The Inference of Fraud
What is not given but must be taken?
False Flag Operations
by David M Shapiro
CUNY Academic Commons (October 31 2009)
My favorite topic since 9/11 is the financial crisis. Some outstanding issues that I've yet to see credibly addressed by US leaders are the following:
1. Why did none of the financial institutions that allegedly needed (and actually received) TARP funds beginning in the Fall of 2008 not warn their shareholders of their precarious financial positions in prior public filings (for example, Forms 10-K / 10-Q)?
2. If senior management and the boards of directors of these financial institutions were genuinely caught short and did not possess actual knowledge of the precarious financial positions of the financial institutions under their stewardship, did they possess constructive knowledge (that is, they could have and should have known of the precarious financial condition)?
3. If they neither could have nor should known about the precariousness of the financial conditions of the financial institutions under their stewardship, how relevant and reliable were the accounting information systems of these financial institutions?
4. If the precariousness of the financial conditions was neither forecast nor capable of forecast (for example, the perfect storm), why did some entities (for example, hedge funds) take significant positions (for example, credit default swap protection from loss of value of Lehman Brothers debt) from which they benefited enormously after the public dissemination of the precariousness of the financial positions of the financial institutions was exploited by politicians (for example, US Congress), administrators (for example, US Treasury Secretary), and regulators (for example, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) to bail-out financial institutions' creditors?
5. If the financial institutions and the ultimate beneficiaries of the bail-outs (for example, financial institutions' creditors) were indeed 'too big to fail', why haven't the individuals responsible for creating the bail-outs acted forthwith to correct such bigness and systemic risk?
6. If the financial institutions (and their creditors) have largely recovered as a result of the bail-outs, why hasn't the US economy created more jobs?
7. If the financial institutions' responsibility is neither job creation in the US nor development of projects promoting the general welfare of the US, why were they so important that they had to be rescued by US taxpayers?
The US taxpayers will support a bipartisan group (that is, the so-called Angelides Commission) to investigate the financial crisis. Some hope for a Pecora Commission redux. What are the odds that it will more closely resemble a 9/11 Commission redux?
http://dshapiro32.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2009/10/31/false-flag-operations/
Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html
False Flag Operations
by David M Shapiro
CUNY Academic Commons (October 31 2009)
My favorite topic since 9/11 is the financial crisis. Some outstanding issues that I've yet to see credibly addressed by US leaders are the following:
1. Why did none of the financial institutions that allegedly needed (and actually received) TARP funds beginning in the Fall of 2008 not warn their shareholders of their precarious financial positions in prior public filings (for example, Forms 10-K / 10-Q)?
2. If senior management and the boards of directors of these financial institutions were genuinely caught short and did not possess actual knowledge of the precarious financial positions of the financial institutions under their stewardship, did they possess constructive knowledge (that is, they could have and should have known of the precarious financial condition)?
3. If they neither could have nor should known about the precariousness of the financial conditions of the financial institutions under their stewardship, how relevant and reliable were the accounting information systems of these financial institutions?
4. If the precariousness of the financial conditions was neither forecast nor capable of forecast (for example, the perfect storm), why did some entities (for example, hedge funds) take significant positions (for example, credit default swap protection from loss of value of Lehman Brothers debt) from which they benefited enormously after the public dissemination of the precariousness of the financial positions of the financial institutions was exploited by politicians (for example, US Congress), administrators (for example, US Treasury Secretary), and regulators (for example, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) to bail-out financial institutions' creditors?
5. If the financial institutions and the ultimate beneficiaries of the bail-outs (for example, financial institutions' creditors) were indeed 'too big to fail', why haven't the individuals responsible for creating the bail-outs acted forthwith to correct such bigness and systemic risk?
6. If the financial institutions (and their creditors) have largely recovered as a result of the bail-outs, why hasn't the US economy created more jobs?
7. If the financial institutions' responsibility is neither job creation in the US nor development of projects promoting the general welfare of the US, why were they so important that they had to be rescued by US taxpayers?
The US taxpayers will support a bipartisan group (that is, the so-called Angelides Commission) to investigate the financial crisis. Some hope for a Pecora Commission redux. What are the odds that it will more closely resemble a 9/11 Commission redux?
http://dshapiro32.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2009/10/31/false-flag-operations/
Bill Totten http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/index.html
posted by Bill Totten at
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