist on refusing to help the resistance. Neutrality is not an option.


By contrast, the capacity of American armed forces to inflict collective punishments does not extend much beyond curfews and other such restrictions, inconvenient to be sure and perhaps sufficient to impose real hardship, but obviously insufficient to out-terrorize insurgents. Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population, the real "terrain" of any insurgency. Of course, the ordinary administrative functions of government can also be employed against the insurgents, less compellingly perhaps but without need of violence. Insurgents everywhere seek to prohibit any form of collaboration or contact with the authorities, but they cannot normally prevent civilians from entering government offices to apply for obligatory licenses, permits, travel documents, and such. That provides venues for intelligence officers on site to ask applicants to provide information on the insurgents, in exchange for the approval of their requests and perhaps other rewards. This effective and straightforward method has been widely used, and there is no ethical or legal reason why it should not be used by the armed forces of the United States as well. But it does require the apparatus of military government, complete with administrative services for civilians. During and after the Second World War, after very detailed preparations, the US Army and Navy governed the American zone of Germany, all of Japan, and parts of Italy. Initially, US officers were themselves the administrators, with such assistance from local officials they chose to re-employ. Since then, however, the United States has preferred both in Vietnam long ago and now in Iraq to leave government to the locals.

That decision reflects another kind of politics, manifest in the ambivalence of a United States government that is willing to fight wars, that is willing to start wars because of future threats, that is willing to conquer territory or even entire countries, and yet is unwilling to govern what it conquers, even for a few years. Consequently, for all the real talent manifest in the writing of FM 3-24 DRAFT, its prescriptions are in the end of little or no use and amount to a kind of malpractice. All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.
_____

Edward N Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, DC.


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Thursday, February 15, 2007

A Parallel State

For how much longer will BAE be allowed to run its own secret service and overrule the armed forces?

by George Monbiot

Published in the Guardian (February 13 2007)

www.monbiot.com (February 13 2007)


There is a state within a state in the United Kingdom, a small but untouchable domain that appears to be subject to a different set of laws. We have heard quite a bit about it over the past two months, but hardly anyone knows just how far its writ runs. The state is BAE, Britain's biggest arms company. It seems, among other advantages, to be able to run its own secret service.

This week the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) hopes to obtain a court order against BAE. The order would allow it to discover how the arms company obtained one of its confidential documents. CAAT instructed its lawyers, Leigh Day & Co, to seek a judicial review of the government's decision to drop the corruption case against BAE, which is alleged to have paid massive bribes to members of the Saudi royal family. Leigh Day sent CAAT an email containing advice on costs and tactics. The email ended up in the hands of the arms company {1}.

How? Correspondence between a plaintiff and his lawyers couldn't be more private. The last people you would show it to are the defendants in the case. But somehow the letter found its way to BAE's offices.

The arms company argues that it was the unwitting and unwilling recipient of the email. So why does it refuse to tell CAAT who sent it? Why, far from assisting CAAT's attempt to explain this mystery, has it threatened the campaign with costs for seeking to reveal its source? {2}

CAAT has good reason to be suspicious. In 2003, the Sunday Times revealed that BAE had carried out a "widespread spying operation" on its critics. "Bank accounts were accessed, computer files downloaded and private correspondence with members of parliament and ministers secretly copied and passed on". {3} The paper says that the arms company made use of a network run by a former consultant for the Ministry of Defence called Evelyn Le Chene. "Le Chene recruited at least half a dozen agents to infiltrate CAAT's headquarters at Finsbury Park, north London, and a number of regional offices". {4} They provided BAE with advanced intelligence on CAAT's campaign against the sale of its Hawk aircraft to the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia. The arms company also obtained CAAT's membership list, its bank account details, the identity of its donors, its letters to ministers, even the contents of private diaries belonging to its staff {5}.

After the story was published, CAAT asked a team of investigators to examine the messages sent from its offices. They found that one of the group's most senior members of staff, the national campaigns and events co-ordinator, had sent 181 emails to an unfamiliar address. Many of them contained extremely sensitive information {6}.

The co-ordinator, Martin Hogbin, denied that he was an agent of Le Chene's. He claimed that the mysterious email address belonged to a former volunteer of CAAT's, and that he had been sending him this information because he might find it interesting. The investigators contacted the former volunteer, who told them that he had not received any messages from Hogbin, and did not recognise the address {7}. CAAT took the case to the UK's Information Commissioner, who found that the email address belonged to "a company with links to Evelyn Le Chene" {8}. Both Le Chene and Hogbin refused to assist the investigations {9,10}.

If it is true, as CAAT believes, that Hogbin was working for Le Chene, it was a tremendous coup for her and her clients. As campaigns and events coordinator, he knew more than anyone else about CAAT's plans. If BAE were to obtain such material, it could anticipate and outmanouevre the campaign's attempts to expose or embarrass it.

BAE's spying operations represent just one of the ways in which the company looks like a parallel state. It also appears to enjoy crown immunity. In August last year, this column suggested that the Saudi corruption case might be dropped, in order to protect a new order for 72 of BAE's jets {11}. It was not a hard prediction to make - Saudi Arabia had made the new deal conditional on the abandonment of the case {12}. But I could not have guessed that both the Attorney General and the Prime Minister would make such a show of squashing the investigation. They seemed to go out of their way to demonstrate to BAE's clients that they would do whatever it took to protect the new order, even if it meant exposing themselves to allegations of collusion.

The Prime Minister has never taken such a risk on behalf of one of his departments, let alone his ministers or officials (witness how Lord Levy and Ruth Turner have been left to swing). There are just two friends for whom he will put his legacy on the line: George Bush and BAE.

In 2001, Blair overruled Clare Short and Gordon Brown to grant an export licence for BAE's sale of a military air traffic control system to one of the world's poorest countries, Tanzania. The World Bank had pointed out that the contract was ridiculously expensive - Tanzania could have bought a better system for a quarter of the price. In January the Guardian revealed that BAE allegedly paid a $12 million "commission" to the agent who brokered the deal {13}.

In 2005, Blair made a secret visit to Riyadh, to expedite BAE's deal with the Saudi princes. He then sent both John Reid and Des Browne to clinch the order. Ministers in the United Kingdom have always acted as unpaid salesmen for the arms companies, but seldom has a prime minister muddied his hands this much. Blair pushed the order through by promising the Saudis that they could have the first 24 planes ahead of schedule. How? By selling them the jets already alloted to the RAF. BAE's interests, in other words, trump the requirements of our own armed forces.

Mr Blair has also broken his government's pledge to publish the National Audit Office's report on BAE's dealings in Saudi Arabia. It remains the only NAO report never to have been made public {15}. We can only guess why the prime minister needs to protect it.

It could be argued, with some force, that this government has always had a special relationship with big business, rather like its special relationship with George Bush (it gets beaten up and thanks him for it). But the special favours it grants BAE are deeply resented by other corporations. After the suppression of the Saudi case, F&C Asset Management, a very large institutional investor, wrote to the government to complain that its decision undermined the rule of law and the predictability of the investment climate {16}. Hermes, Britain's biggest pension fund, said that it threatened the UK's reputation as a leading financial centre {17}, and the chairman of Anglo-American wrote that the abandonment of the case "damaged the reputation of Britain" {18}.

At what point does the government conclude that this company has got out of control? That it presents a danger to national interests, to the reputation of the prime minister, to the privacy and civil liberties of its opponents? Why does it appear to be above the law? For how much longer will it be permitted to run what looks like a parallel secret service? Of all the questions we might ask our ministers, these are the least likely to be answered.

www.monbiot.com


References:


1. Katherine Griffiths, 3rd February 2007. BAE refuses to say how it received secret email. The Daily Telegraph.

2. ibid.

3. Sunday Times Insight Team, 28th September 2003. How the woman at No 27 ran spy network for an arms firm. The Sunday Times.

4. ibid.

5. ibid.

6. Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 17th February 2004. Report of an Investigation into Suspicious Activity of Martin Hogbin.
http://www.caat.org.uk/about/spying/spy-investigation-report.pdf

7. ibid.

8. Richard Thomas, Information Commissioner, 20th December 2004. Letter to CAAT. http://www.caat.org.uk/about/spying/201204letter.pdf

9. Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 17th February 2004, ibid.

10. Richard Thomas, ibid.

11. George Monbiot, 24th August 2006. Peace Is For Wimps. Real men in government use their position to sell weapons. The Guardian. http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2006/08/24/peace-is-for-wimps/

12. David Leigh and Ewen MacAskill, 27th September 2005. Blair in secret Saudi mission. The Guardian.

13. David Leigh, 15th January 2007. The arms deal, the agent and the Swiss bank account. The Guardian.

14. Dominic O'Connell, 20th August 2006. BAE cashes in on GBP 40 billion Arab jet deal. The Sunday Times.

15. Matthew Tempest and agencies, 18th December 2006. Blair pressed to publish secret report on BAE inquiry. Guardian Unlimited.

16. Mark Milner, 23rd December 2006. Fund manager raises alarm over dropping of BAE inquiry. The Guardian.

17. Michael Peel, 7th February 2007. Britain 'damaged' by BAE probe. Financial Times.

18. ibid.

Copyright (c) 2006 Monbiot.com

http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/02/13/a-parallel-state/



Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Wednesday, February 14, 2007

Short Changed

9/11 conspiracism is dragging activists away from the real issues

by George Monbiot

Published in the Guardian (February 06 2007)

www.monbiot.com (February 12 2007)


There is a virus sweeping the world. It infects opponents of the Bush government, sucks their brains out through their eyes and turns them into gibbering idiots. First cultivated in a laboratory in the United States, the strain reached these shores a few months ago. In the past fortnight it has become an epidemic. Scarcely a day now passes without someone possessed by this sickness, eyes rolling, lips flecked with foam, trying to infect me. The disease is called Loose Change. It is a film made by three young men which airs most of the standard conspiracy theories about the attacks of September 11 2001. Unlike the other 9/11 conspiracy films, Loose Change is sharp and swift, with a thumping soundtrack, slick graphics and a calm and authoritative voiceover. Its makers claim that it has now been watched by 100 million people.

The Pentagon, the film maintains, was not hit by a commercial airliner. There was "no discernable trace" of a plane found in the wreckage, and the entrance and exit holes in the building were far too small. It was hit by a Cruise missile. The twin towers were brought down by means of "a carefully planned controlled demolition". You can see the small puffs of smoke caused by explosives just below the cascading sections. All other hypotheses are implausible: the fire was not hot enough to melt steel and the towers fell too quickly. Building 7 was destroyed by the same means a few hours later.

Flight 93 did not crash, but was redirected to Cleveland Airport, where the passengers were taken into a NASA building and never seen again. Their voices had been cloned by the Los Alamos laboratories and used to make fake calls to their relatives. The footage of Osama Bin Laden, claiming responsibility for the attacks, was faked. The US government carried out this great crime for four reasons: to help Larry Silverstein, who leased the towers, to collect his insurance money; to assist insider traders betting on falling airline stocks; to steal the gold in the basement; and to grant George Bush new executive powers, so that he could carry out his plans for world domination.

Even if you have seen or read no other accounts of 9/11, and your brain has not yet been liquidised, a few problems must occur to you. The first is the complete absence of scientific advice. At one point the presenter asks "So what brought down the Twin Towers? Let's ask the experts." But they don't ask the experts. The film makers take some old quotes, edit them to remove any contradictions, then denounce all subsequent retractions as further evidence of conspiracy.

The only people they interview are a janitor, a group of firemen and a flight instructor. They let the janitor speak at length, but cut the firemen off in mid-sentence. The flight instructor speaks in short clips, which give the impression that his pupil, the hijacker Hani Hanjour, was incapable of hitting the Pentagon. Elsewhere he has said the opposite: he had "no doubt" that Hanjour could have done it {1}.

Where are the structural engineers, the materials scientists, the specialists in ballistics, explosives or fire? The film makers now say that the third edition of the film will be fact-checked by an expert, but he turns out to be "a theology professor" {2}. They don't name him, but I would bet that it's David Ray Griffin, who also happens to be the high priest of the 9/11 conspiracists.

The next evident flaw is that the plot they propose must have involved tens of thousands of people. It could not have been executed without the help of demolition experts, the security firms guarding the World Trade Centre, Mayor Giuliani (who hastily disposed of the remains), much of the US Air Force, the Federal Aviation Administration and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the relatives of the people "killed" in the plane crashes, the rest of the Pentagon's staff, the Los Alamos laboratories, the FBI, the CIA and the investigators who picked through the rubble.

If there is one universal American characteristic it is a confessional culture which permits no one with a good story to keep his mouth shut. People appear on the Jerry Springer Show to admit to carnal relations with their tractors. Yet none of the participants in this monumental crime has sought to blow the whistle - before, during or after the attacks. No one has volunteered to tell the greatest story ever told.

Read some conflicting accounts, and Loose Change's case crumbles faster than the Twin Towers. Hundreds of people saw a plane hit the Pentagon. Because it collided with one of the world's best- defended buildings at full speed, the plane was pulverised: even so, both plane parts and body parts were in fact recovered. The wings and tail disintegrated when they hit the wall, which is why the holes weren't bigger {3}.

The failure of the Twin Towers has been exhaustively documented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Far from being impossible, the collapse turns out to have been inevitable. The planes cut some of the support columns and ignited fires sufficient to weaken (but not melt) the remaining steel structures. As the perimeter columns buckled, the weight of the collapsing top stories generated a momentum the rest of the building could not arrest. Puffs of smoke were blown out of the structure by compression as the building fell {4}.

Counterpunch, the radical leftwing magazine, commissioned its own expert - an aerospace and mechanical engineer - to test the official findings {5}. He shows that the institute must have been right. He also demonstrates how Building 7 collapsed. Burning debris falling from the twin towers ruptured the oil pipes feeding its emergency generators. The reduction in pressure triggered the automatic pumping system, which poured thousands of gallons of diesel onto the fire. The support trusses weakened and buckled and the building imploded {6}. Popular Mechanics magazine polled 300 experts and came to the same conclusions {7}.

So the critics - even Counterpunch - are labelled co-conspirators, and the plot expands until it comes to involve a substantial part of the world's population. There is no reasoning with this madness.

People believe Loose Change because it proposes a closed world: comprehensible, controllable, small. Despite the great evil which runs it, it is more companionable than the chaos which really governs our lives, a world without destination or purpose. This neat story draws campaigners away from real issues - global warming, the Iraq war, nuclear weapons, privatisation, inequality - while permanently wrecking their credibility. Bush did capitalise on the attacks, and he did follow a pre-existing agenda, spelt out, as Loose Change says, by the Project for a New American Century. But by drowning this truth in an ocean of nonsense, the conspiracists ensure that it can never again be taken seriously.

The film's greatest flaw is this: the men who made it are still alive. If the US government is running an all-knowing, all-encompassing conspiracy, why did it not snuff them out long ago? There is only one possible explanation. They are in fact agents of the Bush regime, employed to distract people from its real abuses of power. This, if you are inclined to believe such stories, is surely a more plausible theory than the one proposed in Loose Change.

www.monbiot.com

References:

1. Thomas Frank, 23rd September 2001. Tracing Trail Of Hijackers. Newsday. Viewed at: http://www.pentagonresearch.com/Newsday_com.htm

2. Ed Pilkington, 26th January 2007. 'They're all forced to listen to us'. The Guardian.

3. Benjamin Chertoff et al, March 2005. Debunking The 9/11 Myths. Popular Mechanics.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/1227842.html

4. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/factsheets/faqs_8_2006.htm.

5. Manuel Garcia, 28th November 2006. We See Conspiracies That Don't Exist: The Physics of 9/11. http://www.counterpunch.org/physic11282006.html

6. Manuel Garcia, 28th November 2006. Dark Fire: The Fall of WTC 7. http://www.counterpunch.org/darkfire11282006.html

7. Benjamin Chertoff et al, ibid.


Copyright (c) 2006 Monbiot.com

http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/02/12/short-changed/


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

The US says it is fighting for democracy -

but is deaf to the cries of the Iraqis

They are not building a palatial embassy with the intention of going


by Noam Chomsky


The Independent & The Independent on Sunday


www.independent.co.uk (February 11 2007)


There was unprecedented e'lite condemnation of the plans to invade Iraq. Sensible analysts were able to perceive that the enterprise carried significant risks for US interests, however conceived. Phrases thrown in by the official Presidential Directive from the standard boilerplate about freedom that accompany every action, and are close to a historical universal, were dismissed as meaningless by reasonable people. Global opposition was utterly overwhelming, and the likely costs to the US were apparent, though the catastrophe created by the invasion went far beyond anyone's worst expectations. It's amusing to watch the lying as the strongest supporters of the war try to deny what they very clearly said.

On the US motives for staying in Iraq, I can only repeat what I've been saying for years. A sovereign Iraq, partially democratic, could well be a disaster for US planners. With a Shia majority, it is likely to continue improving relations with Iran. There is a Shia population right across the border in Saudi Arabia, bitterly oppressed by the US-backed tyranny. Any step towards sovereignty in Iraq encourages activism there for human rights and a degree of autonomy - and that happens to be where most of Saudi oil is.

Sovereignty in Iraq might well lead to a loose Shia alliance controlling most of the world's petroleum resources and independent of the US, undermining a primary goal of US foreign policy since it became the world-dominant power after the Second World War. Worse yet, though the US can intimidate Europe, it cannot intimidate China, which blithely goes its own way, even in Saudi Arabia, the jewel in the crown - the primary reason why China is considered a leading threat. An independent energy bloc in the Gulf area is likely to link up with the China-based Asian Energy Security Grid and Shanghai Cooperation Council, with Russia (which has its own huge resources) as an integral part, and with the Central Asian states (already members), possibly India. Iran is already associated with them, and a Shia-dominated bloc in the Arab states might well go along. All of that would be a nightmare for US planners and their Western allies.

There are, then, very powerful reasons why the US and UK are likely to try in every possible way to maintain effective control over Iraq. The US is not constructing a palatial embassy, by far the largest in the world and virtually a separate city within Baghdad, and pouring money into military bases, with the intention of leaving Iraq to Iraqis. All of this is quite separate from the expectations that matters can be arranged so that US corporations profit from the vast riches of Iraq.

These topics, though high on the agenda of planners, are not within the realm of discussion, as can easily be determined. That is only to be expected. These considerations violate the fundamental doctrine that state power has noble objectives, and while it may make terrible blunders, it can have no crass motives and is not influenced by domestic concentrations of private power. Any questioning of these Higher Truths is either ignored or bitterly denounced, also for good reasons: allowing them to be discussed could undermine power and privilege.

There is another issue: even the most dedicated scholar/advocates of "democracy promotion" recognise that there is a "strong line of continuity" in US efforts to promote democracy going back as far as you like and reaching the present: democracy is supported if and only if it conforms to strategic and economic objectives. For example, supporting the brutal punishment of people who committed the crime of voting "the wrong way" in a free election, as in Palestine right now, with pretexts that would inspire ridicule in a free society. As for democracy in the US, e'lite opinion has generally considered it a dangerous threat which must be resisted. But some Iraqis agreed with Bush's mission to bring democracy to the world: one per cent in a poll in Baghdad just as the noble vision was declared in Washington.

On withdrawal proposals from e'lite circles, however, I think one should be cautious. Some may be so deeply indoctrinated that they cannot allow themselves to think about the reasons for the invasion or the insistence on maintaining the occupation, in one or another form. Others may have in mind more effective techniques of control by redeploying US military forces in bases in Iraq and in the region, making sure to control logistics and support for client forces in Iraq, air power in the style of the destruction of much of Indochina after the business community turned against the war, and so on.

As to the consequences of a US withdrawal, we are entitled to have our personal judgements, all of them as uninformed and dubious as those of US intelligence. But they do not matter. What matters is what Iraqis think. Or rather, that is what should matter, and we learn a lot about the character and moral level of the reigning intellectual culture from the fact that the question of what the victims want barely even arises.

The Baker-Hamilton report dismisses partition proposals, even the more limited proposals for a high level of independence within a loosely federal structure. Though it's not really our business, or our right to decide, their scepticism is probably warranted. Neighbouring countries would be very hostile to an independent Kurdistan, which is landlocked, and Turkey might even invade, which would also threaten the long-standing and critical US-Turkey-Israel alliance. Kurds strongly favour independence, but appear to regard it as not feasible - for now, at least. The Sunni states might invade to protect the Sunni areas, which lack resources. The Shia region might improve ties with Iran. It could set off a regional war. My own view is that federal arrangements make good sense, not only in Iraq. But these do not seem realistic prospects for the near-term future.

US policy should be that of all aggressors: (1) pay reparations; (2) attend to the will of the victims; (3) hold the guilty parties accountable, in accord with the Nuremberg principles, the UN Charter, and other international instruments. A more practical proposal is to work to change the domestic society and culture substantially enough so that what should be done can at least become a topic for discussion. That is a large task, not only on this issue, though I think e'lite opposition is far more ferocious than that of the general public.
_____

Adapted from an interview for Z Net with Michael Albert, published tomorrow in 'The Drawbridge'. Noam Chomsky's latest book is Failed States (Hamish Hamilton, June 2006; Penguin Books, March 2007)

Copyright (c) 2006 Independent News and Media Limited

http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article2258798.ece


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Monday, February 12, 2007

Happiness is...

by Bill McKibben

The Ecologist (February 2007)


Climate change isn't just a threat. it's an opportunity for us to live happier, more fulfilling lives. The fossil fuel age changed every detail of western human life - where we lived, how we traveled (and how much), what we ate, how our economies worked. But there were two changes in particular that it wrought - huge changes. Changes so huge they redefine the meaning of huge.

One is physical - the sudden onset of a rapid warming that will change the very geography of the planet in almost unbelievable fashion over the next century. We live on a different earth already, and it is going to get worse fast. Way worse.

The other is psychological - cheap fossil fuel tipped the balance in the modern mind between self as individual and self as member of community. It made us different people. Worse people.

And so here's the good news - fighting either problem means fighting them both. We've been backed into a corner, and the only way out is the right way ...


LET'S LOOK AT the physical problem first. In the last three years or so, the environmental movement has been busy morphing into the global warming movement. And with good reason. For a long time, environmentalists have been declaring that unless we change our course, Something Bad will happen. Now we know what. The earth is warming - indeed, it's warming more rapidly, and with far mow devastating effect, than we would have guessed just a few years ago.

I wrote the first book for a general audience about climate change back in 1989; at the time, we thought the phenomenon would be epochal (I called my account The End of Nature), but we also thought it would be relatively linear, a gradually heating planet with gradually rising seas. Most scientists guessed that both negative and positive feedback effects would appear - for instance, we'd see more clouds, which would help cool the earth and keep the temperature rise at least a little under control. But those ameliorating effects haven't shown up; instead, we've seen - as documented in each issue of Nature - yet more evidence of just how badly we've unhinged the basic physical systems of our home planet. To wit:

* Soils, as they've warmed, have become more mlcrobially active, leading to higher rates of decay, and hence giving off more carbon dioxide. The classic study was done in the UK, and it showed that the flux out of the soils is roughly equal to everything Britain has done since 1990 to reduce carbon emissions.

* Everything frozen on earth is now melting, and melting very quickly. Arctic sea ice has failed to fully re-freeze for the past two winters - the first time anything like that has been observed. If you look at the earth from a satellite, it looks remarkably different than it did a decade or two ago - those Apollo shots of our lonely blue/white orb in the darkness of space are now more blue and less white.

* Hot ocean water is leading - much faster than anyone would have predicted a decade ago - to more massive storms. In 2005, Hurricane Wilma set the Atlantic record for the lowest barometric pressure ever recorded in the hemisphere.


All of which leads scientists to a new kind of despair. In the winter of 2006, James Lovelock famously announced that we had already passed the point of no return - billions would perish, while a remnant of civilization might survive if wise leaders led them north towards the pole. Less feverishly, but at least as ominously, the planet's foremost climate scientist, America's James Hansen, defied a White House gag order in the winter of 2005 to declare that unless we started putting less carbon into the atmosphere in the next ten years, we'd soon inhabit a 'totally different planet'. He seemed most spooked by new data from Greenland showing ice sheets breaking up at a faster-than-expected rate, and thus threatening to raise sea levels by many meters. Ten years. And that was a year ago.

So the Something Bad is here. And it's big - as big or bigger than the effects of a thermonuclear exchange. What we need to note is where it came from.

Environmentalists have spent most of their time working on the periphery of our economic life: we stuck filters on smokestacks and filters on effluent pipes and filters on car exhausts. The theory was that our basic scheme of life - getting more money then buying more stuff - worked pretty well, it just needed some filtering.

It turns out that idea was wrong. The basic scheme of things was the problem. There's no filter you can stick on a car that will keep it from emitting carbon dioxide. What you need is, for instance, a train. Or a bicycle. Which is to say, a different basic scheme. We can change all our light bulbs for low-energy light bulbs (and we should), but if we don't change the set of attitudes that produces tomatoes in January, or a Ryanair flight across the globe whenever we're chilly, and two people to a house well - that nifty light bulb will be shining on a 'totally different planet'. The best guess? Stabilizing climate at current levels of disruption would require an immediate, worldwide, seventy percent reduction in carbon emissions. That's a lot of light bulbs.

There's a reason, of course, why environmentalists have concentrated on light bulbs and filters. It's easy, at least relatively. It doesn't require engaging in discussion about the bigger questions about how we live, and we haven't wanted to engage with those because we assumed we'd lose any argument. Assumed that people liked the way they lived so much they couldn't imagine changing it. Indeed, that's been the biggest operating assumption of our time, the thought that underlay the career of Tony Blair or Bill ('It's the economy, stupid') Clinton. All change needed to come around the edges - we were so deeply enmeshed in the rhythms of consumer culture that challenging it in any real way seemed anathema. You could really see this attitude at work in the negotiations around the World Trade Organization. Relentless expansion of the international economy was the central business at hand - labour and environmental concerns could be discussed, but as 'side agreements'. We were, literally, in the margins; the economic worldview loomed so large that all else was in its shadow.


BUT THAT'S BEGUN to change - or soon will. Or could, anyway, if environmentalism begins to transform itself from a fixation on filters and light bulbs to a new fixation - on human satisfaction.

For a very long time, 'happiness' has been considered a soft topic, something that hippies and sandal-wearers bothered themselves with and the actual world ignored as it went about the important business of More. In the past decade, however, economists, aided by psychologists and sociologists, have begun to question some of their assumptions. In the old view, you measured happiness by what people bought - under the principle of utility maximization, your credit card statement held the answer to what satisfied you. Ipso facto.

But some academic began wondering: why not ask people if they were happy? The first problem was, would their answers be meaningful? An immense amount of research went into trying to answer this question - people undergoing colonoscopies were prodded about the precise level of pain they were feeling, researchers looked at 'biases in recall of menstrual symptoms' or 'fearlessness and courage in novice paratroopers undergoing training'. Some of the early papers had a distinctly academic ring: 'The Importance of Taking Part in Daily Life', for instance. (Or the discovery by another analyst that 'there is no context in which cutting oneself shaving will be a pleasant experience'.)

Eventually, however, the various researchers (led in some ways by Princeton's Daniel Kahneman, who won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics - despite not being an economist - for his work on this and other problems) converged on the idea that people really could decide whether they were happy or not. British economist Richard Layard, who has written a great deal about this work, says: 'We now know that what people say about how they feel corresponds closely to the actual levels of activity in different parts of the brain, which can be measured in standard scientific ways'. People who call themselves happy also seem happier to their friends, live healthier lives, and so forth.

Which allows you to start doing something interesting. It allows you to start reversing two centuries of reductionism. Instead of asking: 'What did you buy?', you can ask someone: 'Is your life good?' And once you've asked that, you're in position to ask the most subversive question there could be: 'Is "more" better?'

Because if more really is better, then environmentalism is a lost cause. There aren't enough Powerpoint slides of calving icebergs to turn things around.

But if more isn't necessarily better, then there are possibilities.


AND SO HERE'S the bottom line. We've become significantly richer, but not significantly happier. In a sense, you could say that the years since the Second World War have been a loosely controlled experiment designed to answer this precise question.

The environmentalist Alan Durning found that compared to 1950, the average American family now owns twice as many cars, uses 21 times as much plastic, and travels 25 times farther by air. Gross domestic product per capita has tripled since 1950 in the US. We obviously eat more calories. And yet the satisfaction meter seems not to have budged. More Americans say their marriages are unhappy, their jobs are hideous, and that they don't like the place where they live. The number who, all things considered, say they are 'very happy' with their lives has slid steadily over that period. During the rapid economic boom of the Clinton years, the decline in satisfaction seemed, if anything, to accelerate - for instance, a report from the National Opinion Research Center showed increasing numbers of relationships breaking up. As one journalist summarized the findings, 'there's more misery in people's lives today'.

As always, the United States leads the way, but the rest of the world doesn't trail terribly far behind. In the United Kingdom, per capita gross domestic product grew 66 per cent between 1973 and 2001 and yet people's satisfaction with their lives changed not a whit. Nor did it budge in Japan, despite a fivefold increase in income in the postwar years.

Depression has risen steadily across the advanced world. As the British researcher Richard Douthwaite noted, the doubling of UK income corresponded with rises in everything from crime to divorce. Which doesn't necessarily mean that getting richer caused these problems, but it surely didn't alleviate them. Taken as a whole we got both more stuff and less happiness.

Why did this happen? Though the study of satisfaction is in fact an infant science, the data suggests powerfully that what modern westerners lack is community - we've lost the connections to other people that as evolved primates we need in order to thrive. In the US, for instance, studies show that if you find one of the tens of millions of Americans who doesn't belong to anything and convince them to join a church choir or a baseball fan club or any other league of fellow humans, their mortality risk - the chance that they will die in the next year - drops by half. That's not a very subtle effect. People have many fewer friends on average than they did a generation ago, and they visit with those friends - and with family and neighbours - considerably less often. We have, in effect, privatised our lives; an emergent species, the hyper-individual, is on the ascendant.

And here's what's interesting. It's fossil fuel that let that happen, just as surely as it's fossil fuel that's melting the ice caps. In America, for instance, cheap gas meant building suburbs - in 1920, Americans lived, on average, about ten persons to an acre. By the year 2000, new subdivisions averaged two people per acre. And once you've moved out to the edge, cheap electricity and heating oil lead people to build with ever-greater grandiosity. The average new home in America has doubled in size since 1970 - there are entire suburbs that look like they were built for entry-level monarchs, every home with turrets.

But it's not just big cars and big houses. As Felicity Lawrence and Joanna Blythman have shown in their reporting on the transformation of European agriculture, It's also our most basic habits. Forget about relying on your neighbours - the farmer, the butcher, the baker - for your food. Why not, since it's always summer somewhere, simply order takeout from across the globe every single night? Supermarkets, says Blythman, peddle the dream that it is 'feasible, and indeed reasonable, for the UK shopper to expect virtually every horticultural production the planet every day'. But you can only get Californian lettuce to London if you're willing to spend 100 calories of fossil energy for every calorie of food. And, so far, we are willing - refrigerated air transport is the fastest growing sector of the food economy.

Think I'm overstating the case? Consider the greatest television phenomenon of our time, the show Survivor, which touched off the wave of 'reality' television. It operates from the premise that, even in an emergency, the obvious goal is to end up alone on the island, to manipulate and scheme until everyone else disappears and leaves you by yourself with your money. The Soviets and the Chinese failed In their 20th-century efforts to build the New Man. But we've evolved one in the West, a hardy hyper-individualist. Margaret Thatcher at the zenith of her power once said, 'there is no such thing as "society". There are individual men and women and there are families.' The only problem is the individuals aren't all that happy and they're starting to get kind of hot.


IN A NEW world like this, we need a new environmentalism. It begins with, say, a carrot. Slightly gnarled, perhaps - not a 'baby carrot' lathed to millimetric precision and entombed in a plastic sack, but a real one. Or a potato. Or even a parsnip. The winter before last, I decided on an experiment. Could I make it through the winter in our northern valley eating only the food that came from the fields around me? I wasn't sure - winter's long here (though not as long as it once was, sigh) and an awful lot of our agricultural infrastructure has disappeared. (America now has more prisoners than farmers.) But it turned out that in fact there were enough old farmers hanging on, and enough new ones starting up, to make it a delicious eight months. Root vegetables, but also every kind of cheese and yogurt. Apples from the county's lovely orchards, stored properly for the winter and pressed weekly for cider (even though, in the local supermarket, all the apples were arriving from China and South Africa). Even good beer from our local brewery, made with wheat from a neighbour's field.

And it wasn't just the food that was so satisfying. It was the network of new friends - the orchardlst, the guy who grew forty kinds of potatoes on three acres, the fellow raising fallow deer on an old cow pasture. Yes, all this took more time - but the time was the benefit. I felt more connected instead of less.

It turns out that I'm not alone. A pair of sociologists recently followed shoppers as they made their rounds, first at the supermarket and then at the local farmers' market. Everyone knows the supermarket experience - light trance, quick tour of the same stations of the culinary cross, back out to the parking lot. At the farmers' market, people had ten times as many conversations as they had at the supermarket - an order of magnitude more community. Something like an order of magnitude less energy used, too. That's an environmentalism that might start adding up to the scale of change that the planet requires, and that we require.

And you don't need to stop with food - you can do the same analysis with energy, with wood, even with entertainment. Why does music, like milk, need to be downloaded from some distant location? Why can't your neighbours make it with you? That's why it's good news when British officials report a resurgence of live music in pubs and clubs, and touring jam bands - descendants of the wandering bards - are making more money in America than the MTV stars.

In a weird way, the marketers had figured out all of this years ago, long before the academics and the politicians. Hence advertisements gradually went from being straightforward (this car has more cylinders) to being straightforwardly devious (buy this car and have sex with this girl) to being incredibly bent: buy this car or beer or cosmetic and you will have the community that you crave. If only it were true - if only buying a Heineken could make you part of a world that worked for you - then we'd be fine. But since it's not true, then It's up to the rest of us to make good on the promise.

Environmentalists, in other words, need to build a world where that kind of satisfaction really is possible. A world where we rely on each other for something real again. The kind of world, not incidentally, that needs less coal and gas and oil to make it run.

In autumn 2005, the New Economics Foundation released a truly mind-blowing study, which attempted to rank the nations of the world by how much human satisfaction they'd achieved, with how little environmental devastation. Most of the headlines about the study focused on the abysmal rankings of the richest nations (the US was 150th and 178th). But just as interesting was the group that did best: regardless of income, the citizens of island nations were counted as both happier and less spendthrift. Which makes sense. No man is an island, and on an island he's more likely to figure that out. It's a finding every bit as important as the news about Greenland's melting glaciers.

We know, after the long experience of the 20th century, all the things that don't work for human satisfaction (centrally planned economies, endlessly repeated ideologies, ever more accumulation). We know, from what the scientists now tell us weekly, what doesn't work for the planet (burning hydrocarbons). Environmentalism is now the art of putting those two sets of facts together.

Nothing more, but nothing less.
_____

Bill McKlbben Is the author of The End of Nature (Anchor, 1997) and Enough : Genetic Engineering and the End of Human Nature (Owl, 2004). He is a scholar in residence at Middlebury College and lives with his family in the Adirondack.


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Sunday, February 11, 2007

The Agenda Restated

by Jim Kunstler

www.kunstler.com (February 05 2007)


Out in the public arena, people frequently twang on me for being "Mister Gloom'n'doom", or for "not offering any solutions". I find this bizarre because I never fail to present audiences with a long, explicit task list of projects that American society needs to take up in the face of the combined problems I have labeled The Long Emergency. That the audience never hears this, and then indignantly demands such instruction, only reinforces my sense that the cognitive dissonance in our culture has gone totally off the charts.

Insofar as I just returned from a college lecture road trip, and heard the same carping all over again, I conclude that it's necessary for me to spell it all out a'fresh. I think of this not so much as a roster of "solutions" but as a set of reasonable responses to a new set of circumstances. (Not everything we try to do will succeed, that is, be a "solution".) So, for those of you who are tired of wringing your hands, who would like to do something useful, or focus your attention in a purposeful way, here it is.

* Expand your view beyond the question of how we will run all the cars by means other than gasoline. This obsession with keeping the cars running at all costs could really prove fatal. It is especially unhelpful that so many self-proclaimed "greens" and political "progressives" are hung up on this monomaniacal theme. Get this: the cars are not part of the solution (whether they run on fossil fuels, vodka, used frymax^(TM) oil, or cow shit). They are at the heart of the problem. And trying to salvage the entire Happy Motoring system by shifting it from gasoline to other fuels will only make things much worse. The bottom line of this is: start thinking beyond the car. We have to make other arrangements for virtually all the common activities of daily life.

* We have to produce food differently. The ADM / Monsanto / Cargill model of industrial agribusiness is heading toward its Waterloo. As oil and gas deplete, we will be left with sterile soils and farming organized at an unworkable scale. Many lives will depend on our ability to fix this. Farming will soon return much closer to the center of American economic life. It will necessarily have to be done more locally, at a smaller-and-finer scale, and will require more human labor. The value-added activities associated with farming - for example, making products like cheese, wine, oils - will also have to be done much more locally. This situation presents excellent business and vocational opportunities for America's young people (if they can unplug their Ipods long enough to pay attention.) It also presents huge problems in land-use reform. Not to mention the fact that the knowledge and skill for doing these things has to be painstakingly retrieved from the dumpster of history. Get busy.

* We have to inhabit the terrain differently. Virtually every place in our nation organized for car dependency is going to fail to some degree. Quite a few places (Phoenix, Las Vegas, Miami ...) will support only a fraction of their current populations. We'll have to return to traditional human ecologies at a smaller scale: villages, towns, and cities (along with a productive rural landscape). Our small towns are waiting to be reinhabited. Our cities will have to contract. The cities that are composed proportionately more of suburban fabric (for example Atlanta, Houston) will pose especially tough problems. Most of that stuff will not be fixed. The loss of monetary value in suburban property will have far-reaching ramifications. The stuff we build in the decades ahead will have to be made of regional materials found in nature - as opposed to modular, snap-together, manufactured components - at a more modest scale. This whole process will entail enormous demographic shifts and is liable to be turbulent. Like farming, it will require the retrieval of skill-sets and methodologies that have been forsaken. The graduate schools of architecture are still tragically preoccupied with teaching Narcissism. The faculties will have to be overthrown. Our attitudes about land-use will have to change dramatically. The building codes and zoning laws will eventually be abandoned and will have to be replaced with vernacular wisdom. Get busy.

* We have to move things and people differently. This is the sunset of Happy Motoring (including the entire US trucking system). Get used to it. Don't waste your society's remaining resources trying to prop up car-and-truck dependency. Moving things and people by water and rail is vastly more energy-efficient. Need something to do? Get involved in restoring public transit. Let's start with railroads, and let's make sure we electrify them so they will run on things other than fossil fuel or, if we have to run them partly on coal-fired power plants, at least scrub the emissions and sequester the carbon dioxide at as few source-points as possible. We also have to prepare our society for moving people and things much more by water. This implies the rebuilding of infrastructure for our harbors, and also for our inland river and canal systems - including the towns associated with them. The great harbor towns, like Baltimore, Boston, and New York, can no longer devote their waterfronts to condo sites and bikeways. We actually have to put the piers and warehouses back in place (not to mention the sleazy accommodations for sailors). Right now, programs are underway to restore maritime shipping based on wind - yes, sailing ships. It's for real. Lots to do here. Put down your Ipod and get busy.

* We have to transform retail trade. The national chains that have used the high tide of fossil fuels to contrive predatory economies-of-scale (and kill local economies) - they are going down. WalMart and the other outfits will not survive the coming era of expensive, scarcer oil. They will not be able to run the "warehouses-on-wheels" of eighteen-wheel tractor-trailers incessantly circulating along the interstate highways. Their 12,000-mile supply lines to the Asian slave-factories are also endangered as the US and China contest for Middle East and African oil. The local networks of commercial interdependency which these chain stores systematically destroyed (with the public's acquiescence) will have to be rebuilt brick-by-brick and inventory-by-inventory. This will require rich, fine-grained, multi-layered networks of people who make, distribute, and sell stuff (including the much-maligned "middlemen"). Don't be fooled into thinking that the Internet will replace local retail economies. Internet shopping is totally dependent now on cheap delivery, and delivery will no longer be cheap. It also is predicated on electric power systems that are completely reliable. That is something we are unlikely to enjoy in the years ahead. Do you have a penchant for retail trade and don't want to work for a big predatory corporation? There's lots to do here in the realm of small, local business. Quit carping and get busy.

* We will have to make things again in America. However, we are going to make less stuff. We will have fewer things to buy, fewer choices of things. The curtain is coming down on the endless blue-light-special shopping frenzy that has occupied the forefront of daily life in America for decades. But we will still need household goods and things to wear. As a practical matter, we are not going to re-live the 20th century. The factories from America's heyday of manufacturing (1900 - 1970) were all designed for massive inputs of fossil fuel, and many of them have already been demolished. We're going to have to make things on a smaller scale by other means. Perhaps we will have to use more water power. The truth is, we don't know yet how we're going to make anything. This is something that the younger generations can put their minds and muscles into.

* The age of canned entertainment is coming to and end. It was fun for a while. We liked "Citizen Kane" and the Beatles. But we're going to have to make our own music and our own drama down the road. We're going to need playhouses and live performance halls. We're going to need violin and banjo players and playwrights and scenery-makers, and singers. We'll need theater managers and stage-hands. The Internet is not going to save canned entertainment. The Internet will not work so well if the electricity is on the fritz half the time (or more).

* We'll have to reorganize the education system. The centralized secondary school systems based on the yellow school bus fleets will not survive the coming decades. The huge investments we have made in these facilities will impede the transition out of them, but they will fail anyway. Since we will be a less-affluent society, we probably won't be able to replace these centralized facilities with smaller and more equitably distributed schools, at least not right away. Personally, I believe that the next incarnation of education will grow out of the home schooling movement, as home schooling efforts aggregate locally into units of more than one family. God knows what happens beyond secondary education. The big universities, both public and private, may not be salvageable. And the activity of higher education itself may engender huge resentment by those foreclosed from it. But anyone who learns to do long division and write a coherent paragraph will be at a great advantage - and, in any case, will probably out-perform today's average college graduate. One thing for sure: teaching children is not liable to become an obsolete line-of-work, as compared to public relations and sports marketing. Lots to do here, and lots to think about. Get busy, future teachers of America.

* We have to reorganize the medical system. The current skein of intertwined rackets based on endless Ponzi buck passing scams will not survive the discontinuities to come. We will probably have to return to a model of service much closer to what used to be called "doctoring". Medical training may also have to change as the big universities run into trouble functioning. Doctors of the 21st century will certainly drive fewer German cars, and there will be fewer opportunities in the cosmetic surgery field. Let's hope that we don't slide so far back that we forget the germ theory of disease, or the need to wash our hands, or the fundamentals of pharmaceutical science. Lots to do here for the unsqueamish.

* Life in the USA will have to become much more local, and virtually all the activities of everyday life will have to be re-scaled. You can state categorically that any enterprise now supersized is likely to fail - everything from the federal government to big corporations to huge institutions. If you can find a way to do something practical and useful on a smaller scale than it is currently being done, you are likely to have food in your cupboard and people who esteem you. An entire social infrastructure of voluntary associations, co-opted by the narcotic of television, needs to be reconstructed. Local institutions for care of the helpless will have to be organized. Local politics will be much more meaningful as state governments and federal agencies slide into complete impotence. Lots of jobs here for local heroes.

So, that's the task list for now. Forgive me if I left things out. But please don't carp at me, by letter or in person, that I am not providing you with anything to think about or devote your personal energy to. If you're depressed, change your focus. Quit wishing and start doing. The best way to feel hopeful about the future is to get off your ass and demonstrate to yourself that you are a capable, competent individual resolutely able to face new circumstances.

http://jameshowardkunstler.typepad.com/clusterfuck_nation/


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Saturday, February 10, 2007

Five Axioms of Sustainability

by Richard Heinberg

Museletter #178 (February 2007)


My aim in this essay is to explore the history of the terms sustainable and sustainability, and their various published definitions, and then to offer a set of five axioms (based on a review of the literature) to help clarify the characteristics of a durable society.

The essence of the term sustainable is simple enough: "that which can be maintained over time". By implication, this means that any society, or any aspect of a society, that is unsustainable cannot be maintained for long and will cease to function at some point.

It is probably safe to assume that no society can be maintained forever: astronomers assure us that in several billion years the Sun will have heated to the point that the oceans will have boiled away and life on our planet will have come to an end. Thus sustainability is a relative term. It seems reasonable to take as a temporal frame of reference the durations of prior civilizations, which ranged from several hundreds to several thousands of years. A sustainable society, then, would be one capable of maintaining itself for many centuries into the future.

However, the word sustainable has become widely used in recent years to refer, in a general and vague way, merely to practices that are reputed to be more environmentally sound than others. Often the word is used so carelessly as to lead some environmentalists to advise abandoning its use. {1} Nevertheless, I believe that the concept of sustainability is essential to the understanding and solution of our species' ecological dilemma, and that the word is capable of rehabilitation, if only we are willing to expend a little effort in arriving at a clear definition.


History and Background

The essential concept of sustainability was embodied in the worldviews and traditions of many indigenous peoples; for example, it was a precept of the Gayanashagowa, or Great Law of Peace (the constitution of the Haudenosaunee or Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy) that chiefs consider the impact of their decisions on the seventh generation to come.

The first known European use of sustainability (German: Nachhaltigkeit) occurred in 1712 in the book Sylvicultura Oeconomica by German forester and scientist Hannss Carl von Carlowitz. Later, French and English foresters adopted the practice of planting trees as a path to "sustained yield forestry".

The term gained widespread usage after 1987, when the Brundtland Report of the World Commission of Environment and Development defined sustainable development as development that "meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". {2} This definition of sustainability has proven extremely influential, and is still widely used; nevertheless it has been criticized for its failure to explicitly note the unsustainability of the use of non-renewable resources, and for its general disregard of the problem of population growth. {3}

Also in the 1980s, Swedish oncologist Dr Karl-Henrik Robert brought together leading Swedish scientists to develop a consensus on requirements for a sustainable society. In 1989 he formulated this consensus in four conditions for sustainability, which in turn became the basis for an organization, The Natural Step. {4} Subsequently, sixty major Swedish corporations and 56 municipalities, as well as many businesses in other nations, pledged to abide by Natural Step conditions. The four conditions are as follows:

1. In order for a society to be sustainable, nature's functions and diversity are not systematically subject to increasing concentrations of substances extracted from the earth's crust.

2. In order for a society to be sustainable, nature's functions and diversity are not systematically subject to increasing concentrations of substances produced by society.

3. In order for a society to be sustainable, nature's functions and diversity are not systematically impoverished by physical displacement, over-harvesting, or other forms of ecosystem manipulation.

4. In a sustainable society, people are not subject to conditions that systematically undermine their capacity to meet their needs.


Seeing the need for an accounting or indicator scheme by which to measure sustainability, Canadian ecologist William Rees in 1992 introduced the concept of the Ecological Footprint, defined as the amount of land and water area a human population would hypothetically need in order to provide the resources required to support itself and to absorb its wastes, given prevailing technology. {5} Implicit in the scheme is the recognition that, for humanity to achieve sustainability, the total world population's footprint must be less than the total land/water area of the Earth (that footprint is currently calculated by the Footprint Network as being about 23 percent larger than what the planet can regenerate, indicating that humankind is to this extent operating in an unsustainable manner).

In a paper published in 1994 (revised 1998), professor of physics Albert A Bartlett offered 17 Laws of Sustainability, with which he sought to clarify the meaning of sustainability in terms of population and resource consumption. {6} Bartlett's criticisms of the careless use of the term, and his rigorous demonstration of the implications of continued growth, were important influences on the present author's efforts to define what is genuinely sustainable.

A truly comprehensive historical survey of the usage of the terms sustainable and sustainability is not feasible. A search of Amazon.com for sustainability (January 17 2007) yielded nearly 25,000 hits - presumably indicating several thousand distinct titles containing the word. Sustainable yielded 62,000 hits, including books on sustainable leadership, communities, energy, design, construction, business, development, urban planning, tourism, and so on.

A search of journal articles on Google Scholar turned up 538,000 hits, indicating thousands of scholarly articles or references with the word sustainability in their titles. However, my own admittedly less-than-exhaustive acquaintance with the literature (informed, among other sources, by two books that offer an overview of the history of the concept of sustainability) {7} suggests that much, if not most of this immense body of publications repeats, or is based on, the various definitions and conditions described above.


Five Axioms

As a contribution to this ongoing refinement of the concept, I have formulated five axioms (self-evident truths) of sustainability. I have not introduced any fundamentally new notions in any of the axioms; my goal is simply to distill ideas that have been proposed and explored by others, and to put them into a form that is both more precise and easier to understand.

In formulating these axioms I endeavored to take into account previous definitions of sustainability, and also the most cogent criticisms of those definitions. My criteria were as follows:

* To qualify as an axiom, a statement must be capable of being tested using the methodology of science;

* Collectively, a set of axioms intended to define sustainability must be minimal (with no redundancies);

* At the same time, the axioms must be sufficient, leaving no glaring loopholes; and

* The axioms should be worded in terms the layperson can understand.


Here are the axioms, each followed by a brief discussion:


1. (Tainter's Axiom): Any society that continues to use critical resources unsustainably will collapse.


Exception: A society can avoid collapse by finding replacement resources.

Limit to the exception: In a finite world, the number of possible replacements is also finite.

Discussion: I have named this axiom for Joseph Tainter, author of the classic study, The Collapse of Complex Societies, which demonstrates that collapse is a frequent if not universal fate of complex societies, and argues that collapse is directly related to declining returns on efforts to support growing levels of societal complexity with energy harvested from the environment. Jared Diamond's book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed similarly makes the argument that collapse is the common destiny of societies that ignore resource constraints. {8}

This axiom defines sustainability by the consequences of its absence, that is, collapse. Tainter defines collapse as a reduction in social complexity - that is, a contraction of society in terms of its population size, the sophistication of its technologies, the consumption rates of its people, and the diversity of its specialized social roles. Often, historically, collapse has meant a precipitous decline in population brought about by social chaos, warfare, disease, or famine. However, collapse can also occur more gradually over a period of many decades or even several centuries. There is also the theoretical possibility that a society could choose to collapse (that is, reduce its complexity) in a controlled as well as gradual manner. While it could be argued that a society can choose to change rather than collapse, the only choices that would substantively affect the outcome would be either to cease using critical resources unsustainably or to find alternative resources.

A society that uses resources sustainably may collapse for other reasons, some beyond the society's control (as a result of an overwhelming natural disaster, or of conquest by another, more militarily formidable and aggressive society, to name just two of many possibilities), so it cannot be said that a sustainable society is immune to collapse unless many more conditions for sustainability are specified. This first axiom focuses on resource consumption because that is a decisive, quantifiable, and, in principle, controllable determinant of a society's long-term survival. The question of what constitutes sustainable or unsustainable use of resources is addressed in axioms 3 and 4.

Critical resources are ones essential to the maintenance of life and basic social functions - including (but not necessarily limited to) water and the resources necessary to produce food and usable energy.

The Exception and Limit to the Exception address the common argument of free-market economists that resources are infinitely substitutable, and that therefore modern market-driven societies need never face a depletion-led collapse, even if their consumption rates continue to escalate. {9} In some instances, substitutes for resources become readily available and are even superior, as was the case in the mid-19th century when kerosene from petroleum was substituted for whale oil as a fuel for lamps. In other cases, substitutes are inferior (as is the case with tar sands as a substitute for conventional petroleum, given that tar sands are less energy-dense, require more energy input for processing, and produce more carbon emissions). As time goes on, societies will tend first to exhaust substitutes that are superior and easy to get at, than those that are equivalent, and increasingly will have to rely on ever more inferior substitutes to replace depleting resources - unless rates of consumption are held in check (see Axioms 2-4).


2. (Bartlett's Axiom): Population growth and/or growth in the rates of consumption of resources cannot be sustained.

Discussion: I have named this axiom for Albert A Bartlett because it is his First Law of Sustainability, reproduced verbatim (I found it impossible to improve upon). {10}

The world has seen the human population grow for many decades and therefore this growth has obviously been sustained up to the present. How can we be sure that it cannot be sustained into the indefinite future? Simple arithmetic can be used to show that even small rates of growth, if continued, add up to absurdly large - and plainly unsupportable - population sizes and rates of consumption. For example: a simple one percent rate of growth in the present human population (less than the actual current rate) would result in a doubling of population each seventy years. Thus in 2075, the Earth would be home to thirteen billion humans; in 2145, 26 billion; and so on. By the year 3050, there would be one human per square meter of Earth's land surface (including mountains and deserts).


3. To be sustainable, the use of renewable resources must proceed at a rate that is less than or equal to the rate of natural replenishment.


Discussion:
Renewable resources are exhaustible. Forests can be over-cut, resulting in barren landscapes and shortages of wood (as occurred in many parts of Europe in past centuries), and fish can be over-harvested, resulting in the extinction or near-extinction of many species (as is occurring today globally).

This axiom has been stated (in somewhat differing ways) by many economists and ecologists, and is the basis for "sustained yield forestry" (see above) and "maximum sustainable yield" fishery management. Efforts to refine this essential principle of sustainability are ongoing. {11}

The term "rate of natural replenishment" requires some discussion. The first clue that harvesting is proceeding at a rate greater than that of natural replenishment is the decline of the resource base. However, a resource may be declining for reasons other than over-harvesting; for example, a forest that is not being logged may be decimated by disease. Nevertheless, if the resource is declining, pursuit of the goal of sustainability requires that the rate of harvest be reduced, regardless of the cause of the resource decline. Sometimes harvests must drop dramatically, at a rate far greater than the rate of resource decline, so that the resource has time to recover. This has been the case with regard to commercial wild whale and fish species that have been over-harvested to the point of near-exhaustion, and have required complete harvest moratoria in order to re-establish themselves - though in cases where the remaining breeding population is too small even this is not enough and the species cannot recover. Axiom 3 is implied in the Natural Step's third condition.


4. To be sustainable, the use of non-renewable resources must proceed at a rate that is declining, and the rate of decline must be greater than or equal to the rate of depletion.


The rate of depletion is defined as the amount being extracted and used during a specified time interval (usually a year) as a percentage of the amount left to extract.

Discussion: No continuous rate of use of any non-renewable resource is sustainable. However, if the rate of use is declining at a rate greater than or equal to the rate of depletion, this can be said to be a sustainable situation in that society's dependence on the resource will be reduced to insignificance before the resource is exhausted.

This principle was first stated, in a more generalized and more mathematically rigorous form, by Albert A Bartlett in his 1986 paper, "Sustained Availability: A Management Program for Non-Renewable Resources". {12} The article's abstract notes:

If the rate of extraction declines at a fixed fraction per unit time, the rate of extraction will approach zero, but the integrated total of the extracted resource between t=0 and t=infinity will remain finite. If we choose a rate of decline of the rate of extraction of the resource such that the integrated total of all future extraction equals the present size of the remaining resource then we have a program that will allow the resource to be available in declining amounts for use forever.

Annually reducing the rate of extraction of a given non-renewable resource by its yearly rate of depletion effectively accomplishes the same thing, but requires only simple arithmetic and layperson's terms for its explanation. Estimates of the "amount left to extract", mentioned in the axiom, are disputable for all non-renewable resources. Unrealistically robust estimates would tend to skew the depletion rate in a downward direction, undermining any effort to attain sustainability via a resource depletion protocol. It may be realistic to assume that people in the future will find ways to extract non-renewable resources more thoroughly, with amounts that would otherwise be left in the ground becoming economically recoverable as a result of higher commodity prices and improvements in extraction technology.

Also, exploration techniques are likely to improve, leading to further discoveries of the resource. Thus realistic estimates of ultimately recoverable quantities should be greater than currently known amounts extractable with current technology at current prices. However, it is unrealistic to assume that people in the future will ever be able to economically extract all of a given resource, or that limits of declining marginal returns in the extraction process will no longer apply. Moreover, if discovery rates are currently declining, it is probably unrealistic to assume that discovery rates will increase substantially in the future. Thus for any non-renewable resource prudence dictates adhering to conservative estimates of the "amount left to extract".

Axiom 4 encapsulates Bartlett's 7th and 8th Laws of Sustainability. It is also the basis for the Oil Depletion Protocol, first suggested by petroleum geologist Colin J. Campbell in 1996 and the subject of a recent book by the present author. {13} The aim of the Oil Depletion Protocol is to reduce global consumption of petroleum in order to avert the crises likely to ensue as a result of declining supply - including economic collapse and resource wars. Under the terms of the Oil Depletion Protocol, oil-importing countries would reduce their imports by the world oil depletion rate (calculated by Campbell at 2.5 percent per year); producers would reduce their domestic production by their national depletion rates.


5. Sustainability requires that substances introduced into the environment from human activities be minimized and rendered harmless to biosphere functions.


In cases where pollution from the extraction and consumption of non-renewable resources that has proceeded at expanding rates for some time threatens the viability of ecosystems, reduction in the rates of extraction and consumption of those resources may need to occur at a rate greater than the rate of depletion.

Discussion: If axioms 2 through 4 are followed, pollution should be minimized as a result. Nevertheless, these conditions are not sufficient in all cases to avert potentially collapse-inducing impacts.

It is possible for a society to generate serious pollution from the unwise use of renewable resources (the use of tanning agents on hides damaged streams for centuries or millennia), and such impacts are to be avoided. Likewise, especially where large numbers of humans are concentrated, their biological wastes may pose severe environmental problems; such wastes must be properly composted.

The most serious forms of pollution in the modern world arise from the extraction, processing, and consumption of non-renewable resources. If (as outlined in Axiom 4) the consumption of non-renewable resources declines, pollution should also decline. Thus, in theory, if a society is following the terms of Axiom 4, these pollution problems are less likely to arise in the future.

However, in the current instance, where the extraction and consumption of non-renewable resources have been growing for some time and have resulted in levels of pollution that threaten basic biosphere functions, heroic measures are called for. This is of course the situation with regard to atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, especially in relation to the burning of the non-renewable resource coal; it is also the case with regard to hormone-mimicking petrochemical pollution that inhibits reproduction in many vertebrate species. In the first instance: merely to reduce coal consumption by the global coal depletion rate would not suffice to avert a climatic catastrophe. The coal depletion rate is small, climate impacts from coal combustion emissions are building quickly, and annual reductions in those emissions must occur at high rates if ecosystem-threatening consequences are to be avoided. Similarly, in the case of petrochemical pollution, merely to reduce the dispersion of plastics and other petrochemicals into the environment by the annual rate of depletion of oil and natural gas would not suffice to avert environmental harms on a scale potentially leading to the collapse of ecosystems and human societies.

In the case that reduction in emissions or other pollutants can be obtained without a reduction in consumption of non-renewable resources, for example by using technological means to capture polluting substances and sequester them harmlessly, or by curtailing the production of certain industrial chemicals, then a reduction in consumption of such resources need only occur at the depletion rate in order to achieve sustainability. However, society should be extremely skeptical and careful regarding claims for untested technologies' abilities to safely sequester polluting substances for very long periods of time.

This axiom builds upon Natural Step condition 2.


Evaluation

These axioms are of course open to further refinement. I have attempted to anticipate criticisms likely to be leveled at them, which will probably be of the sort that says these axioms are not sufficient to define the concept of sustainability. The most obvious of these is worth mentioning and discussing here: Why is there no axiom relating to social equity (similar to the Natural Step's fourth condition)?

The purpose of the axioms set forth here is not to describe conditions that would lead to a good or just society, merely to a society able to be maintained over time. It is not clear that perfect economic equality or a perfectly egalitarian system of decision-making is necessary to avert societal collapse. Certainly, extreme inequality seems to make societies vulnerable to internal social and political upheaval. On the other hand, it could be argued that a society's adherence to the five axioms as stated will tend to lead to relatively greater levels of economic and political equality, thus obviating the need for a separate axiom in this regard. In anthropological literature, modest rates of resource consumption and low population sizes relative to the available resource base are correlated with the use of egalitarian decision-making processes and with economic equity - though the correlation is skewed by other variables, such as means of sustenance (hunting-and-gathering societies tend to be highly equitable and egalitarian, while herding societies tend to be less so). If such correlations continue to hold, the reversion to lower rates of consumption of resources should lead to a more rather than less egalitarian society.{14}

Will local, national, and international leaders ever shape public policy according to these five axioms? Clearly, policies that would require an end to population growth - and perhaps even a population decline - as well as a reduction in the consumption of resources would not be popular, unless the general populace could be persuaded of the necessity of making its activities sustainable. However, if leaders do not begin to abide by these axioms, society as a whole, or some aspects of it, will assuredly collapse. Perhaps this is sufficient incentive to overcome the psychological and political resistance that would otherwise frustrate efforts toward true sustainability.


Notes

{1} Eric Freyfogle, Why Conservation Is Failing and How It Can Regain Ground (Yale University Press, 2006)

{2} World Commission of Environment and Development, "Our Common Future" (1987),
www.are.admin.ch/are/en/nachhaltig/international_uno/unterseite02330/

{3} Albert A Bartlett, "Reflections on Sustainability, Population Growth, and the Environment - Revisted". Renewable Resources Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Winter 1997-1998, 6-23. www.hubbertpeak.com/bartlett/reflections.htm

{4} www.naturalstep.org

{5} William E Rees and Mathis Wackernagel, Our Ecological Footprint (New Society, 1995). www.footprintnetwork.org

{6} Bartlett 1998, op cit.

{7} Simon Dresner, Principles of Sustainability (Earthscan, 2002); Andres Edwards, The Sustainability Revolution: Portrait of a Paradigm Shift (New Society, 2005)

{8} Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (Viking, 2005); Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge University Press, 1988)

{9} Julian Simon, "The State of Humanity: Steadily Improving". Cato Policy Report, Vol 17, No 5, 131.

{10} Bartlett 1998, op cit.

{11} For example, Simone Valente, "Sustainable Development, Renewable Resources and Technological Progress" in Environmental and Resource Economics Vol 30, No 1, January 2005, 115-125.

{12} Albert A Bartlett, "Sustained Availability: A Management Program for Nonrenewable Resources". American Journal of Physics, Vol 54, May 1986, 398-402

{13} Richard Heinberg, The Oil Depletion Protocol: A Plan to Avert Oil Wars, Terrorism and Economic Collapse (New Society, 2006); www.oildepletionprotocol.org

{14} See, for example, Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Aldine, 1972); Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege (University of North Carolina Press, 1977); and Ivan Illich, Energy and Equity (Calder and Boyars, 1974).


http://www.richardheinberg.com/


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Friday, February 09, 2007

The Anti-Empire Report

Some things you need to know before the world ends

by William Blum

www.killinghope.org (February 03 2007)


Full Spectrum Dominance

It is not often that the empire is put in the position of one its victims, in fear of the military and technical prowess of another country, forced to talk of peace and cooperation, just as Iraq and others, hoping to put off an American attack, were forced to do over the years; just as Iran now. No, China is not about to attack the United States, but the Chinese shootdown of a satellite (an old weather satellite of theirs) in space on January 11, has made a US attack on China much more dangerous and much less likely; it's made the empire's leaders realize that they don't have total power to make any and all other nations do their bidding.

Here's how the gentlemen of the Pentagon have sounded in the recent past on the subject of space.

"We will engage terrestrial targets someday - ships, airplanes, land targets - from space. ... We're going to fight in space. We're going to fight from space and we're going to fight into space." -- General Joseph Ashy, Commander-in-Chief of the US Space Command, 1996 {1}

"With regard to space dominance, we have it, we like it, and we're going to keep it". -- Keith R Hall, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, 1997 {2}

"US Space Command - dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict ... During the early portion of the 21st century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare ... The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance ... Development of ballistic missile defenses using space systems and planning for precision strikes from space offers a counter to the worldwide proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] ... Space is a region with increasing commercial, civil, international, and military interests and investments. The threat to these vital systems is also increasing ... Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required."
-- "United States Space Command: Vision for 2020", 1997 {3}

"Space represents a fundamentally new and better way to apply military force". -- US Strategic Command, 2004 {4}

And now along comes China, with the ability to make all this proud talk look somewhat foolish. At a State Department press briefing a week after the shootdown, the department's deputy spokesman Tom Casey stated, presumably without chuckling: "We certainly are concerned by any effort, by any nation that would be geared towards developing weapons or other military activities in space ... We don't want to see a situation where there is any militarization of space". He spoke of the "peaceful use of space", and was concerned about the threat to "modern life as we know it", because "countries throughout the world are dependant on space based technologies, weather satellites, communications satellites and other devices".

A reporter asked: "Has the United States conducted such a test destroying a satellite in space?"

Yes, said Casey, in 1985. But that was different because "there was a Cold War that was being engaged in between the United States and the Soviet Union" and there were much fewer satellites moving about space. {5}

Congressman Terry Everett, senior Republican on the House armed services subcommittee on strategic forces, said China's test "raises serious concerns about the vulnerability of our space-based assets ... We depend on satellites for a host of military and commercial uses, from navigation to ATM transactions".{6}

Even prior to the Chinese test, the Washington Post pointed out: "For a US military increasingly dependent on sophisticated satellites for communicating, gathering intelligence and guiding missiles, the possibility that those space-based systems could come under attack has become a growing worry ... The administration insists that there is no arms race in space, although the United States is the only nation that opposed a recent United Nations call for talks on keeping weapons out of space ... Although the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, signed by the United States, allows only peaceful uses of space, some believe that the United States is moving toward some level of weaponization, especially related to a missile defense system".{7}

Tom Casey, the State Department spokesperson, tried his best to give the impression that the United States has no idea why China would do such a thing - "We would like to see and understand and know more about what they're really trying to accomplish here" ... "exactly what their intentions are" ... "questions that arise about what Chinese intentions are" ... "not only the nature of what they've done, but the purpose and intent". {8}

But the United States can well imagine what China's intention was. The Chinese were responding to the efforts of the Bush administration, and the Clinton administration before them, to establish and maintain US military supremacy in space and to use that supremacy as a threatening, or actual, weapon. Beijing wished to put Washington on notice that in any future conflict with China the United States will not be dealing with Iraq or Afghanistan, or Yugoslavia, Panama or Grenada.

"But what did anyone expect?" asks Lawrence Martin, columnist for The Globe and Mail of Canada. "For several years, China, Canada, and virtually every country in the world have been urging the United States to enter into an arms-control treaty for outer space. Leave the heavens in peace, for god's sake. Come together and work something out. It's called collective security ... Mr Bush and Mr Cheney showed no interest in a space treaty. Their national space policy is essentially hegemony in the heavens. They oppose the development of new legal regimes or other measures that restrict their designs. A UN resolution to prevent an arms race in space was supported by 151 countries with zero opposed. The US abstained. It wants strategic control." {9}


The ideology of the ruling class in any society is one that tries to depict the existing social order as "natural"

In 1972 I traveled by land from San Francisco to Chile, to observe and report on Salvador Allende's "socialist experiment". One of the lasting impressions of my journey through Latin America is of the strict class order of the societies I visited. There are probably very few places in the world where the dividing lines between the upper and middle classes on the one hand and the lower class on the other are more distinct and emotionally clung to, including Great Britain. In the Chilean capital of Santiago I went to look at a room in a house advertised by a woman. Because I was American she assumed that I was anti-Allende, the same assumption she'd have made if I had been European, for she wanted to believe that only "Indians", only poor dumb indi'genas and their ilk, supported the government. She was pleased by the prospect of an American living in her home and was concerned that he might be getting the wrong impression about her country. "All this chaos", she assured me, "it's not normal, it's not Chile". When I relieved her of her misconception about me she was visibly confused and hurt, and I was a little uncomfortable as well, like I had betrayed her trust. I made my departure quickly.

There's the classic Latin American story of the servant of a family of the oligarchy. He bought steak for his patro'n's dog, but his own family ate scraps. He took the dog to the vet, but couldn't take his own children to a doctor. And complained not. In Chile, under Allende, there was a terribly nagging fear amongst the privileged classes that servants no longer knew their place. (In Sweden, for some years now, they have been able to examine children of a certain age - their height, weight, and various health measurements - and are then not able to tell which social class the child is from; they have ended class warfare against children.)

In the 1980s, in Central America, servants rose up in much of the region against their betters, the latter of course being unconditionally supported with Yankee money, Yankee arms, even Yankee lives. At the end of that decade the New York Times offered some snapshots of El Salvador:

Over canapes served by hovering waiters at a party, a guest said she was convinced that God had created two distinct classes of people: the rich and people to serve them. She described herself as charitable for allowing the poor to work as her servants. "It's the best you can do", she said. The woman's outspokenness was unusual, but her attitude is shared by a large segment of the Salvadoran upper class.

The separation between classes is so rigid that even small expressions of kindness across the divide are viewed with suspicion. When an American, visiting an ice cream store, remarked that he was shopping for a birthday party for his maid's child, other store patrons immediately stopped talking and began staring at the American. Finally, an astonished woman in the check-out line spoke out. "You must be kidding", she said. {10}


The same polarization is taking place now in Venezuela as Hugo Chavez attempts to build a more egalitarian society. The Associated Press (January 29 2007) recently presented some snapshots from Caracas: A man of European parents says that at his son's private Jewish school some parents are talking about how and when to leave the country. The man wants a passport for his ten-year-old son in case they need to leave for good. "I think we're headed toward totalitarianism". A middle-class retiree grimaces at what she sees coming: "Within one year, complete communism ... What he's forming is a dictatorship". The fact that Chavez is himself part indi'gena and part black, and looks it, can well add to their animosity towards the man.

I wonder what such people think of George "I am the decider" Bush and his repeated use of "signing statements", which effectively means a law is what he says it is, no more, no less; his Patriot Act, and his various assaults on the principle of habeas corpus, to name but a few of the scary practices of his authoritarian rule.

Chuck Kaufman, National Co-Coordinator of the Washington-based Nicaragua Network, was part of a group which visited Venezuela last fall. Following is part of his report:

Venezuela is politically polarized. We witnessed the extremes of this during a dinner with lawyer and author Eva Golinger. Some very drunk opposition supporters recognized Golinger as author of The Chavez Code (Common Courage, 2005) and a strong Chavez partisan. Some of them surrounded our table and began screaming at Golinger and the delegation, calling us "assassins" "Cubans", and "Argentines". The verbal abuse went on for long minutes until waiters ejected the most out-of-control anti-Chavez woman. We were later told that she worked in the Attorney General's office, highlighting one of the many contradictions arising from the fact that Chavez' Bolivarian revolution came into power democratically through the ballot box rather than by force of arms. Armed revolutions generally sweep opponents out of government jobs and places of influence such as the media, but in Venezuela many in the opposition are still in the civil service and most of the media is virulently anti-Chavez. {11}

I admire Hugo Chavez and what he's trying to do in Venezuela, but I wish he wouldn't go out of his way to taunt the Bush administration, as he does so frequently. Doesn't he know that he's dealing with a bunch of homicidal maniacs? Literally. Someone please tell him to cool it or he will endanger his social revolution.


Liberalism's best and brightest

A report in the Washington Post, headlined "Soldier's Death Strengthens Senators' Antiwar Resolve", informs us that Senators Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut) and John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) have been rather upset upon learning of the death in Iraq of an Army Captain whom they met on a visit to the country in December, and who made a strong impression upon them. Dodd has been "radicalized", the story says, and Kerry has been "energized" in his opposition to the war.

Why, it must be asked, does it take the death of someone they met by chance to fire up their anti-war sentiments? Many millions of Americans, and many millions more around the world, have protested the war vehemently and passionately without having met any of the war's victims. What do these protestors have inside of them that so many members of Congress seem to lack?

"This was the kind of person you don't forget", said Dodd. "You mention the number dead, 3,000, the 22,000 wounded, and you almost see the eyes glaze over. But you talk about an individual like this, who was doing his job, a hell of a job, but was also willing to talk about what was wrong, it's a way to really bring it to life, to connect." {12}

Dear reader, is it the same for you? Do your eyes glaze over when you read or hear about the dead and wounded of Iraq?

Neither senator has apparently been "energized" enough to call for the immediate withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. That would be too "radical".

This gap - emotionally and intellectually - between members of Congress and normal human beings has been with us for ages of course. The anti-Vietnam War movement burst out of the starting gate back in August 1964, with hundreds of people demonstrating in New York. Many of these early dissenters took apart and critically examined the administration's statements about the war's origin, its current situation, and its rosy picture of the future. They found continuous omission, contradiction, and duplicity, became quickly and wholly cynical, and called for immediate and unconditional withdrawal. This was a state of intellect and principle it took members of Congress - and then only a minority - until the 1970s to reach. The same can be said of the mass media. And even then - even today - our political and media elite viewed Vietnam only as a "mistake"; that is, it was "the wrong way" to fight communism, not that the United States should not be traveling all over the globe to spew violence against anything labeled "communism" in the first place. Essentially, the only thing these best and brightest have learned from Vietnam is that we should not have fought in Vietnam.


In the land where happiness is guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence

"Think raising the minimum wage is a good idea?"

"Think again".

That was the message of a full-page advertisement that appeared in major newspapers in January. It was accompanied by statements of approval from the usual eminent suspects:

"The reason I object to the minimum wage is I think it destroys jobs, and I think the evidence on that, in my judgment, is overwhelming".
-- Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman

"The high rate of unemployment among teenagers, and especially black teenagers, is both a scandal and a serious source of social unrest. Yet it is largely a result of minimum wage laws."
-- Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize-winning economist {13}

Well, if raising the minimum wage can produce such negative consequences, then surely it is clear what we as an enlightened and humane people must do. We must lower the minimum wage. And thus enjoy less unemployment, less social unrest. Indeed, if we lower the minimum wage to zero, particularly for poor blacks ... think of it! ... No unemployment at all! Hardly any social unrest! In fact - dare I say it? - What if we did away with wages altogether?

"The modern conservative is engaged in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy: that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness".
-- John Kenneth Galbraith


Some little-known items from my old files

Here is US General Thomas Power speaking in December 1960 about things like nuclear war and a first strike by the United States: "The whole idea is to kill the bastards! At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!" The response from one of those present was: "Well, you'd better make sure that they're a man and a woman". {14}

Edward R Murrow is of course a much-honored newsman and "legendary broadcaster". There's the annual Edward R Murrow Award for Excellence in Public Diplomacy, with nominations made by the State Department, and there's the recent acclaimed film about Murrow, "Good Night, and Good Luck", amongst many other tributes. In 1960, CBS aired "Harvest of Shame", a documentary made by Murrow, which was lauded for exposing the terrible abuses endured by migratory farm workers in the United States. The following year Murrow left broadcasting to become the director of the United States Information Agency, whose raison d'e^tre was to make the United States look as good to the world as it does in American high school textbooks. Thus it was that when the BBC planned on showing "Harvest of Shame" in the UK, Murrow called them in an effort to suppress the broadcast, saying it was for US domestic use only. But the film was shown in the UK. {15}

One could wax cynical about Jimmy Carter as well; for example, while in the White House he tried hard to sabotage the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua; even worse, Carter supported the Islamic opposition to the leftist Afghanistan government in 1979, which led to a decade of very bloody civil war, the Taliban, and anti-American terrorism in the United States and elsewhere. However, I think that overall Carter was closer to a decent human being than any post-World War Two president. In 1978 he invited 1960s anti-war activist and leader of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Tom Hayden, to the White House. (Think George W inviting Michael Moore.) As recounted by Hayden, in their private conversation he said to Carter: "You are the elected President of the United States, yet I'm concerned that you have less power than the chairmen of the boards of the large multinational corporations - men we don't elect or even know."

"After looking pensively out the Oval Office window, President Carter nodded and said, 'I believe that's right. I've learned that these last twelve months'". {16}


NOTES

{1} Aviation Week and Space Technology (New York), August 5 1996, page 51

{2} Speaking to the National Space Club (Washington, DC), September 15 1997

{3} Excerpts are in the same sequence as found in the August 1997 brochure beginning on page 1.

{4} March 2004, www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_sm.html.
In 2002, the US Space Command was merged with the US Strategic Command.

{5} State Department Press Briefing, January 19 2007, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/79056.htm

{6} Associated Press, January 19 2007

{7} Washington Post, December 17 2006; page 12

{8} See note 5

{9} January 25 2007, page A19

{10} New York Times, October 7 1990, page 10

{11} For the full report of October 28 2006, see www.vensolidarity.org

{12} Washington Post, January 30 2007, page 3

{13} To see the advertisement - www.MinimumWage.org

{14} Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon
(Stanford University Press, 1983), page 246

{15} Google

{16} San Francisco Chronicle, March 4 1978

_____

To make a financial donation to support the work of the Anti-Empire Report
you can use the following address. But if you are not in pretty good shape
financially, please do not donate. Thanks.

William Blum
5100 Connecticut Avenue, NorthWest #707
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William Blum is the author of:-

Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War 2
(Common Courage Press, 1995)

Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower (Zed Books, 2002)

West-Bloc Dissident: A Cold War Memoir (Soft Skull Press, 2002)

Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire
(Common Courage Press, 2004)


Portions of the books can be read, and copies purchased, at www.killinghope.org
and previous Anti-Empire Reports can be read at this website.

To add yourself to this mailing list simply send an email to bblum6@aol.com with
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Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Thursday, February 08, 2007

The Big Question

Why are rail fares rising so fast, and can these higher prices be justified?

by Ian Herbert

The Independent & The Independent on Sunday

Independent.co.uk Online Edition (January 03 2007)


Why are we asking this question now?

Because another round of inflation-busting increases in rail fares has just been announced which, for those returning to work yesterday, will have provided some alarming experiences at the ticket desk.

For those who chose to travel from Glasgow to London, for instance, there was an eye-watering 8.1 per cent increase on last year's fare, which now stands at GBP 240 for a standard and open return. London to Plymouth was an equally miserable experience: it now costs GBP 214 for a standard open return - an increase of 12.6 per cent.

London Tube travellers were also hit, particularly those still paying cash for their journeys rather than using Oyster travelcards. The minimum single fare on the London Underground for a customer paying cash is now GBP 4. The travellers' watchdog body Passenger Focus describes the rises as "very disappointing".


Who is affected?

The fares are a disaster for those who make regular peak-time long-distance business trips - from Manchester or Newcastle to London, for example - especially if they don't book well in advance. But the increases will be barely felt by those who do not travel at peak times and who can book weeks ahead.

The current overcrowding is largely confined to cities such as London, Manchester, Leeds and Newcastle, where more people than ever are using trains at peak-commuting periods and there are now simply too many passengers and not enough seats.

Across the entire railway system, overcrowding in 2005 was only just below the Government's limit of three per cent more passengers than rated capacity, and on the busiest commuter lines the limit is regularly flouted.

The rail industry argues that higher prices are one way of encouraging commuters to travel at less popular times of the day. The two worlds of travel are demonstrated by the London Euston to Manchester trip: a 9 am standard single ticket today will cost GBP 109. Book it a month in advance, travel at midday and you will pay GBP 12.50.


What happens if the high fares don't deter rail travellers?

The environmental risks are profound because business travellers will turn in increasing numbers to low-cost airlines instead, to get them around Britain. Yesterday alone, there were thirteen flights from Manchester Airport to London. Even a last-minute flight costs less than GBP 100 (GBP 97, in bmi's case) which is much cheaper than the rail equivalent. That flight will generate 0.09 tonnes of carbon dioxide. A train's emissions are one-tenth of the figure.

Environmentalists say the continual above inflation increases in rail fares fly in the face of government pledges on carbon emissions. They want the pricing regime for public transport to be at least the same as for air and road travel.


How have the railways fared under this government?

As opposition spokeswoman on transport, Clare Short pledged in 1996 to renationalise the railways. But for several years after Labour came to power in 1997, there was little action, and what progress had been made was delayed by the Hatfield disaster in 2000, which prompted a huge investment in safety. There have been improvements. In 2000, the passenger rolling stock was, on average, 21 years old. Investment by train-operating companies has now pushed that down to fifteen. The Public Performance Measure, which follows punctuality and reliability, has also been rising every year since 2001. With 83.6 per cent of trains running on time last year, Britain can compare itself to Germany and Switzerland. Greater reliability brings greater demand, however. UK rail use has grown at a higher rate than most EU countries, with a two per cent climb since 2003.


Will the Government spend more to increase capacity?

It seems unlikely. Since the end of the First World War, when the railways were in serious financial trouble, governments have tried to avoid increasing the amount of subsidy which goes into the railways: that was what inspired the rail privatisation of 1993. The problem is that rail improvements swallow up vast amounts of money. Network Rail, which owns the rail infrastructure, suggested last year that the Government might spend GBP 8 billion to upgrade stations and lay new track. That horrified ministers, for whom the network already costs considerably more than they want to pay.

Partly because of stricter safety requirements introduced after the Hatfield crash, which killed four people in 2000, railways account for forty per cent of the total transport budget - but only eight per cent of journeys made.

One option put forward by some analysts is to reduce the amount of money spent on the relatively little-used rural services. The investment per passenger mile for these lines is huge, with many of the trains maintained to the same standard as 90 mph mainline services.

Cutting rural lines would prompt accusations that the Government is repeating the act of Dr Beecham, who axed nearly one quarter of the system forty years ago. But the Government should at least raise the issue by demonstrating to the taxpayer what some of these lines are costing them, according to Professor Stephen Glaister of Imperial College. Last year's Eddington committee, which examined the future of public transport, made the same observation.


Are things better in continental Europe?

Generally speaking, yes. In France, Spain, Germany and Switzerland, there is a deeply ingrained culture of public investment in railways, which in most of those countries are considered a public service that should not be subject to the vagaries of private-sector operators. Ticket prices reflect this. There are none of the big differentials between peak and off-peak times.

The cost of travelling from Paris to Metz, in Lorraine, eastern France (at 206 miles, roughly the equivalent of the London Euston to Manchester trip) is GBP 32, whatever time of the day you travel. None of the standard prices would budge if you booked them two weeks in advance or ten minutes before your train departed. British rail fares are three times higher than the rest of Europe, according to figures collected by the rail union TSSA. But the cost of major public investment in the railways is hurting some cash-strapped continental governments.


Is there any prospect that the situation will get better?

This year presents a big opportunity. In the summer, a railways White Paper is expected to be published, setting out the next thirty years of rail travel in Britain. Environmentalists and rail passenger groups see this as a key time to examine how capacity in the railways might be increased, with the incentive of tackling climate change in the process.


Are the higher prices fair to rail travellers?

Yes ...

* Over the past decade, trains have become more reliable and safer. A better standard of service comes at a price

* Uproar over rail prices does not reflect the railways' usage: only six per cent of the population - most of them affluent - travel by train

* Businesses, who can afford it, are worst hit by price increases - not the poor or elderly, who tend not to travel at peak times


No ...

* If we do not persuade more people to travel by train, there will be further increases in environmentally damaging car and air travel

* Train operators receive large government handouts and are profitable. They should not be allowed to use demand to inflate prices

* Gazprom would make the UK far too reliant on Russian gas at a time when government policy is to diversify energy supplies


Copyright (c) 2006 Independent News and Media Limited


http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/transport/article2121633.ece


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Wednesday, February 07, 2007

Planes, trains, and the road to ruin

Soaring rail fares are boosting the growth in domestic flights and undermining the fight against global warming

by Ian Herbert, Ben Russell and Andy McSmith

The Independent & The Independent on Sunday

Independent.co.uk Online Edition (January 03 2007)


Environmentalists and passenger groups have attacked the Government for driving rail passengers on to low-cost flights by presiding over a fourth consecutive year of inflation-busting train fares.

Sixty per cent of tickets sold have unregulated fares, which are set by private rail companies. These prices have gone up by as much as 8.4 per cent - more than three times the Government's target rate of inflation - so that a standard open return ticket between Manchester and London now costs GBP 219, or GBP 337 for first class.

The transport union TSSA said the increase meant UK rail fares were "by far and away the most expensive in Europe". Michael Meacher, a former environment minister, said the Government had "missed a golden opportunity to point up the benefits of public transport, and to make a very strong point about climate change". Instead of allowing train fares to go up, the Government should have capped or lowered them, he said.

Jason Torrance, campaigns director of the Transport 2000 pressure group, said the price rises flew in the face of "the Government's rhetoric about climate change".

Despite a poor image, with expectations of late trains and bad service, the railways have recently become popular. Approximately 83 per cent of trains ran on time in 2005 and customer satisfaction levels are at an all-time high of eighty per cent.

The train operating companies cannot keep up with demand and increased fares - rather than increased investment - are being used as a way of tackling the problem. That means flying is attracting more customers.

Those hit hardest by the fare increases are people who use trains at peak times. A standard open return ticket on the London to Glasgow service now costs GBP 240. A standard open ticket from London to Plymouth is GBP 214.

Business travellers have been hit harder than those who can choose to travel at off-peak times or can plan ahead. A Manchester to London ticket can be picked up for as little as GBP 12.50 for those booking weeks in advance. But business travellers are those who are most likely to switch from rail to air, according to environmentalists. "Rail is an ideal solution for tackling the increase of low-cost airlines but these increases are instead pushing more people to use them", said Mr Torrance. "That's a disaster. The carbon dioxide emissions from a London to Brussels trip by rail is ten per cent of that by air."

Chris Huhne, the Liberal Democrat environment spokesman, said the Government's "limited green record" had been shot to pieces at a time when vast airport expansions were being permitted. "Motoring costs have been steadily declining as a share of income while the cost of public transport has steadily risen", said Mr Huhne. "These trends have to be reversed if we are to tackle climate change. Gordon Brown's claim to be environmentally friendly is clearly nonsense. Transport emissions are up eighteen per cent since the Kyoto base year of 1990. Any climate change programme which does not tackle this sector is not worth the paper it's written on."

Chris Grayling, the shadow Transport Secretary, said: "This is further evidence that high fares are a deliberate part of government strategy to tackle overcrowding on trains. We can't expect people to leave their cars at home if they are being priced off the railways."

The TSSA union compared the GBP 219 London to Manchester (200 miles) fare with the GBP 34.50 it costs to travel from Paris to Calais. Travelling from Madrid to Barcelona (387 miles) or from Berlin to Bonn, (365 miles) costs just GBP 63 in each case.

A Department for Transport spokesman said the Government was already spending record sums - on average GBP 88 million a week on the railways - meaning that 42 per cent of the costs of the railway are met by taxpayers. "We regulate some fare increases", he said. "Most commuter tickets and saver fares have their average increases capped at inflation plus one per cent. Setting fares which are not regulated is a commercial decision for train operators. It is in their interests to provide an attractive range of fares and to encourage more passengers to use the railway."

_____


Why we took the plane from Manchester to London

"We never use trains any more. We don't feel safe on them; they're full of yobbos and drunks. Flying is much more convenient. It's more comfortable, and the cost doesn't really enter into it. I wouldn't care if the train was much cheaper; I would still want to fly."

- Bernard Dewhurst, 67, from Lancashire, and his wife, Vivien


"I'm flying because I find trains really unreliable. I would use trains if they ran regularly, but now the prices are going up it makes them look even less attractive, and who wants to have to book ahead anyway? The whole point of getting a train is being able to jump on it. I do consider the damage to the environment flying makes, but this doesn't stop me. In this instance I'm doing the convenient thing."

- Maxine Shapira, 39, a secretary from Rochdale


"I find trains completely unreliable and I'd rather get the plane. I can get from Manchester to London in forty minutes. Planes are faster, more convenient and more comfortable. If the prices are going up for trains, I think more and more people will fly. I'm just not very environmentally sound, I'm sorry to say."

- Alison Gilroy, 35, a teacher from Lancaster


"I would use trains if I was going to central London ... but I'm getting a connecting flight today. If I knew I was going somewhere I'd book ahead and take advantage of the cheaper [rail] fares."

- Helen Kaye, 37, hairdresser from Huddersfield

_____

Manchester to London by rail

The numbers: Every day, 34 trains - many of them packed - leave Manchester Piccadilly bound for London Euston

The price: The cost of a ticket varies, but after yesterday's increase a standard open return is now priced at GBP 219 (an 8.4 per cent rise)

The true cost: Each passenger's journey produces 14.8 kilograms of carbon dioxide


London to Manchester by air

The numbers: Every day, 48 flights take off from London bound for Manchester airport

The price: Costs vary but return tickets for travel today were available last night for GBP 171 (including tax)

The true cost: Each passenger's journey produces 90 kilograms of carbon dioxide


Copyright (c) 2006 Independent News and Media Limited

http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/transport/article2121672.ece


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Tuesday, February 06, 2007

Consumer adultery - the new British vice

In the UK we throw away more consumer products, and faster, than anywhere else in Europe. The result is a shocking - and unsustainable - mountain of discarded hardware.

by Lois Rogers

New Statesman (February 05 2007)


Just as Britain tops the European league for marriage breakdowns, so it also now tops the league for falling in love with consumer products and then throwing them away when newer models come out.

This social trend, which product designers have termed "adulterous consumption", has given us the biggest methane-producing rubbish tip in Europe - and the biggest headache in deciding what to do with our waste.

Last month, Britain narrowly escaped a huge and embarrassing fine from the European Union by finally implementing the Brussels-inspired Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directive. The directive seeks to prevent us from tossing any more of these products with highly toxic, non-degradable components into holes in the ground. From now on, manufacturers of everything from electric toothbrushes and hairdryers to kettles, lighting equipment and washing machines will be forced to take back their products for recycling.

While other European states - notably Germany and the Scandinavian countries - have seen the writing on the wall and have been recycling for more than two decades, Britain's binge borrowers have remained obstinately wedded to their credit cards and have gone on consuming and discarding with abandon.

We were the very last country in Europe to adopt the new law, and the problems with compliance seem insurmountable unless we return to a more conventional loyalty to consumer products.

British women discard their hairdryers after three years, usually in favour of another one that simply looks different. The average ownership of a mobile phone lasts eighteen months. And manufacturers of DIY (do it yourself) tools have calculated that most power drills are lost or abandoned after a single weekend.

"We don't throw things away because they are broken - it's usually because we have fallen out of love with them", says Jonathan Chapman, a senior lecturer in design at the University of Brighton, who is trying to promote what he calls "emotionally durable" design as a way of reducing the generation of toxic waste.

Researchers in the United States have calculated that only one per cent of all the materials flowing through their domestic economy goes into products which are still being used six months later. Chapman believes that, without a big shift in our attitude to the things we live with, the UK will soon catch up. "At the beginning of a relationship with a product, we consume it rampantly", he says. "Then consumption becomes routine, and then we stop thinking about it altogether and start noticing newer models. Often the relationship ends because the product is not doing something we want it to do, or it has started doing something we didn't think it would do, but not because it doesn't work. Unless we return to more sustainable relationships with these possessions we are going to have a really huge problem."

How to square this reckless attitude with the demands of the WEEE directive is a crisis of such proportions that no one has dared look at it.

All manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers of electrical equipment have until 15 March to register for WEEE compliance. They are required to provide precise information on the weight of the products on the market. They will then have to demonstrate that they are taking back and recycling an agreed quantity.

In practice, they will pay local authorities to provide "designated collection facilities" (DCFs), which will perform the laborious function of recovering, sorting and returning their products.

The British Retail Consortium has agreed to provide GBP 10 million to upgrade local-authority tips to DCFs, but this works out at roughly GBP 6,000 per site - hardly enough to cover the purchase of the separate containers required, let alone wages for the vast armies of additional staff who will be needed to sort copper wire from cadmium and computer screens from lead components.

The only way the directive is likely to work is by somehow engendering a sense of collective social responsibility for waste management, yet there has been no public education campaign, and most consumers are unaware of the existence of the WEEE requirement.

Last month, a county council waste manager in West Sussex admitted that it is not clear where the facilities are to deal with the anticipated WEEE mountains. "We're not telling the public about this because we don't want them asking questions when we don't know the answers", she said.

This, coupled with our fragmented waste- disposal industry, and our usual hostility to any anonymous edict handed down from Brussels, is a recipe for chaos.

Others are exasperated at the lack of preparation. "Britain has known this electrical equipment directive was coming for a good ten to fifteen years, but instead of getting properly prepared for it, the general response has been for people to stick their heads in the sand", says Cerys Ponting, whose work at Cardiff business school on the effects of the WEEE rules is to be published shortly.

Although she has found that most British consumers are oblivious to the implications of our throwaway culture, she does think attitudes will change. "It is like the early days of seat-belt laws, when people still didn't really see the point of them", she says. "Until now there has been little pressure from the government to recycle.

"People somehow regard electronics as a clean industry and they don't understand how much of a problem it actually is. That is slowly changing and there is more and more public understanding of the need to be responsible. We are going to run out of landfill sites and many raw materials fairly soon. Local authorities recognise that, but they are still at the stage of experimenting with different methods of tackling the recycling issue."

Meanwhile the situation is becoming critical. We are producing one million tonnes of electrical wreckage annually, a volume that is rising by five per cent year on year - much faster than the generation of other types of waste.

The average British household contains 25 electrical products, of which at least five are thrown away every year. Two million personal computers are discarded annually. This voracious consumption is being fuelled by plummeting prices. According to the Office for National Statistics, the price of a personal computer has fallen by 93 per cent, in real terms, in the past decade. Prices of televisions, DVD players and vacuum cleaners have fallen by 45 per cent over the same timescale.

Because of an old, and somewhat irrational, resistance in this country to incinerating rubbish, the vast majority of our electronic junk is simply tipped into the disused quarries that conveniently pepper most of Britain's shire counties. Items that may have been used for just a few hours during their working lives are being left to sit underground for thousands of years, giving off copious amounts of methane, a highly potent greenhouse gas that is 23 times more damaging than carbon dioxide.

The proliferating volume of "large WEEE", as it is known in the industry, presents even more of a problem. Most people find it physically impossible to conceal washing machines and cookers in their dustbins, and there has been a slow move towards recycling the raw materials from such items - or at least not dumping them in holes in the ground.

Government waste advisers fear, however, that the new directive may simply lead to increasing quantities of such discarded goods being exported illegally to countries such as India or Nigeria, where desperate workforces will do just about anything for money, including stripping out heavy metals and other toxic materials from appliances by hand. A 2005 report from the European Commission described an enforcement operation, carried out in seventeen European seaports, during which 140 waste shipments were found. Although almost half of these cargoes turned out to be totally illegal, there is no evidence of any major prosecutions. A fifteen-year-old UN convention, designed to prevent the export of hazardous waste from developed to developing nations, has been similarly ineffective.

Other academics have contrasted the growth of adulterous consumption with our paradoxical attachment to ancient jeans, old teddy bears and worn-out wooden spoons.

Tim Cooper, head of the Centre for Sustainable Consumption at Sheffield Hallam University, says harnessing this desire for connection to our possessions is the key to preventing disaster. He says that the WEEE directive and other legislation restricting the use of hazardous substances in manufactured items should eventually lead to a generation of more durable and repairable items that are not encased in the sealed units which prevent a long life anyway.

"People do like the idea of developing long-term relationships with their possessions; it is just that they have been prevented from doing so by industry, which is geared around stimulating a continuous sense of need for change in order to sell more and more", he says.

"It is true, though, that there has been no evidence so far of any trend to make things which last longer or which are even more recyclable, and it does look as if things will get considerably worse before they get better".

Five ways to dispose ethically:

http://www.sofaproject.org.uk The Bristol-based recycling charity Sofa sells on donated furniture and electrical appliances. Anyone can buy from the charity, but if you are on a low income you get a 25 per cent discount

http://www.createuk.com Collects and recycles fridges, freezers, cookers and washing machines. Items suitable for reuse are separated and passed on to refurbishment operations

http://www.seek-it.co.uk Computer and software disposal. Good for the security-conscious: Seek-it wipes hard drives. The items it collects are resold or reused as donations to projects in the UK and Africa through www.it-exchange.org

http://www.wasteonline.org.uk A website that provides information on recommended companies throughout the UK that recycle and reuse electrical goods - from computers to lighting - as well as others specialising in industrial plastics and food

http://www.actionaidrecycling.org.uk Collects ink and toner cartridges, mobile phones and PDAs. All are recycled in order to help fund ActionAid's charitable projects in the third world

Research by Lucy Knight

http://www.newstatesman.com/200702050031


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Monday, February 05, 2007

The Age of Perpetual Conflict

by Gabriel Kolko

www.lewrockwell.com (February 01 2007)


Nearly all wars in the twentieth century have both surprised and disillusioned all leaders, whatever their nationality. Given the political, social, and human elements involved in every conflict, and the near certainty that these mercurial ingredients will interact to produce unanticipated consequences, leaders who calculate the outcome of wars as essentially predictable military events are invariably doomed to disappointment. The theory and the reality of warfare conflict immensely, for the results of wars can never be known in advance.

Blind men and women have been the motor of modern history and the source of endless misery and destruction. Aspiring leaders of great powers can neither understand nor admit the fact that their strategies are extremely dangerous because statecraft by its very nature always calculates the ability of a nation's military and economic resources to overcome whatever challenges it confronts. To reject such traditional reasoning, and to question the value of conventional wisdom and react to international crises realistically on the basis of past failures would make them unsuited to command. The result is that politicians succeed in terms of their personal careers, states make monumental errors, and people suffer. The great nations of Europe and Japan put such illusions into practice repeatedly before 1945.

At the beginning of the 21st century only the US has the will to maintain a global foreign policy and to intervene everywhere it believes necessary. Today and in the near future, America will make the decisions that will lead to war or peace, and the fate of much of the world is largely in its hands. It thinks it possesses the arms and a spectrum of military strategies all predicated on a triumphant activist role for itself. It believes that its economy can afford interventionism, and that the American public will support whatever actions necessary to set the affairs of some country or region on the political path it deems essential. This grandiose ambition is bipartisan and, details notwithstanding, both parties have always shared a consensus on it.

The obsession with power and the conviction that armies can produce the political outcome a nation's leaders desire is by no means an exclusively American illusion. It is a notion that goes back many centuries and has produced the main wars of modern times. The rule of force has been with mankind a very long time, and the assumptions behind it have plagued its history for centuries. But unlike the leaders of most European nations or Japan, the United States' leaders have not gained insight from the calamities that have so seared modern history. Folly is scarcely an American monopoly, but resistance to learning when grave errors have been committed is almost proportionate to the resources available to repeat them. The Germans learned their lesson after two defeats, the Japanese after World War Two, and both nations found wars too exhausting and politically dangerous. America still believes that if firepower fails to master a situation the solution is to use it more precisely and much more of it. In this regard it is exceptional - past failures have not made it any wiser.

Wars are at least as likely today as any time over the past century. Of great importance is the end of Soviet hegemony in East Europe and Moscow's restraining influence elsewhere. But the proliferation of nuclear technology and other means of mass destruction have also made large parts of the world far more dangerous. Deadly local wars with conventional weapons in Africa, the Balkans, Middle East, and elsewhere have multiplied since the 1960s. Europe, especially Germany, and Japan are far stronger and more independent than at any time since 1945, and China's rapidly expanding economy has given it a vastly more important role in Asia. Ideologically, Communism's demise means that the simplified bipolarism that Washington used to explain the world ceased after 1990 to have any value. With it, the alliances created nominally to resist Communism have either been abolished or are a shadow of their original selves; they have no reason for existence. The crisis in NATO, essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of American hegemony. Economically, the capitalist nations have resumed their rivalries, and these have become more intense with the growth of their economies and the decline in the dollar - which by 2004 was as weak as it has been in over fifty years. These states have a great deal in common ideologically, but concretely they are increasingly rivals. The virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons that existed about a quarter-century ago has ended with proliferation.

Whether it is called a "multipolar" world, to use President Jacques Chirac's expression in November 2004, in which Europe, China, India, and even eventually South America follow their own interests, or another definition, the direction is clear. There may or may not be "a fundamental restructuring of the global order", as the chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council presciently reflected in April 2003, but the conclusion was unavoidable "that we are facing a more fluid and complicated set of alignments than anything we have seen since the formation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949". Terrorism and the global economy have defied overwhelming American military power: "Our smart bombs aren't that smart".

All of the many factors considered - ranging from events in Africa and the Middle East and Afghanistan to the breakup of Yugoslavia - wars, whether civil or between states, remain the principal (but scarcely the only) challenge confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Ecological disasters relentlessly affecting all dimensions of the environment are also insidious because of the unwillingness of the crucial nations - above all the United States - to adopt measures essential for reversing their damage. The challenges facing humanity have never been so complex and threatening, and the end of the Cold War, while one precondition of progress, is scarcely reason for complacency or optimism. The problems the world confronts far transcend the Communist-capitalist tensions, many of which were mainly symptoms of the far greater intellectual, political, and economic problems that plagued the world before 1917 - and still exist.

Whatever its original intention, America's interventions can lead to open-ended commitments in both duration and effort. They may last a short time, and usually do, but unforeseen events can cause the US to spend far more resources than it originally anticipated, causing it in the name of its "credibility" or some other doctrine to get into situations which are disastrous and which in the end produce defeats and will leave America much worse off. Vietnam is the leading example of this but Iraq, however different in degree, is the same. Should it confront even some of the forty or more nations that now have terrorist networks then it will in one manner or another intervene everywhere, but especially in Africa and the Middle East. The consequences of such commitments will be unpredictable.

The US has more determined and probably more numerous enemies today than at any time, and many of those who hate it are ready and able to inflict destruction on its shores. Its interventions often triumphed in the purely military sense, which is all the Pentagon worries about, but in all too many cases they have been political failures and eventually led to greater American military and political involvement. Its virtually instinctive activist mentality has caused it to get into situations where it often had no interests, much less durable solutions to a nation's problems, and thereby repeatedly creating disasters and enduring enmities. America has power without wisdom, and cannot, despite its repeated experiences, recognize the limits of its ultra-sophisticated military technology. The result has been folly, and hatred, which is a recipe for disasters. September 11 confirmed that, and war has come to its shores.

That the US end its self-appointed global mission of regulating all problems, wherever, whenever, or however it wishes to do so, is an essential precondition of stemming, much less reversing, the accumulated deterioration of world affairs and wars. We should not ignore the countless ethical and other reasons it has no more right or capacity to do so than any state over the past century, whatever justifications they evoked. The problems, as the history of the past century shows, are much greater than America's role in the world; but at the present time its actions are decisive and whether there is war or peace will be decided far more often in Washington than any other place. Ultimately, there will not be peace in the world unless all nations relinquish war as an instrument of policy, not only because of ethical or moral reasoning but because wars have become deadlier and more destructive of social institutions. A precondition of peace is for nations not to attempt to impose their visions on others, adjudicate their differences, and never to assume that their need for the economic or strategic resources of another country warrants interference of any sort in its internal affairs.

But September 11 proved that after a half-century of interventions America has managed to be increasingly hated. It has failed abysmally to bring peace and security to the world. Its role as a rogue superpower and promiscuous, cynical interventionist has been spectacularly unsuccessful even on its own terms. It is squandering vast economic resources, and it has now endangered the physical security of Americans at home. To cease the damage the US causes abroad is also to fulfill the responsibilities that America's politicians have to their own people. But there is not the slightest sign at this point that voters will call them to account, and neither the American population nor its political leaders are likely to agree to such far-reaching changes in foreign policy. The issues are far too grave to wait for American attitudes and its political process to be transformed. The world will be safer to the extent that the US' alliances are dissolved and it is isolated, and that is happening for many reasons, ranging from the unilateralism, hubris, and preemptory style of the Bush Administration to the fact that with the demise of Communism the world's political alignments are changing dramatically.

Communism and fascism were both outcomes of the fatal errors in the international order and affairs of states that the First World War spawned. In part, the Soviet system's disintegration was the result of the fact it was the aberrant consequence of a destructive and abnormal war, but at least as important was its leaders' loss of confidence in socialism. But suicidal Muslims are, to a great extent, the outcome of a half-century of America's interference in the Middle East and Islamic world, which radicalized so many young men ready to die for a faith. Just as the wars of 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945 created Bolsheviks, the US' repeated grave errors, however different the context or times, have produced their own abnormal, negative reactions. The twenty-first century has begun very badly because of America's continued aggressive policies. These are far more dangerous than those of the preceding century. The destructive potential of weaponry has increased exponentially and many more people and nations have access to it. What would once have been considered relatively minor foreign policy problems now have potentially far greater consequences. It all augurs very badly. The world has reached the most dangerous point in recent, perhaps all of history. There are threats of war and instability unlike anything that prevailed when a Soviet-led bloc existed.

Even if the US abstains from interference and tailors its actions to fit this troubled reality, there will be serious problems throughout much of the world. Internecine civil conflicts will continue, as well as wars between nations armed with an increasing variety of much more destructive weapons available from outside powers, of which the US remains, by far, the most important. Many of these sources of conflicts have independent roots, but both principles and experiences justify America staying out of them and leaving the world alone. Both the American people and those involved directly will be far better off without foreign interference, whatever nation attempts it.

The US' leaders are not creating peace or security at home or stability abroad. The reverse is the case: its interventions have been counterproductive and its foreign policy is a disaster. Americans and those people who are the objects of successive administrations' efforts would be far better off if the US did nothing, closed its bases overseas and withdrew its fleets everywhere, and allowed the rest of world to find its own way. Communism is dead, and Europe and Japan are powerful and both can and will take care of their own interests. The US must adapt to these facts. But if it continues as it has over the past half-century, attempting to attain the vainglorious but irrational ambition to run the world, then there will be even deeper crises and it will inflict wars and turmoil on many nations as well as on its own people. And it will fail yet again, for all states that have gone to war over the past centuries have not achieved the objectives for which they sacrificed so much blood, passion, and resources. They have only produced endless misery and upheavals of every kind.
_____

From The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World by Gabriel Kolko (Lynne Rienner, 2006).

Copyright (c) 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission of the publisher.
_____

Gabriel Kolko is the author, among other works, of Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War?, and Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is The Age of War.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/kolko6.html


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Sunday, February 04, 2007

Blame for global warming ...

... placed firmly on humankind

by Catherine Brahic


NewScientist (February 02 2007)


The 2nd of February 2007 will one day hopefully be remembered as the day the question mark was removed from the debate on whether human activities are driving climate change, said the head of the UN Environment Programme at the launch of the most authoritative scientific report on climate change to date.

The new Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report says there is ninety percent certainty that the burning of fossil fuels and other human activities are driving climate change.

"The word unequivocal is the key message of this report", said Achim Steiner, executive director of UNEP, adding that those who have doubts about the role of humans in driving the climate "can no longer ignore the evidence".

The IPCC report says the rise in global temperatures could be as high as 6.4 degrees Celsius by 2100. The report also predicts sea level rises and increases in hurricanes. It is the work of 1200 climate experts from forty countries, who have spent six years reviewing all the available climate research. It was released in Paris, France, on Friday. {1,2}

The last IPCC report {3}, issued in 2001, predicted that temperatures would rise by 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius by 2100, relative to 1990 temperatures.

But the new report says temperature rises by 2100 could, in the most extreme scenarios, range from 1.1 to 6.4 degrees Celsius. The most likely range is 1.8 to 4.0 degrees Celsius {4}), with the report predicting that four degrees Celsius is most likely if the world continues to burn fossil-fuels at the same rate {5}.


Melting, moving ice

Rises in sea levels are predicted by the new report, threatening low-lying areas of land around the world. As the oceans warm, their waters expand, while rising temperatures also increase the melting of the ice sheets that cover Greenland and Antarctica.

In 2001, the IPCC predicted that sea levels would rise by between nine and 88 centimetres by 2100, relative to 1990 levels. The new report says rises could range from eighteen to 59 centimeters. The top end of the range corresponds to a fossil-fuel intensive future {6}.

But predictions of sea level rise are one of the most contentious areas of the report - very recent research has suggested that rises of up to 140 centimeters are possible {7}.

The problem is that the understanding of how warming affects Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets remains limited, and they are predicted to be the most important contributors to change. Estimates of the straightforward melting of ice are incorporated in the IPCC report. But warming may also accelerate the movement of ice in glaciers into the ocean, perhaps by meltwater lubricating the undersides of ice streams.

Susan Solomon, one of the report's lead authors, said there was no published research that quantified this effect, and so it was not included. But she added: "If temperatures exceed 1.9 to 4.6 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures, and were to be sustained for thousands of years, eventually we would expect the Greenland ice sheet to melt. That would raise sea level by seven metres".

Climate change is also expected to affect the frequency and strength of tropical storms and hurricanes. The latest IPCC report says the activity of tropical cyclones is "likely" to increase over the 21st century. It says "likely" indicates a probability of more than 66%. This is a bolder statement than the World Meteorology Organisation issued in January {8}.

Precipitation patterns will change too by 2100, according to IPCC predictions {9}. Mid- to high-latitude regions will see up to twenty percent more rain and snow, while the tropical regions will see less.


Humans to blame

Considering the human role in causing climate change, the IPCC report is damning: "The understanding of [human] influences on climate has improved since the [2001] report, leading to a very high confidence that human activities" are responsible for most of the warming seen since 1950, says the report's summary for policymakers. "Very high confidence" is described as "at least a nine out of ten chance of being correct".

Before the industrial revolution, human greenhouse gas emissions were small, and the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide - the main greenhouse gas - was about 280 parts per million.

Thanks largely to the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use, such as agricultural exploitation and deforestation, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide reached 379 parts per million in 2005, says the IPCC.


Gold standard

The IPCC draws together the world's leading climate experts to review and assess all available research, under the auspices of UN Environment Programme and the World Meteorology Organization.

The result of their assessment, which is done every five to six years, establishes what is considered the gold standard of consensus on climate change science.

The latest IPCC report was written by hundreds of experts and reviewed by hundreds more, from 113 countries. It is being released in stages during 2007. The first chapter, released on Friday, deals with the scientific basis for climate change.

The next two parts of the IPCC's 2007 assessment, plus a synthesis, will be released throughout the year. Part 2, dealing with the impacts of climate change and our vulnerability to those impacts, will be released in April. Part 3, to be released in May, deals with how we might mitigate these impacts.


Notes and References:

{1} Read the 21-page IPCC summary:
http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb2007.pdf
(Note: The IPCC server may be struggling due to high demand).

{2} Listen to audio from press conference at:
http://www.empreinte.com/richmediaevent/20070202/vod/ipc_audio_en_900x540_WindowsLD.htm

{3} Previous IPCC Report, issued in 2001.
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn443-global-warning.html

{4} Figure 1: Global Surface Warming
http://environment.newscientist.com/data/images/ns/cms/dn11088/dn11088-1_622.jpg

{5} The impacts of rising global temperatures
by Catherine Brahic, NewScientist (February 02 2007)
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn11089-the-impacts-of-rising-global-temperatures.html

{6} Modelling the future climate: the baseline scenarios
by Catherine Brahic, NewScientist (February 02 2007)
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn11090-modelling-the-future-climate-the-baseline-scenarios.html

{7} Shorelines may be in greater peril than thought.
by David L Chandler, NewScientist (December 14 2006)
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn10799-shorelines-may-be-in-greater-peril-than-thought.html

{8} Global warming link to hurricanes likely but unproven
by Catherine Brahic, NewScientist (December 14 2006)
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn10796-global-warming-link-to-hurricanes-likely-but-unproven.html

{9} Figure 2: Projected Patterns of Precipitation Change
http://environment.newscientist.com/data/images/ns/cms/dn11088/dn11088-2_750.jpg



http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn11088


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Saturday, February 03, 2007

Resource Wars

by William K Tabb

Monthly Review (January 2007 issue)

[This essay is adapted from a plenary presentation to the conference of the Union for Radical Political Economics, August 12 2006.]


The close relation between war and natural resources is of long standing. What else was colonial conquest about? Vast estates held by the Dutch East India Company came under direct control of the Crown as did the lands conquered by the British East India Company. What was in demand in Europe dictated the commodities produced and the natural resources that were ripped from the earth. European violence set the terms on which resource extraction occurred. There was no free trade for mutual benefit based on comparative advantage. There were few constraints on the violence employed in the extraction of resources starting with the "shock and awe" of bombardments and fire storms of wars of conquest and followed by the pitiless subjugation of people of color. Having defeated the locals in battle the invaders suborned local elites and customs to extract resources from those they had conquered.

The form of the exploitative relationships with particular colonial and neocolonial overlords depended in large measure on the local traditions and social structures the invaders found. The Spanish used the Inca mita system of requisitioned labor for the mines where the subjugated died by the thousands from brutality and, as in the case of the vast silver mines of Potosi, by mercury poisoning. The crushed ore was mixed with mercury and trodden by the workers with their bare feet and then heated producing poisonous vapors. King Leopold murdered millions in the Congo employing slavery, terror, maiming, and mass killings because it was his view that "the colonies should be exploited, not by the operation of a market economy, but by state intervention and compulsory cultivation of cash crops to be sold to and distributed by the state at controlled prices". {1}

The Belgians ruled through Tutsi chiefs promoting them to a superior status over the Hutus and imposed compulsory cash crop demands through their Tutsi intermediaries. After independence Tutsi military dictators were left to rule. The animosities created provided the fear and hatred which led to genocide decades after independence. In the post-independence states without indigenous capitalism, but with only a comprador class, control of state revenues and natural resources were the major sources of wealth. After independence, control of the army and the power to coerce, following the colonial model, became the norm in many new nation states. In the struggles which broke out after independence and frequently under Cold War pressures it was often the most violent and ruthless elements willing to do whatever was necessary to gain control who came out on top - especially where there were easily exploitable resources to be appropriated and make those commanding them rich beyond imagining. The new nation's economy remained entwined with that of the former colonial power. More democratically inclined indigenous leaders could be coerced and assassinated. sponsored civil war and military coups could be employed to maintain access on favorable terms to resources.

Resource extraction in the contemporary era continues to spur extremes of violence and war. In a 1997 study Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner examined the economic performance of ninety-five countries between 1970 and 1990. {2} They found the higher a country's dependence on natural resource exports the slower their economic growth rate. Paul Collier and co-authors analyzed fifty-four large-scale civil wars that occurred between 1965 and 1999 and found that a higher ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP "significantly and substantially" increases the risk of conflict. {3} High levels of oil dependence correlate especially strongly. Timber it turns out is also "technologically suited to rebel predation", as with the Khmer Rouge. Researchers find the phenomenon of "war booty futures" where outsiders back rebel groups in exchange for a future share of the takings - a prospect which features heavily in Richard K Morgan's powerful dystopic novel Market Forces.

It should be pointed out that when we speak of wars in the last third of the twentieth century we are talking about civil wars. Between 1965 and 1999 if we look at those wars in which more than a thousand people were killed a year, there were seventy-three civil wars, almost all driven by greed to control resources - oil, diamonds, copper, cacao, coca, and even bananas. Collier and Anke Hoeffler find countries with one or two primary export resources have more than a one-in-five chance of civil war in any given year. {4} In countries with no such dominant products there is a one in a hundred chance. In these civil wars more than ninety percent of casualties are civilians. At the start of the twentieth century war casualties were ninety percent soldiers. Such "traditional" wars are rare today. Resource wars with their devastating impacts on civilians have become the norm.

Indeed, the oil rich countries of Africa - Nigeria, Gabon, the Sudan, the Congo, Equatorial Africa, and Chad - have long histories of coups, military rule, and strongmen. Millions have died of hunger and disease as a result of wars over oil, diamonds, copper, and other resources as armed rebels steal, rape, and murder making life-generating economic activity difficult if not impossible. In the Congo, one of the resource richest countries on the planet, a half dozen countries have armies deployed and countless rebel groups have fought to control rich deposits of gold, diamonds, timber, copper, and valuable cobalt and coltan in what is often referred to as "Africa's First World War". Global Witness reports that despite being the fourth largest oil producer in Africa, Congo Brazzaville has overseas debt of $6.4 billion as a consequence of Elf Aquitaine, the former French state oil company's strategy of influence peddling and bribery.

In Angola, Joseph Savimbi, backed by foreign powers from the Cold war, amassed a reported $4 billion from diamonds, ivory, and other resources sold abroad in his decades of looting and brutality before he was killed. In Angola a million people died in the civil war, one child in five does not live to its fifth birthday, and forty percent of Angola's population has been displaced. Almost none of the income from the state-owned oil company found its way to Angola but was instead diverted to overseas banks. It was the wholesale looting of Angola's oil revenues that fueled that country's vicious civil war.

Africa bleeds because of its abundant wealth. Charles Taylor privatized the resources of Liberia by selling rights to resources to foreign companies and pocketing the money. There is the case of Dafur in the oil rich Sudan. There is Nigeria, exceedingly rich in oil and corruption, where foreign aid is badly needed. The environment of the Niger Delta is being destroyed, and people are killed by army thugs protecting Shell oil. Equatorial Guinea is a criminalized state which receives half a billion in oil revenues. Because of this, it ranks sixth in the world in per capita income but third from the bottom in the UN's human development index table. A third of the population has been killed or driven into exile. The revenues of the Cameroon-Chad pipeline operated by Exxon-Mobile, with additional investment from ChevronTexaco, do not help the people of the area who remain among the poorest of the poor as the natural wealth of their land is looted.

Wherever there are resources to be plundered we find foreign companies ready to cooperate; often there is the World Bank to put a smiley face on these atrocities, claiming things would be worse if they did not supervise the corruption. The reality of the bank's role however is quite different. Emil Salim, a former Indonesian environment minister who led the World bank Extractions Industries Review, has written, "The bank is a publicly supported institution whose mandate is poverty alleviation. Not only have the oil, gas and mining industries not helped the poorest developing countries, they have often made them worse off". {5} That is from the man the World Bank chose to review its past practices. He points out that scores of academic assessments as well as the bank's own reports correlate corruption, civil war, and growing poverty with reliance on extractive industries, comparing unfavorably with the performance of more diversified economies.

While the cases I have mentioned focus on the relationship between resources and war in Africa, Salim's own country of Indonesia is also an example of this relationship. Indonesia can be seen as analogous to a nineteenth-century empire. The central government exploits the territories, especially those rich in resources, along lines similar to what was done by the Europeans. Jakarta conducts a dirty war in Aceh, its northern province rich in natural gas and rife with civilian killings and disappearances. The Indonesian state has waged a campaign of terror and near genocide in oil and natural gas rich East Timor. Exxon-Mobil is the largest long-term investor in Indonesia. The foreign owned gold and copper mines of Irian Jaya, where miners die while working or are killed by security forces and the environment is devastated making life difficult for the province's people, are an international scandal. In West Papua logging companies with close ties to the military have terrible reputations as well for using force against locals as they displace tribal people from their land and destroy the local ecosystem. The atrocities carried out by the military and the government in pursuit of revenues from their resources frequently require the cooperation of foreign transnationals and are supported by World Bank project aid.

Ted Koppel, writing in the New York Times (February 24 2006), responded to what he described as the Bush administration's "touchiness" about the charge that we are in Iraq because of oil by stating the obvious, though often unsaid, truth, "Now that's curious. Keeping oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz has been bedrock American foreign policy for more than half a century." Today control over the world's oil supply is at the forefront of Washington policy makers' thinking, even if the president and his team deny any such intent and talk publically of reducing dependence on Middle East oil by three-quarters of present levels, an absurdly impossible goal. Two-thirds of the oil in the world is in the Middle East, much of it under Iraq and Iran, the axis of oil, the current targets of the US war on terrorism. Control of oil is integral to Washington's official goal of world domination, a goal stated this baldly in national security documents.

During the administration of the first President Bush, the Pentagon under then defense secretary Dick Cheney produced a strategy paper stating the mission of "convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests". The United States would defend their interests for them and so the policy was to "discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order". {6} Control of the world is facilitated through control of essential resources. By controlling the world's energy, and in the presence of its overwhelming military superiority, the United States is potentially able to deny the lifeblood of any society and intimidate and coerce the world more effectively, a design going back easily to Henry Kissinger, and earlier to the emergence of US global power at the end of the Second World War, but now carried to new heights by the neoconservatives.

Hegemony has always been a bipartisan consensus. With regard specifically to the Middle East we have the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". Since Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force with this intervention in mind the United States has moved to forward positioning, the establishment of a huge permanent military presence in the region, including a number of multi-billion dollar bases in Iraq, huge fortified cities with all the comforts of home, fast food places, video stores, and car rental agencies for the soldiers who garrison the empire along "the arc of instability". All of this takes place in territories which coincide with the parts of the Global South where oil is found. That the official rationale is now the war on terrorism in place of anticommunism is secondary to the continuation of the basic policy of world domination.

Michael Klare, author of Resource Wars (Owl Books, 2002) and Blood for Oil (Penguin, 2004), cites British defense secretary John Reid's warning that climate change "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" and so "make the emergence of violent conflict more likely". {7} In the United States, too, military planners and the CIA spin out scenarios of wars for desperately needed natural resources and the need to deal with the mass migrations of desperate people as entire societies disintegrate. Climate change, these forecasts suggest, will bring on new and even greater resource wars. The United States with its overwhelming advantage in all things military is likely to see saber rattling, shock, and awe as the best responses. "When you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail", seems the appropriate metaphor for the petro-political situatioon. Some Americans, afraid of not being able to heat their homes and fill the tanks of their gas guzzling cars, may unthinkingly offer support for new foreign adventures - but Iraq has shown such oil comes at a high cost in blood and treasure.

It seems it is not all that easy to shock, awe, invade, and occupy countries. In the spring of 2006, sixty percent of Americans told the Gallup Poll that they did not think it worth going to war in Iraq and 74 percent disapproved of Bush's handling of gasoline prices. They saw neither victory nor an easy exit and they had become suspicious that higher energy prices seemed to accompany such adventurism. Some worried about the US balance of payments and some even knew that energy costs equaled a third of the trade deficit. Before the war, Lawrence Lindsey, then Bush's senior economic adviser, suggested the war would cost $200 billion. He was sacked soon thereafter by an administration that insisted the war would cost $50 to 60 billion. Current estimates by Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz are in terms of trillions of dollars.

The relationship of demand and supply of oil is complicated. It takes up to ten years and billions of dollars to get a new field into production. Refineries also take time to build and are hugely expensive. The present shortage of gasoline, often seen as a conspiracy by the oil giants, is in the main the result of rising demand especially from China and India, and supply shocks due to political events such as the US invasion of Iraq, and uncertainty over the Bush administration's intentions toward Iran and perhaps other producer states. When oil prices spiked in the 1970s the supply response was so great that the price of crude collapsed by 1986. In the 1990s demand growth was slow, no new fields were developed to increase production levels, and even so the price collapsed again in 1998 to 1999. This is not to say that huge profits were not made by the Western oil companies as well as OPEC and the banks which recycled petro-dollars. Since then there has been little excess capacity - in 2005 the world's excess capacity was two to three percent. It had been fifteen percent in 1986.

Those who would deny even the possibility of any conspiracy point out that the international oil companies have complete control over only seven to eight percent of global crude oil and access to perhaps twenty percent of reserves. They are therefore unlikely to have conspired to produce today's high energy prices. This is a cyclical industry and conjunctural events are responsible for most oil spikes. Events such as Vice President Cheney's remarks during a visit to Lithuania in the spring of 2006 when he criticized Russia for using oil and natural gas as "tools of intimidation and blackmail", and the intense negotiations to build pipelines for oil and natural gas from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, or Uzbekistan without going through Iran or Russia, serve to illustrate that global market shares for particular companies are not the most crucial factors in understanding oil as a weapon.

It is analysis rather than an apology for Big Oil that tells us that the situation has changed since the end of the Second World War when the so-called seven Sisters dominated the world oil market. Today Exxon-Mobil produces less than three percent of world output and the seven largest oil companies control less than five percent of world reserves. This does not mean that Exxon-Mobil is not the world's most valuable and most profitable company nor that the oil giants do not benefit from high oil prices. They do however face more sophisticated national oil companies from China, India, Brazil, and elsewhere who compete for supply which is increasingly under the control of state-controlled producers. The seven largest national oil companies, like Kuwait Petroleum, Abu Dhabi National Oil, Algeria's Sonatrach, and the more familiar Saudi Aramco, hold at least half the world's proven resources and account for a quarter of current production. {8} Like Venezuela's national oil company, which fuels Chavez's Bolivarian revolution, they have changed the distributional equation nationally as well as globally.

The days of unalloyed Anglo-American petroleum dominance are gone, and that is why the hegemonic state and its coalition partner, no-longer-so-great Britain, are using force to reassert dominance not through corporate control so much as state terror and coercion. While there can be no question that the national oil companies have changed the distribution of revenues from the grossly exploitative terms of pre-Second World War Anglo-American total dominance, the governments of the Middle East retain limited room to maneuver where the national interests of the United States and its thirst for oil are concerned. The long shadow of Washington darkens and dominates the politics of the region. Price-supply conditions have been set in the past by Saudi Arabia, which has acted to prevent problems for the advanced capitalist economies. It is less certain that they can continue to do so. It is surely in the interest of the hegemonic state and its British ally to gain greater purchase over supply conditions through regime change and closer working relations with new producers in the Caspian Basin and in Africa.

As to peak oil, predictions of the end of oil have been made often in the past and it is not clear that frightening scenarios will play out in the short run that some suggest. There are complex issues of geology, technology, and prospective efficiency considerations. The accepted definition of proven reserves includes what is known and can be exploited economically with existing technology. Both price and potential supply are conservatively estimated for this purpose, although some experts suggest that producers have a strong interest in overestimating their reserve position. Because OPEC quotas are based on proven reserves it is in the interest of members to greatly exaggerate their reserves so they can pump more. Such "political barrels" are estimated to be 44 percent of the total reserves OPEC claims. Russia's reserves are also uncertain but probably thirty to forty percent lower than officially claimed. {9} Some countries have been extracting large amounts of crude but maintaining the same proven reserves figures. Companies too have incentive to exaggerate their reserves. In 2006 Shell had to admit it had overestimated its reserves by nearly a third and its stock price promptly fell. Finally it is also the case that for the past two decades the oil taken out of the ground has exceeded new discoveries.

However, since only a little over a third of oil in known fields can be recovered today, technological innovation can be expected to increase the proven reserve figure. Among the optimists, Leonardo Maugeri wrote in Foreign Affairs, "Put simply, the world will continue to have plenty of oil". {10} In his view oil experts generally underestimate supply and overestimate demand. Like other optimists he believes China's demand for oil is due to extraordinary circumstances that may not last and that demand in much of the industrialized world appears to have reached its peak and faces long-term decline. That is one view. Others point out that between 1992 and 2002 world oil demand grew by 1.5 percent, by 1.9 percent in 2003, and by 3.7 percent in 2004, with China's demand increasing by 7.6 percent in 2003 and 15.8 percent in 2004. To say that it may not keep growing at this rate may be sensible, but it will surely keep growing and it will not be alone.

Even for those as optimistic as Maugeri, the question of who controls the oil cannot be irrelevant. The US state through threat, intimidation, and violence wants its ham fist on the spigot, allowing it to blackmail other countries. US imperialism has exerted control over the Global South through the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. During the Cold War it used the threat of communist Russia and China to keep Europe and Japan under its "leadership". It is now attempting to use terrorism in the same way, not altogether successfully as it is turning out since its invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq have failed to produce stable governments. Its actions have produced more terrorists and alienated most of the world. Seeking control over oil for leverage does not seem a far fetched stratagem for the oil soaked Bush-Cheney administration.

The most effective resistance to this imperialist pattern now is coming from Latin America where Hugo Chavez has been repeatedly elected and won referenda because he has stood up to the United States and used his country's oil revenues to raise living standards of the poor of his nation. In April 2006, Petroleos de Venezuela increased its stake in major projects to sixty percent from forty percent as well as increasing its royalty cut. In Bolivia Evo Morales nationalized the energy industry, causing the United States to express disapproval regarding Morales's "weak commitment to democracy" (echoing its charge against Chavez). However, Bolivia's first elected indigenous president, according to the leading polling organization in the country, enjoyed an eighty percent approval rating in the spring of 2006 while George W Bush's approval rating was at 33 percent among his country's citizens. Like Chavez who had suffered at least one coup attempt, Morales has to confront a military whose officers, trained at the School of the Americas, are not, as the press delicately put it, "a natural ally of Mr Morales". Such developments in Latin America and similar manifestations of petro-nationalism elsewhere along with the general decline in US prestige and authority in the world have led Thomas Friedman to suggest we are now in the post-post-cold war era in which, "US power is being checked from every corner".{11} The major enemies of the United States somehow seemed to be oil producers, a group of countries that given the current high energy prices cannot be easily intimidated through economic sanctions or political pressure.

To cheerleaders for US imperialism it is the ineptitude of the Bush-Cheney policies, not their goals, that receive criticism. The critique of anti-imperialists now includes a maturing ecological consciousness. Struggles over energy are being conceptualized more usefully in terms of the economic system as well as energy alternatives. Indeed there is growing awareness that the final resource war will likely be for the planet's survival. Currently, only 1.25 percent of China's population possesses a car. If car ownership in that country were to reach the US level, and the forecasts are that in 2031 China will have a per capita income close to that of the United States in 2004, China would have a billion vehicles. If they all needed to run on gasoline there is simply not enough oil and of course the greenhouse gases produced would heat things up distressingly. One hopes for technological breakthroughs but the precautionary principle suggests some major changes are in order as global energy consumption presses on available supply. A system that privileges accumulation over sustainability, individualism over solidarity, cannot be accepted.

The scarcity of other resources may prove serious as well. For example, today one in four people on the planet do not have access to safe drinking water; 12 percent of the world's population consumes 86 percent of available fresh water. With global consumption of fresh water doubling in the next twenty years, there are all sorts of water war scenarios. Already five million people die a year from diseases related to contaminated water. China's rapid industrialization has been accompanied by water contamination affecting 300 million people, that is nearly a third of the population. Kofi Annan's Millennium Report tells us that if present trends continue two out of three people on the planet will live in countries considered to be "water stressed". The World Bank projects that forty percent of the people living in the world of 2050 will face some form of water shortage. In Palestine, Israel's commandeering of scarce water is a major issue and on many other borders water conflicts are major occurrences.

The resource war against the environment will be better avoided when we stop counting consumption of nature as income, as a free good, while we deplete our natural capital, as Herman Daly and others have long suggested. The past rates of accumulation of capital which are now blithely projected forward were possible because of the unsustainable usage of natural resources. Mainstream economists have a great deal of responsibility for ignoring the distinction between natural capital and humanmade capital. Fortunately many world citizens take conservation and recycling seriously and consider a very different set of policies essential. They are ready to challenge the presumptions of a consumer society which has ignored the limits of the biosphere and resource base of our planet. How we respond to these resource pressures will determine what kind of society we shall have and what sort of planet ours will be.

The dramatic changes which will be required raise central issues regarding the logic of capitalism. Writing from prison in 1915 and facing the likely prospect of the First World War, Rosa Luxemburg in her Junius Pamphlet famously argued that humanity faced the choice between socialism or barbarism. "We stand today", she wrote, "between the awful proposition: either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or, the victory of socialism". The ecological crisis we face and the prospect of future resource wars make her warning all the more salient.
_____

William K Tabb taught economics at Queens College for many years, and economics, political science, and sociology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His books include Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 2004), Unequal Partners: A Primer on Globalization (The New Press, 2002), and The Amoral Elephant: Globalization and the Struggle for Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2001). He can be reached at william.tabb@gmail.com.


Notes:

{1} Peter Duignan & Lewis H Gann, The Rulers of Belgian Africa (Princeton University Press, 1979), 30; also see Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998).

{2} Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew Warner, "Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth", American Economics Review (May 1997).

{3} See Paul Collier, "Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of causation and Policy Interventions", World Bank (April 28 2003).

{4} Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war", Oxford Economic Papers (October 2004).

{5} Extractive industries Review Secretariat, http://www.eireview.org/eir/eirhome.nsf.

{6} Patrick E Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop; A One-Superpower World; Pentagon's Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges to Primacy of America", New York Times (March 08 1992).

{7} Michael T Klare, "The Coming Resource Wars" (March 07 2006) http://TomPaine.com.

{8} Valerie Marcel & John V Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Chatham House / Brookings, 2006).

{9} Nicolas Sarkis, "Addicted to crude", Le Monde Diplomatique (May 2006), 4.

{10} Leonardo Maugeri, "Two Cheers for Expensive Oil", Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006), 155.

{11} Thomas L Friedman, "The Post-Post-Cold War", New York Times (May 10 2006).


http://www.monthlyreview.org/0107tabb.htm


Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html

Friday, February 02, 2007

Manifest Destiny

A New Direction for America

by William Pfaff

New York Review of Books

Volume 54, Number 2 (February 15 2007 issue)


President George Bush has decided to disregard both the political message of the 2006 midterm election and congressional pressure for an early end to America's Iraq involvement, as well as the Baker-Hamilton proposals. These decisions are meeting much opposition, which is likely to fail. Bush's opponents have been unable to propose a course of withdrawal that is not a politically prohibited concession of American defeat and that does not risk still more destructive consequences in Iraq and probably the region - even though the result of delayed withdrawal could be worse in all respects. Most of Bush's critics in Congress, in the press and television, and in the foreign policy community are hostage to past support of his policy and to their failure to question the political and ideological assumptions upon which it was built.

This followed from a larger intellectual failure. For years there has been little or no critical reexamination of how and why the limited, specific, and ultimately successful postwar American policy of "patient but firm and vigilant containment of Soviet expansionist tendencies ... and pressure against the free institutions of the Western world" (as George Kennan formulated it at the time) has over six decades turned into a vast project for "ending tyranny in the world". {1}

The Bush administration defends its pursuit of this unlikely goal by means of internationally illegal, unilateralist, and preemptive attacks on other countries, accompanied by arbitrary imprisonments and the practice of torture, and by making the claim that the United States possesses an exceptional status among nations that confers upon it special international responsibilities, and exceptional privileges in meeting those responsibilities.

This is where the problem lies. Other American leaders before George Bush have made the same claim in matters of less moment. It is something like a national heresy to suggest that the United States does not have a unique moral status and role to play in the history of nations, and therefore in the affairs of the contemporary world. In fact it does not.

This is a national conceit that is the comprehensible result of the religious beliefs of the early New England colonists (Calvinist religious dissenters, moved by millenarian expectations and theocratic ideas), which convinced them that their austere settlements in the wilderness represented a new start in humanity's story. However, the earlier Virginia settlements were commercial, as were those of the Dutch, and the proprietary colonies in Pennsylvania and Maryland were Quaker and Catholic, and had no such ideas. Nor did the earliest colonies, the Spanish in Florida and the Southwest, and the French on the Great Lakes and the Mississippi.

The nobility of the colonies' constitutional deliberations following the War of Independence, and the expression of the new thought of the Enlightenment in the institutions of government they created, contributed to this belief in national uniqueness. Thomas Paine wrote that

"... the case and circumstances of America present themselves as in the beginning of the world ... We have no occasion to roam for information into the obscure field of antiquity, nor hazard ourselves upon conjecture. We are ... as if we had lived in the beginning of time."


Even Francis Fukuyama, a recovering neoconservative, acknowledges in a recent book that American economic and political policies today rest on an unearned claim to privilege, the American "belief in American exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find not credible". Nor, he adds, is the claim tenable, since "it presupposes an extremely high level of competence" which the country does not demonstrate. {2}

The belief nonetheless is old and very powerful. The critic Edmund Wilson, scarcely a chauvinist, wrote nostalgically, near the end of his long life, about "the old idea of an anointed nation doing God's work in the world", although he deplored its corruption in his time by "moralistic cant". {3} It is true that by establishing a republic, Americans made themselves successors to the dynastic monarchies of Europe (although the Dutch Republic and Swiss Federation preceded us). But that God had taken a hand in this, nominating us as his Chosen and confiding to us an earthly mission, has yet to be demonstrated, and a moral theologian might see in the claim the grave sin of Presumption.


A claim to preeminent political virtue is a claim to power, a demand that other countries yield to what Washington asserts as universal interests. Since 1989, when the end of the cold war left the United States the "sole superpower", much has been made of this, with discussion of a benevolent (or even inevitable) American world hegemony or empire - a Pax Americana in succession to the Pax Britannica. While such ideas have not been explicit in official discourse, they seem all but universally assumed, in one or another form, in policy and political circles.

The most coherent and plausible official articulation of such reasoning was offered in the summer of 2003 by Condoleezza Rice, then President Bush's national security adviser, speaking in London at the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She said that the time had come to discard the system of balance of power among sovereign states established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Westphalian settlement ended the wars of religion by establishing the principles of religious tolerance and absolute state sovereignty. The UN is a faulty embodiment of international authority because it is an indiscriminate assembly of all the governments of the world, and should, she argued, be replaced as the ultimate world authority by an alliance or coalition of the democracies. This is a theme frequently promoted in conservative circles in Washington.

Rice also told the institute's members that the time had come to reject ideas of multipolarity and balance of power in international relations. This was a reference to French and other arguments in favor of an international system in which a number of states or groups of states (like the EU) act autonomously, serving as counterweights to American power. It followed the controversy earlier that year over the UN Security Council's failure to authorize the US invasion of Iraq. In the past, she said, balance of power may have "sustained the absence of war" but did not promote an enduring peace. "Multipolarity", she continued, "is a theory of rivalry; of competing interests - and at its worst, competing values. We have tried this before. It led to the Great War ... "

Foreign policies of power balance were, of course, a response to the rise of nation-states of varying weight and ambition, which, in order to preserve their independence and protect their national interests, had no alternative to policies that "balanced" their relations and alliances with others in order to contain rival interests and conflicting ambitions. The only apparent alternative to such a policy is submission of all to a dominant power. Rice's seeming confidence that such conflicts and rivalries would not create problems in some new international organization of the democracies would seem very optimistic. Nonetheless both the professional foreign policy community and American opinion generally seem to assume that the international system is "naturally" headed toward an eventual American-led consolidation of democratic authority over international affairs.


During the first century and a half of the United States' history, the influence of the national myth of divine election and mission was generally harmless, a reassuring and inspiring untruth. During that period the country remained largely isolated from international affairs. The myth found expression in the idea of a "manifest destiny" of continental expansion - including annexation of Mexican land north of the Rio Grande - with no need to plead a divine commission.

With Woodrow Wilson, this changed. The national myth became a philosophy of international action, and has remained so. In the great crisis of World War I the United States and Wilson personally had thrust upon them seemingly providential international roles; Wilson said that he believed he had been chosen by God to lead America in showing "the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty". The war's carnage and futility largely destroyed the existing European order and undermined confidence in European civilization. The European allies enthusiastically welcomed American intervention in 1917, which tipped the military balance, and Wilson's Fourteen Point plan for peace appealed to the people of the Central Powers as well as to the allies and neutrals.

Wilson's plan, however, did not prove a success. The principle of universal national self-determination did not solve Europe's problems but further complicated them, creating new ethnic and territorial grievances subsequently exploited by the fascist powers. A witness to the Versailles negotiations, the British diplomat Harold Nicolson, considered Wilson a man "obsessed, possessed ... by the conviction that the League [of Nations] covenant was his own revelation and the solution of all human difficulties". The US Senate's failure to ratify the League of Nations treaty (which Wilson had imagined as a proto-world government) left most Americans persuaded of the prudence of national isolation, support for which remained majority opinion in the United States until Pearl Harbor.

When World War II ended, the isolationist bias remained, and foreign policy was an issue in the 1946 and 1948 elections. As late as 1949, the leading figure in the Republican Party, Senator Robert A Taft, objected to the NATO treaty, saying that it involved unforeseeable commitments. (We can only imagine what he would have made of NATO in Afghanistan today.) He was, on the other hand, in favor of "international law defining the duties and obligations of nations ... international courts ... and joint armed force to enforce the law and the decisions of that court". He felt the UN did not yet fulfill this ideal "but it goes a long way in that direction".

This seemingly contradictory position actually expressed the paradox of American sentiment concerning foreign relations: on the one hand apprehensive about involvement in international "power politics", and on the other open to utopian reform, provided that it confirmed the special position the US had always claimed. Despite his reservations about US military commitments abroad and his isolationist instincts, Taft accepted the utopian global visions of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.


The Korean War and developing political confrontation with Soviet Russia in Europe provided a new reason for American international involvement, interpreted in quasi-theological terms by John Foster Dulles, Dwight D Eisenhower's secretary of state, a lawyer and Presbyterian elder (a Calvinist, as both Wilson and the Puritan Pilgrims had been). The notion of the United States as the providential nation became integrated into American foreign policy under Dulles, so that George W Bush in 2001 automatically articulated his global war on terror in imitation of Dulles's conception of cold war (even to the instant portrayal of the September 11 terrorists as agents of an organized global threat to freedom). The formulation was uncritically accepted in most political and press circles, and much of the professional policy community.

Bush administration policy continues to reflect the influence of cold war ideology, which in Dulles's case revealed the influence of the world-historical thinking of the Marxist enemy as well as personal religious assumptions about the meaning of history. The neo-conservative, "neo-Wilsonian" ideological influence on Bush's thinking, that history's course is moving toward universal democracy, was reinforced by the President's encounter in 2004 with Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident. Sharansky's argument that international stability is possible only under the rule of democracy was reflected in the President's second-term inaugural announcement that America's foreign policy objective had become "ending tyranny in our world". {4} This amounted to a naive instance of what the British-Austrian political philosopher Karl Popper called "historicism", meaning faith in large-scale "laws" of historical development. {5} The Bush vision is of a vast struggle between democracy and an effort by "the terrorists" to establish an oppressive Muslim caliphate of global scope. (How they are to do this against the opposition of the industrial West and non-Muslim Asia has yet to be given a persuasive explanation.)

The Bush administration and its sympathizers thus see themselves supporting the dominant force in history's development. If history's natural trajectory is toward democracy, US policy is simply to accelerate the inevitable. When, as in Iraq, this does not turn out to be so simple, a political equivalent of the economist Joseph Schumpeter's argument concerning "creative destruction" can be evoked, which says that destruction (in certain circumstances) clears the way for progress. Schumpeter describes a mechanism of the market economy, but when applied to the development of human society it reduces to a matter of secular belief in progress - which is a question of faith, not evidence.


The United States today is the leading world power by many if not most conventional measures. With the largest economy and the largest and most advanced arsenal of weapons, it is acknowledged as such and exercises wide influence. However, it is in the nature of political relationships that an effort to translate a position of material superiority into power over others will provoke resistance and may fail, possibly in costly ways. In the present case, it implies the subordination of others, notably the other democracies that are expected to accept US leadership in a new international order, and may resist this for a variety of well-founded reasons. In the past, societies that were more advanced in political and social organization, or economic or military power, or even so narrow a specialty as navigation, created empires, but in medieval and early modern times imperial powers were not necessarily technologically or militarily superior to their subject nations. The Hapsburg empire was the result of dynastic marriages and religious alliances.

Today's major democracies are all advanced societies; in some ways, in social standards, distribution of wealth and opportunity, the provision of universal health care and free or affordable education, and certain technologies and industries, many are more advanced than the United States. They are willing to cooperate with the United States in matters of common concern, as they have for a half-century, but not to subordinate themselves to Washington. They are aware that this administration's effort to establish a system of Central Asian and Middle Eastern client states (the "Greater Middle East") has already produced two ruinous and continuing wars, and worsened situations in Lebanon, Gaza and the Palestinian territories, and Israel.

Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins recently asked why, if other nations really objected to an American effort to establish a new international hegemony, there has been no effort to build a military coalition to oppose it. He describes the United States as already dominating the world, much as the elephant (in his genial comparison) dominates the African savanna: the calm herbivorous goliath that keeps the carnivores at a respectful distance, while supporting "a wide variety of other creatures - smaller mammals, birds and insects - by generating nourishment for them as it goes about the business of feeding itself". {6} Everyone knows the United States is not a predatory power, he says, so everyone profits from the stability the elephant provides, at American taxpayer expense.

Elephants are also known to trample people, uproot crops and gardens, topple trees and houses, and occasionally go mad (hence, "rogue nations"). Americans, moreover, are carnivores. The administration has attacked the existing international order by renouncing inconvenient treaties and conventions and reintroducing torture, and arbitrary and indefinite imprisonment, into advanced civilization. Where is the stability that Mandelbaum tells us has been provided by this American military and political deployment? The doomed and destructive war of choice in Iraq, continuing and mounting disorder in Afghanistan following another such war, war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, as well as between Hamas and Fatah, accompanied by continuing crisis in Palestine, with rumbles of new American wars of choice with Iran or Syria, and the emergence of a nuclear North Korea - all demonstrate deep international instability.

American efforts to deregulate the international economy and promote globalization, whatever its benefits, have been the most powerful force of political, economic, social, and cultural destabilization the world has known since World War II, providing what closely resembles that "constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation" forecast by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto.


Michael Mandelbaum's question about using military coalitions to contain American power seems spoken from another age. The utility of military coalitions is not what it used to be, as the United States has reason to know. No one today would rationally consider conventional war with the United States a useful (or feasible) response to American power, although North Korea and Iran (and undoubtedly others) have concluded that a nuclear deterrent to what is seen as the threat from the United States is a worthwhile investment.

The new American militarism, as Andrew Bacevich calls it, encourages reliance on obsolete notions about power based on quantitative military advantage. Power now comes primarily from economic, financial, industrial, political, and cultural assets and influence, in all of which the United States is vulnerable. {7} If American international hegemony is considered a threat, there are political and economic ways for international society to check it, not to speak of unconventional forms of military resistance, which have been employed with success in Iraq, in Lebanon last summer, and, much earlier, in Vietnam.

War tends now to be driven by nationalism and religious or political ideology. Nationalism and communalism, the defense of a community's identity and autonomy, remain eminently powerful political forces, as in Vietnam three decades ago. The recent history of Lebanon, Iraq, Chechnya, the Palestinian intifadas, failed states, the memory of the Vietnam War, and the specter of rogue nations possessing nuclear weapons combine to make military interventions in the non-Western world an unattractive prospect.

Is there an alternative policy? At the time of George Kennan's death in 2005, much was made of the cold war policy of containment, of which he was the author, and its vindication by the collapse of the Soviet Union from inner decay, as he had foreseen. Not much was written about Kennan's general view of the nature of relations between states, which was in radical contrast with the policies and assumptions of the present US government and most of those concerned with foreign policy in Washington. Kennan's volume of autobiographical reflections, Around the Cragged Hill (Norton), published in 1993 when he was eighty-nine, contained his mature reflections on this subject, as well as his thoughts on American foreign policy.

He did not think that democracy along North American and Western European lines can prevail internationally. "To have real self-government, a people must understand what that means, want it, and be willing to sacrifice for it". Many nondemocratic systems are inherently unstable. "But so what?" he asked. "We are not their keepers. We never will be." (He did not say that we might one day try to be.) He suggested that nondemocratic societies should be left "to be governed or misgoverned as habit and tradition may dictate, asking of their governing cliques only that they observe, in their bilateral relations with us and with the remainder of the world community, the minimum standards of civilized diplomatic intercourse". {8}

With the cold war over, Kennan saw no need for the continuing presence of American troops in Europe, and little need for them in Asia, subject to the security interests of Japan, allied to the United States by treaty. He deplored economic and military programs that existed in "so great a profusion and complexity that they escape the normal possibilities for official, not to mention private oversight". He asked why the United States was [in 1992] giving military assistance to forty-three African countries and twenty-two (of twenty-four) countries in Latin America. "Against whom are these weapons conceivably to be employed? ... [Presumably] their neighbors or, in civil conflict, against themselves. Is it our business to prepare them for that?"


In the late 1950s, a colleague, the late Edmund Stillman, and I circulated an argument that eventually became a magazine article and book, suggesting that the American obsession with Soviet Communist power was turning the United States toward an American version of Marxist historicism and ideological messianism. We said that Washington had fallen under the influence of "the ideological politics of the Thirties and moral fervor of the second world war" in assuming that we and Soviet Russia were struggling, so to speak, for the soul of the world. {9}

We argued that quite the opposite was true. We said that common sense about the nature of Russia's and China's real interests suggested that time was not on their sides, and that Kennan's policy of containing the major Communist powers, until what Marx would have called their internal contradictions undermined them, was the correct one. The interest of China was mainly to weaken Soviet supremacy among the Communists. Russia itself was in material decline, its messianism faded. Western Europe, Japan, and other Asian nations were increasingly dynamic, and could be expected to reclaim their pre-war influence. The 1950s, we concluded, were already a time of plural power centers and multiple interests, a system in which international power and ambitions were increasingly expressed by independent state actors, a system in which the United States could flourish, but the Soviet Union, in the long term, could not. We ended by recommending patience.

This went against much thinking of the period. In retrospect, it is the loser's tale, describing a road not taken. It might seem of little interest now, if the direction actually followed had not proven so disastrous. It seems scarcely imaginable that the present administration could shift course away from the interventionist military and political policies of recent decades, let alone its own highly aggressive version of them since 2001, unless it were forced to do so by (eminently possible) disaster in the Middle East. Whether a new administration in two years' time might change direction seems the relevant question.

Yet little sign exists of a challenge in American foreign policy debates to the principles and assumptions of an international interventionism motivated by belief in a special national mission. The country might find itself with a new administration in 2009 which provides a less abrasive and more courteous version of the American pursuit of world hegemony, but one still condemned by the inherent impossibility of success.

The intellectual and material commitments made during the past half-century of American military, bureaucratic, and intellectual investment in global interventionism will be hard to reverse. The Washington political class remains largely convinced that the United States supplies the essential structure of international security, and that a withdrawal of American forces from their expanding network of overseas military bases, or disengagement from present American interventions into the affairs of many dozens of countries, would destabilize the international system and produce unacceptable consequences for American security. Why this should be so is rarely explained.

What is the threat that America keeps at bay? Neither China nor Russia directly threatens Western security interests, at least in the opinion of most governments other than the one in Washington. Obviously all the major nations have energy and resource needs and interests that intersect and conflict, but there is little reason to think that these and other foreseeable problems are not negotiable. Warmongering speculation of the kind one sometimes hears when American conservatives discuss China or Russia - not to speak of Iran - is a product of world-hegemonic thinking, and a disservice to true American interests.

America's so-called war against terrorism has not saved its allies from violence. The terrorist problem is generally seen in Europe as one of domestic social order and immigrant integration - a matter for political treatment and police precautions - related to a religious and political crisis inside contemporary Islamic culture that is unsusceptible to foreign remedy. Few leaders outside the United States, other than Tony Blair, consider the terrorist threat a global conspiracy of those "who hate freedom" - a puerile formulation - or think the existing militarized response to it a success. The positive results have been meager, and the negative consequences in relations with Muslim countries have been disastrous. The US approach has become perceived as a war against Islamic "nationalism" - a reaffirmation of cultural as well as political identity (and separatism) - which like most nationalisms has thrown up terrorist fighting organizations (as did another nationalism without a nation, Zionism, in its day).


The noninterventionist alternative to the policies followed in the United States since the 1950s is to minimize interference in other societies and accept the existence of an international system of plural and legitimate powers and interests. One would think the idea that nations are responsible for themselves, and that American military interference in their affairs is more likely to turn small problems into big ones than to solve them, would appeal to an American public that believes in individual responsibility and the autonomy of markets, considers itself hostile to political ideology (largely unaware of its own), and professes to be governed by constitutional order, pragmatism, and compromise.

A noninterventionist policy would shun ideology and emphasize pragmatic and empirical judgment of the interests and needs of this nation and of others, with reliance on diplomacy and analytical intelligence, giving particular attention to history, since nearly all serious problems between nations are recurrent or have important recurrent elements in them. The current crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine-Israel, and Iran are all colonial or postcolonial in nature, which is generally ignored in American political and press discussion.

Such a noninterventionist policy would rely primarily on trade and the market, rather than territorial control or military intimidation, to provide the resources and energy the United States needs. Political and diplomatic action would be the primary and essential instruments of international relations and persuasion; military action the last and worst one, evidence of political failure. Military deployments abroad would be reexamined with particular attention to whether they might actually be impediments to solutions of the conflicts of clients, or reinforce intransigence in the complex dynamics of relations among nations such as the two Koreas, China, Taiwan, and Japan, where lasting solutions can only be found in political settlements between principals.

Had a noninterventionist policy been followed in the 1960s, there would have been no American war in Indochina. The struggle there would have been recognized as nationalist in motivation, unsusceptible to solution by foreigners, and inherently limited in its international consequences, whatever they might be - as has proved to be the case. The United States would never have been defeated, its army demoralized, or its students radicalized. There would have been no American invasion of Cambodia, which precipitated the Khmer Rouge genocide. The tribal peoples of Laos would probably have been spared their ordeal.

The United States would not have suffered its catastrophic implication in what was essentially a domestic crisis in Iran in 1979, which still poisons Near and Middle Eastern affairs, since there would never have been the huge and provocative American investment in the Shah's regime as American "gendarme" in the region, compromising the Shah and contributing to the fundamentalist backlash against his secularizing modernization.

Without entering further into what rapidly would become an otiose discussion of the "mights" or "might nots" of the last half-century, one can certainly argue that a noninterventionist United States would not be at war in Iraq today. While obviously concerned about the free flow of Middle Eastern oil, Washington would have assumed that the oil-using states bought their oil on the market and that oil producers had to sell, having nothing else they can do with their oil, and that politically motivated interference in the market by the oil producers would in the mid- and long term fail, as happened after the OPEC oil price rise of 1973.

Israel, with its conventional and unconventional arms, is capable of assuring its own defense against external aggression, if newly aware of the limits of its ability to combat irregular forces. It cannot expect total security without political resolution of the Palestinian question, a problem only it can solve, by withdrawing from the territories to some negotiated approximation of the 1967 border. International engagement would undoubtedly be necessary to a solution, and would willingly be supplied. Forty years of American involvement have unfortunately served mainly to allow the Israelis to avoid facing facts, contributing to radicalization in Islamic society.

Washington might reasonably have considered people who are victims of domestic despots, such as the Iraqis before 2003, as responsible for their own solutions, and usually capable of their own revolutions - if they really wanted revolution. No foreign power occupied Iraq, imposing Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. The current Iraqi insurgencies against military occupation and an American-imposed government, accompanied by mounting sectarian conflict, now tie down the quasi totality of available American ground forces. "Regime change" is better left to the people whose regime it is, who know what they want, and who will benefit from or suffer the consequences of change.


A hard-headed doctrine concerning the responsibilities of people themselves may seem unacceptable when the CNN audience witnesses mass murder in Darfur, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. However an interventionist foreign policy in which the US aggressively interferes in other states in order to shape their affairs according to American interest or ideology is not the same as responding to atrocious public crimes.

The latter may be relatively simple to deal with, as in the case of Charles Taylor, onetime president of Liberia, responsible for several rapacious and exceptionally bloody West African conflicts, now being tried for war crimes in The Hague. The adroit British intervention that ended civil chaos and conflict in Sierra Leone was a public service, as was the pacification of Liberia.

There are limits to the feasibility of humanitarian intervention. It can create its own problems, as nongovernmental groups now acknowledge. Their and UN efforts to feed and support refugees can facilitate aggression by taking the victims off the aggressor's hands, as happened in the initial Yugoslav intervention, where the Security Council limited the UN force to "protection" of civilians while a war of sectarian and territorial aggression was going on. {10} Eventual military intervention produced the Dayton agreement, which nonetheless left Kosovo and the explosive problem of the Albanian regional diaspora unsettled.

Humanitarian crises are often the current manifestation of intractable historical grievances, as in the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda, where the Tutsi, Hamitic cattle-raising people who migrated to the Lake Kivu area some four centuries ago, presumably from Ethiopia, had imposed a form of monarchical and aristocratic rule on the Bantu-speaking Hutus, despite the latter's much greater numbers. German and Belgian colonial authorities left this system as they found it, and it persisted until independence in the 1960s, when the Hutus' bid for democratic power launched the conflicts that followed, culminating in the genocidal upheaval of 1994 against the Tutsis that ended with them once again in power.

Such crises are often intensified by material developments, like the droughts in recent years in the semi-arid Sahel, the geographical and climactic zone running from Senegal to Ethiopia that separates the coastal deserts of Africa from the savannah to the south. Its occupants have mainly been nomadic pastoral peoples identified as Arabs, distinct from the black peasant cultivators of the more fertile south. Arable land has been reduced, producing conflict, population movement, and political unrest in fragile states. The Darfur victims are refugees from political conflict inside Sudan, and their plight has spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic, and threatens trouble elsewhere.

This is not, obviously, a situation susceptible to solution by foreign military intervention. However the US Army is pressing for a new Africa Command, possibly based in Djibouti, with "forward-based troops" ready to deal with Africa's "emergence ... as a strategic reality" (as Marine General James Jones, departing commander of US forces in Europe, said in December). The 2004 US National Security Strategy declaration identifies "failed states" in Africa as well as "rogue states" as threats to American interests.

US support of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, which overturned Islamist rule in that "failed state", together with demands in the US and Europe for military intervention against the Muslim "Arab" tormentors of the Darfur refugees, suggest that in government circles as well as the public mind, the African humanitarian crisis is beginning to be confused with or assimilated to the larger US "war on terror". This is a profound error, and risks setting the United States on a course of endless and fruitless military interventions against Africa's miseries - a "long war" indeed.

Nuclear weapons proliferation, since North Korea's recent nuclear claims, is now more than ever an American preoccupation. In North Korea and elsewhere, the most important incentive for obtaining nuclear weapons is to deter American (or in Iran's case, Israeli) military intervention. The advantage provided by possession of such weapons is intimidation of neighboring states and inhibition of foreign interference. On the other hand, as Iran is finding out, the effort to obtain nuclear weapons may invite a precautionary foreign attack, so the choice of proliferation presents its own risks.

In Washington, Iranian possession of nuclear weapons is usually described as a threat to Israel, or to American bases or interests in the region, or even to Europe. Given the ability of all of these governments to retaliate conventionally as well as by nuclear means, it seems implausible or even unreasonable that Iran would initiate such an attack, or even imagine that there would be something to gain from doing so.

The possession of nuclear weapons provides mainly symbolic power, since their actual use implies unforeseeable and uncontrollable consequences, while this same uncertainty contributes to their deterrence effect. Building and testing a nuclear weapon makes a country ostensibly more important, or a more notorious and more feared actor on the international and regional stage, but the positive exploitation of nuclear status, even for purposes of blackmail, is not easy.

The nuclear threat is not automatically a credible one since its execution would be so disproportionate to any easily imagined provocation. Whatever the motive, a nuclear attack against a nonnuclear state with no means for deterrence or retaliation would provoke enormous international uproar and anxiety, invite intervention by one (or all) of the old nuclear states as well as by the UN and other international organizations, bring intense international opprobrium upon the state making use of the nuclear weapon - and of course inspire any other government in the region that thought itself potentially threatened to go after its own nuclear deterrent.

Would, for example, either the United States or Israel really gain by using nuclear penetration weapons against Iran's nuclear installations, breaking the nuclear truce that has lasted since Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Would this not add to the incentives that Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, perhaps states in the Persian Gulf, and certain countries in the Far East already may feel to seek nuclear deterrents? And would it not give the Europeans reason seriously to reconsider their own situation?

As the last sixty years of nuclear strategy studies suggest, the value of these weapons for any purpose other than deterrence seems slight. Their utility for coercion or blackmail seems very doubtful when not linked to a secure second-strike capability to deter retaliation, of the kind possessed by the cold war nuclear states, and this is beyond the means of the countries now considered candidates for nuclear status. {11}


History does not offer nations permanent security, and when it seems to offer hegemonic domination this usually is only to take it away again, often in unpleasant ways. The United States was fortunate to enjoy relative isolation for as long as it did. The conviction of Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the country was exempt from the common fate has been succeeded in the twenty-first century by an American determination to fight (to "victory", as the President insists) against the conditions of existence history now actually does offer. It sets against them the consoling illusion that power will always prevail, despite the evidence that this is not true.

Schumpeter remarked in 19